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ABSTRACT 
India's Policy Towards Southeast Asia is very old. India's liberation struggle 
was a great source of constant inspiration to Southeast Asian countries. They were 
indebted to India for setting in move decolonization through her unique style of 
struggle against European imperialism. India felt that its struggle for freedom would 
definitely strengthen India's position in the regional as well as global sphere provided 
both move in the same direction of friendly terms. Nehru was also not to bind himself 
in the domestic politics of India only, but abroad to put his idealism in greater and 
broader sphere for which Southeast Asia would only be a launching pad. India had 
earned tremendous good will of the countries of this region not only because of her 
own liberation struggle, but also because of its support to liberation movements all 
over the World. 
The first step in the direction of spreading knowledge about Southeast Asia 
was taken with the establishment of Greater Indian Society in Calcutta in 1926. 
This was the first scholarly attempt by Indians themselves towards rehabilitating 
their ancient history of cultural expansions in Java and other islands across the 
Bay of Bengal. With India's freedom was linked the freedom of Burma, Malaya, 
Indonesia, and Indochina. At the Brussels Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru, Secretary-
General of the Indian National Congress had an opportunity to meet among others, 
the Indonesian and Indochinese delegates. He evinced keen interest especially in 
the Indonesian representatives, in understanding the Indonesian people, their 
names, their religion and culture. 
These early contacts, at later stages, rendered the freedom struggles in 
India and Southeast Asia mutually complementary. With Nehru having been 
greatly influenced by the deliberations at the Brussels Congress, the attitude of the 
Indian National Congress towards foreign policy issues, particularly those relating 
to the freedom struggles in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in Asia, had grown quite 
assertive. 
The enormous fund of goodwill as bequeathed by a long history of 
commercial interaction provided a sound basis for evolving a new Southeast Asia 
policy. As compared to China, another major Asian power, having centuries old 
relationship with the eountries of the region, hidia had a decisive advantage. It could 
start with a clean state, since with only one exception in the eleventh century, India 
had no record of imperialistic ventures in the area. India's relations with Southeast 
Asia had all along been based on peace and harmony. If the basis of this relationship 
in the past was provided by cultural exchange, the core content of it for the present 
was bound to be trade and commerce. It also required a deeper understanding of the 
forces at work in the region and the rest of Asia, such as those of nationalism 
asserting to break the chains of colonial slavery and emerging as independent political 
entities on the World scene. 
Different terminologies were used by different people of different countries. 
For example the early Indian navigators and merchants identified the region by names 
as Suvemadvipa (Island of Gold). Suvemabhumi or Kanakapuri (land or city of gold) 
variably referred to Burma, Malaya and Sumatra. 
Geographically, the present Southeast Asia is divided into two parts, 
Continental Southeast Asia comprising Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, 
and Malaysia. And insular Southeast Asia comprising the island republics of 
Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia. In the 19* century continental Southeast 
Asia became the arena of confrontation between the British and French colonialism. 
Since the 18"^  century insular Southeast Asia was the scene of British and Dutch 
colonialism they were the three "super-powers" playing their game of power politics 
of the 19'*' century in Southeast Asia later on joined by the Americans, the latecomers 
to the Southeast Asian stage. 
The term Southeast Asia is of recent origin. It gained currency as 
political entity only during World War II when the territories, the South of tropics 
were placed under Lord Mountbatten's Southeast Asia command to repulse the 
Japanese forces from the region. Thus the region owes initially its first perception to 
the strategic requirements of external powers. The region became more significant 
after the end of World War II because of its strategic location. The region consists of 
a vast stretch of land in the East of India, South of China and in the North of 
Australia. It lies between pacific and Indian Ocean and China Sea and serves as a 
bridge connecting the Southeast Asian countries on one side and Australia and New 
Zealand on the others. 
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A substantial input into India's relations with Southeast Asia came from the 
establishment and operation of the Indian National Army (INA) towards the end of 
the Second World War. Inspired by the speeches of Subhash Chandra Bose, many 
overseas Indians in Southeast Asia (especially in Thailand, Malaya, Singapore and 
Burma) joined the INA and also offered considerable financial support. For the first 
time, Indian communities in the region came to have a closer feeling of belonging to 
one mother country. 
On the eve of India's freedom from British colonialism, all factors, such as 
history, geo-politics, strategic security environment, vast economic potential of the 
area, pointed to the necessity of a new thinking and a new approach to the region. The 
enormous fund of goodwill as bequeathed by a long history of commercial interaction 
provided a sound basis for evolving a new Southeast Asian policy. India's relations 
with Southeast Asia had all along been based on peace and harmony with virtually no 
discordant note in the era of harmony. If the basis of this relationship in the past was 
provided by cultural exchange, the core content of it for the present was bound to be 
trade and commerce. 
Since the region lies in the close proximity of India and China, both the 
countries have influenced Southeast Asian political and cultural life to a great extent. 
India's cultural relations with these countries date back in BC era. But the known 
history of first Indian kingdom began in second century A.D. The oldest and best 
known kingdom founded by Indians known as Funan, the predecessor of Cambodia 
and Champa (present Vietnam). 
The economic relations with Southeast Asia formed an important component 
of India's overall pattern of economic transactions with the outside world. A pattern 
of interdependence based on mutual needs of different primary commodities with 
which India and the various countries of Southeast Asia were endowed, coupled with 
easy access to each other markets formed the bedrock on which this super structure of 
economic relations was constructed. Immediately after Indian independence, the 
Southeast Asian region, taken as a whole, ranked third, after the United Kingdom and 
the United States, in terms of India's foreign trade. 
It is because of strategic, economic and political significance of the region that 
it was made a theater of "cold war" and the integrity, independence and security of the 
region was threatened. As politically India had established democratic, and socialist 
institutions, the development of these institutions depended, to some extent on the 
political development in Southeast Asia. Whatever India's plans to develop, it could 
do, only when favourable conditions prevailed in India's surroundings. 
India has vital stakes in Southeast Asia whose independence and security are 
bound up with her own. Jawaharlal Nehru pointed out, "India was the gate way to 
both West and Southeast Asia and therefore, inevitably came into the picture". The 
independence and security of Southeast Asian countries served to strengthen India's 
own independence and security and any serious set back in these countries constituted 
a potential threat to India too. India's approach towards Southeast Asia was marked 
by two basic postulates. One, colonialism must go and that all vestiges of imperial 
rule must be liquidated. Second, no big or medium power should try to or be allowed 
to dominate the area in the name of filling the vacuum. 
There was yet another dimensions to India's relation with Southeast Asia-the 
presence of Indian communities in sizeable numbers in the region. There was a large 
concentration in Malaysia: merchants, traders and labour prepared by the British 
during its imperial rule over India as well as in many other parts of the region, there 
was a some what smaller, but not insignificant, presence in Singapore, Thailand and 
the Philippines. 
India's relation with countries of Southeast Asia viz., Burma, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam Laos and Cambodia are to 
be viewed in the content of her overall foreign policy and her relations with the big 
powers. The importance of India relations with the Countries of Southeast Asia lies in 
the fact that her role in the Southeast Asia largely influences policies of the major 
powers towards her. The existence of close cultural bond between India and the 
countries of Southeast Asia also contributed to closer relations between India and 
countries of the region. India has also maintained intimate relations with Burma 
(Myanmar) since earliest times. Burma fall under the influence of Buddhism, which 
still continues to be a dominant element in Burma's social life. 
Independent Itidia's foreign policy was largely formulated by Jawaharlal 
Nehru. He was first Prime Minister and also the Foreign Minister of the country. The 
basic idea that dominated Nehru's mind in the field of foreign policy was that the 
United States of America and the Soviet Union, both have emerged as the prime move 
of contemporary history. Nehru did not seem to regard China in any way different 
from India in terms of actual power to influence history. Nehru inspired to develop 
multi-sided relations with Asian and African countries in General and with China in 
particular on the basis of Panchsheel Nehru professed to stand whole-heartedly for a 
link offerees of peace, independence and democracy. 
The post second World war period witnessed the liquidation of colonialism in 
most of the Asian countries. The Western imperialists who managed to keep these 
colonies under their sv^ay by following the policy of 'divide and rule' for centuries 
followed the policy of cither 'combine and go' or 'break and leave' in the process of 
granting independence to the colonies. For example, India, the former British colony 
was divided into two separate entities of Union territory of India and Pakistan and 
independence was granted. Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak got their independence 
through merger with tlie Malaya Union, which got independence earlier in 1957. In 
the wake of partition Oi" combination and independence, these colonies were left to 
face the social, economic and political dislocation, which resulted in the 
encroachment upon territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighboring countries. The 
sudden exposure to the international politics, with a free hand to handle their foreign 
policies, the competition over filling up the vacuum created by the extinct of 
imperialists among the former colonies drove these states either to form one group 
against another or to join the already existing power blocs. 
The year 1945 fnarked a dramatic climax in Indonesia's freedom movement. 
Immediately after the surrender of the Japanese to the allied forces, Indonesian 
independence was proclaimed on 17*'' August 1945 by Sukarno and Hatta and the 
republic of Indonesia was established with the former as the president and the latter as 
Vice-president. But the Dutch government was in no mood to relinquish its control 
over Indonesia. In ordef to help the Dutch government in its endeavor to re-impose its 
rule, the British government signed a civil administration Agreement which revealed 
tne rea'l mtentions o! tVie tDhuni^ ") puwia^ iTi "iiititjntard. 
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Although India herself was under alien rule, she was keenly interested in the 
developments taking place in the neighboring countries particularly Indonesia. India's 
immediate reaction was to express its concern over the attempts of the colonial 
powers to re-subjugate the people of Southeast Asia through a resolution passed by 
the Indian National Congress at its Bombay Session in September 1945. The 
resolution further stated that the continuation of imperialism in any guise or form was 
a violation of U.N. Charter. 
India's Anti colonial policy further got crystallized when the Dutch launched 
their military attack on the republic of Indonesia on July 20, 1947. Nehru criticized it 
strongly and observed that the Dutch military action had "shocked not only the so 
called liberal elements in other countries but even those who normally would not be in 
sympathy with colonial people". 
While the Indonesian question was being considered at the U.N., Nehru also 
convened a Conference of 18 Asian Nations at New Delhi to discuss it on 20'*" January 
1949. Naturally, the Indonesian leaders hailed this step as "The most encouraging 
manifestation of international concern" whereas the Dutch government was stunned 
when it heard the news of Nehru convening a Conference to discuss the "internal 
affairs of another country". No doubt India under the leadership of Nehru played a 
pioneering role in Indonesia's freedom struggle between 1945-49. 
After the Bandung Conference of 1955 the friendship between India and 
Indonesia were strengthened. President Sukarno and Nehru were instrumental in 
successfully holding the Conference, India and Indonesia consulted each other often 
and informally on major World and Asian issues. They usually adopted a similar 
attitude at various conferences. 
Although Indonesia did not take side on the Kashmir question. Indonesia's 
friendship with India gave a fillip to India to maintain equilibrium in its relations with 
the Muslim countries of West Asia. Both countries followed a policy of nonalignment 
and adhered to the Principles of Panchsheel. 
Indonesia claimed sovereignty over West Asian (Dutch New Guinea) and 
India consistently supported Indonesia's claim at the Bogor Conference, the Bandung 
Conference and the United Nations. Nehru said in the Rajya Sabha on 12'*' December 
1957 that the Indonesian claim to West Iran was "right and legitimate". 
Military cooperation between the two countries was also very close. A large 
number of Indonesian officers were trained in India. India and Indonesia signed an 
agreement on 4' December 1958 ensuring closer cooperation between their navies. A 
similar agreement between the air forces of the two countries was signed in February 
1956. 
In the wake of the Cultural Revolution in China, there was an increase in the 
activities of the Communist in the countries of Southeast Asia. This encouraged the 
non-communist countries to come closer. The ouster of Sukarno in Indonesia and end 
of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia paved the way for greater co-
operation among the countries of the region. This also paved the way for 
improvement of India's relations with these countries. However, her relations with 
North Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma continued to be formal. No doubt the countries 
of Southeast Asia attached more importance to their relations with China and Japan, 
but they could not ignore India on account of her close relations with the USSR. 
Certain developments that showed president Sukarno's inclination to end his 
country's policy of confrontation with Malaya evoked a sense of relief in India. The 
joint statement issued at the conclusion of the Sukarno-Tunku Abdul Rahman talks in 
Tokyo on 30'*" May - T' June 1963, showed the two leaders agreement to end 
"acrimonious attacks and dispersing references to each other" and also " reaffirmed 
their faith in the Treaty of Friendship between Indonesia and Malaya in 1959". In 
India it was seen as conducive to easing tensions between the two countries. A few 
days later, the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines met in 
Manila (7"" - ll"" June 1963) and agreed to take "Initial steps towards the 
establishment of Maphilindo" as based on the principle of common "tics of race and 
culture". Both Indonesia and the Philippines assured Malaya that " they would 
welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo 
territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority the Secretary-
General of the United Nations or his representative". This was quite encouraging 
development. The three countries seemed to be inclined to resolve their mutual 
disputes and join together in ensuring peace and stability in the region. 
India, whose interest lay in the promotion of friendship, peace and stability in the 
region was expected to welcome the Maphilindo scheme. 
On the close of World War II, Malaya was put under a military form of Government 
by the British. A number of Indians were prosecuted for pro-Japanese activities. The 
old office of the Agent of the Indian Government, which had been closed on the 
arrival of the Japanese occupation, again commenced functioning in September 1945. 
In 1946, Nehru proceeded to Malaya and his visit was very beneficial as he was able 
to achieve much for the Indian community, especially in the establishment of a Trust, 
it was as a result of his efforts that many Indians who had been arrested for 
collaboration with the Japanese were released. In so far as India was concerned, the 
Malayan leaders were convinced of her lead in the ways of peace and mutual good 
will. 
The emergence of the Federation of Malaya, which is now known as Malaysia 
as a sovereign state on 31 August 1957 was widely acclaimed in India. The 
government of India always showed keen interest in the constitutional advancement 
of Malaysia and Singapore. On the occasion when Malaya joined United Nations 
India expressed happiness at her becoming a member of the United Nations in the 12* 
Session of UN Genera! Assembly. 
India approved Malaysia's membership of the Common Wealth and its acceptance of 
a military alliance with Britain. There was all-round cooperation between the two 
nations. Soon after attaining independence, Malaysia faced an acute shortage of 
trained personnel. India assisted Malaysia in this respect. The Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman said with a feeling of pride that Indians in his 
country were playing an active part in moulding the Malaysian national. 
The birth of independent Malaysia included Singapore spurred the growth of a more 
meaningful relations with India. Both Malaysia and Singapore had unreservedly and 
Unmistakably supported India against China during the border war. 
Subsequently, viewing the Federation of Malaysia as a stabilizing factor in 
Southeast Asia, India tended to ignore the susceptibilities of the ruling elite group in 
Indonesia and continued to pursue pro-Malaysian policy. This became more than 
evident when, at the preparatory meeting of the second Afro-Asian Conference in 
Jakarta in April 1964, the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Swaran Singh, linked 
the question of Malaysia with the very prospects of the second Afro-Asian 
Conference coming off at all. India also ignored the anti-Indian sentiment growing in 
Indonesia as a result of it. India also offered active moral and diplomatic support to 
Malaysia in getting a non-permanent seat at the Security Council of the United 
Nations. 
Another important issue that fitted well into Prime Minister Nehru's Southeast 
Asia policy was the Vietnamese struggle for freedom from French colonialism. 
Keeping in view India's all-out support to the Indonesian nationalists in their fight 
against the Dutch, it was very much expected that the Vietnamese freedom movement 
would likewise attract India's attention and active involvement. However, India's 
effoit in this direction lacked the same enthusiasm. 
Nehru's enthusiasm was probably restrained by the fact that the Vietnamese 
nationalist struggle was dominated by the communist leadership. Nehru's 
Government aversion to communist violence (as in India) was well known. This was 
particularly so where the local communist rose against the nationalist leaderships 
fighting for freedom from colonialism. Within India, the government had crushed the 
Telangana uprising with an Iron hand. 
French dilatory tactics on the question of transfer of its authority on the small 
colonial pockets to India was another likely reason that prompted the Nehru 
government to be less enthusiastic to the Vietnamese question. These Indian 
territories were used by France for refueling and other facilities for its colonial war in 
Indochina. 
India's hesitation and circumspection as regards developments in Indochina 
continued until 1954, when it perceived a qualitative change in the international 
environment. As for as the concerned of the superpowers, the United States, was 
committing itself lo giving military and economic assistance to France to enable it to 
carry on its colonial war in Indochina. By pursuing this policy, the Americans 
ostensibly aimed at checkmating the extension of communism, as also Chinese 
influence in neighboring Laos and Cambodia and then in other countries of the region. 
On other hand, China and the Soviet Union were committed to help, preserve and 
consolidate the gains achieved by the Vietnamese communist leadership. 
A significant development in the field of international politics, at this stage, 
promoted Prime Minister Nehru to shed his earlier hesitation and take an initiative 
with regards to the deteriorating situation in Indochina. 
India's attitudes toward, and participation in, the freedom movements of 
neighboring countries must be seen against the backdrop of these domestic 
difficulties. In the midst of such exciting, exulting, and anxious moments in the 
country's history, Nehru did not lose his Asia perspective. Despite its own problems, 
India reacted to the distressing developments elsewhere in Asia, particularly in 
Indonesia and Indochina. 
India's formal defacto recognition of the republic of Vietnam was preceded by 
a steady improvement of relations between the two countries. The development was 
in sharp contrast to the situation in the previous year, when the Indian delegation to 
the ICC (International Control Commission) had been attacked by Government-
sponsored demonstrators in Saigon. On August 18, 1956, a trade delegation from 
South Vietnam, consisting of businessmen and Economic Experts under the 
leadership of Nguyen Huu Chau, secretary of State to the Presidency of the Republic 
of Vietnam, visited India at the invitation of the Indian government. The delegation's 
aim was to resolve the misunderstanding of India about Vietnam and lay down the 
basis for a closer friendship between the two countries. 
The Indian Government responded positively to this change and agreed to 
open a Consulate-General of South Vietnam in New Delhi in February 1957. With 
North Vietnam, India was closer, both adopted non-alignment as the basis of their 
foreign policy. Nehru described that president Ho Chi Minh as a "great revolutionary 
and an almost legendary figure". 
India continued her policy of circumspection and noninterference in the affairs 
of Indochina until early 1954. Despite economic and military aid to the rival sides 
from Communist China on the one hand and the United States on the other. India's 
role in the settlement of Indochinese dispute and her detente with communist China 
marked the beginning of a more forward stance, described by Nehru as "positive 
dynamic neutralism. Nehru was certainly the most influential individual at the 
Colombo meeting, whose course he had predetermined four days before its formal 
opening on April 28, 1954 by announcing in the Indian parliament a Six point 
proposal for an Indochinese settlement, with certain modifications this plan formed 
the core of the Colombo recommendations to the Geneva Conference and ultimately 
the basis of the Geneva agreements. 
Nehru's proposals in essence asked all foreign powers to keep their hands off 
Indochina, whose independence peace and neutrality were to be guaranteed by the 
major powers through the United Nations. Nehru saw the Indochinese conflict "in its 
origin and essential character as a movement of resistance to colonialism", and 
wanted its solution to come about through direct negotiations between the colonial 
power concerned and the indigenous parties to the conflict. Nehru was essentially 
trying to apply the five principles of coexistence, which had formed the basis of the 
Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet. Behind his apparently simple plan of granting 
independence to the Indochinese states and guaranteeing it through a nonintervention 
agreement lay a shrewd and subtle policy of promoting the Indian national Interest of 
keeping China, the United States and France out of a region so close to India. Further, 
in proposing to bring the issue within the purview of the United Nations Indian 
participation. 
Under Nehru plan, the Geneva Conference could be by passed altogether or 
limited to France, the Associated states, and the Vietminh, the Colombo powers were 
anxious to avoid anything that might hinder the negotiations in Geneva and in fact, to 
do everything they could to assist the negotiators. Significantly enough, the Colombo 
conference communique did not mention the Anglo-American plan for collective 
defense for Southeast Asia, equally conspicuous was a lack of any specific reference 
to the Chinese threat to the region. On the contrary, the Colombo powers expressed 
themselves in favour of seating communist China in the United Nations. India was not 
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officially represented at the Geneva Conference, in fact, her presence was deemed 
undesirable by at least one major power. 
India's presence at Geneva was not only useful but in a sense also vital the 
Geneva Conference was unusual in that it was the first attended by both the United 
States and Communist China, whose representatives were however, not prepared to 
concede to each other even ordinary countries commonly demanded by decency if not 
protocol. There was a total absence of normal diplomatic relations among a number of 
countries presented at the Conference. 
Krishna Menon arrived at Geneva at a time when the Geneva Conference 
seemed to be making no headway. Closely connected with the Korean armistice talks 
and with the Colombo conference of April 1954, Menon was most intimately 
connected with Nehru's peace making efforts. 
The Geneva settlement on Indochina included three ceasefire agreements, 
eight unilateral declarations, and the final declaration of the Conference. In effect, the 
settlement recognized the independence of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam and the 
principle of Vietnamese unity. Vietnam was to be temporarily placed under two 
separate administrations. 
Finally, Indian participation at Geneva and in the ICC (International Control 
Commission) affected her policy perspectives that had been responsible for the 
abandonment of her earlier policy of nonintervention in Indochina affairs. India's 
initial intervention had been prompted by the policy objectives of averting exhalation 
of the conflict in a region geographically close to India, keeping Communist China 
and the Untied States from major intervention in Indochina and minimizing their 
influence in an area that Prime Minister Nehru hoped to add to his area of peace. In 
the mean time, however, Sino-Indian relations improved markedly, being placed on a 
new amicable footing by the Sino-Indian agreement over Tibet in April 1954 and by 
Nehru-Chou panchsheel declaration when Chou visited India in June, 1954. In the 
Hindi-Chini bhai bhai period that ensued, one of the twin policy aims that of checking 
the Communist advance in Indochina and Southeast Asia was assumed to have been 
successfully fulfilled. 
For at least two years after the Geneva Conference of 1954, India's relations 
with the D.R.V.(Democratic Republic of Vietnam) were far more cordial than with 
the government of South Vietnam. Whereas the DRV had subscribed to the final 
Declaration at Geneva and had in words and deeds largely demonstrated its 
willingness to implement the agreements, South Vietnam publicly avowed opposition 
to the agreement. As one of the principle negotiators at Geneva, as promoter of 
principles underlying the Indochinese settlement and finally, as custodian of the 
armistice agreements, India was most concerned about the implementation of the 
agreements. 
India played an active role in bringing peace in Indochina. It is true that it was 
not invited to the Geneva conference, but behind the scene activities of Krishna 
Menon in Geneva brought the parties closer to a settlement. The Geneva agreement 
provided for three ceasefire agreements in respect of the three states of Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos. 
To supervise and control the armistice agreements, three International 
Commissions for Supervision and Control were setup. They were composed of 
representatives of Canada, India and Poland, with India as Chairman. 
As envisaged by the Geneva Declaration, the general elections took place in 
Cambodia in September 1955 and in Laos in December 1955. But no elections could 
take place in Vietnam. 
Soon after the establishment of the SEATO, Nehru reiterated India's many 
objections to it with specific reference to the terms of the treaty. The whole approach 
of the treaty was not only a wrong approach but also a dangerous approach from the 
point of view of any Asian country. The Treaty converted a potential area of peace 
into 'an area of potential war'. Of course, India did not object to outside powers 
taking interest in Southeast Asia, but when vital decisions were taken, ignoring the 
vital parts of that area, there was something wrong in that procedure. Referring to the 
argument that China and Russia could not be trusted, Nehru observed that in the final 
analysis no country could trust the other. 
Apart from these many-sided objections, India was directly affected by the 
establishment of the SEATO because India came under the 'treaty area,' of the pact, 
as well as the fact that Pakistan was a member of it. Pai<istan was the only 'Colombo 
power' which participated in the Manila Conference and which also joined the 
organization. It was believed in India that the only reason for her joining the pact was 
her hostility towards India. 
At the end of 1954, India gave defacto recognition to North Vietnam (Similar 
recognition having been given to South Vietnam before) and Laos and established a 
special political mission in Cambodia. With Cambodia, India renewed her ancient ties 
of friendship and culture. Prime Minister Nehru visited Cambodia in November 1954. 
India recognized Cambodia and provided help to preserve its independence and 
integrity, established diplomatic relations and give her economic aid for development. 
The Cambodian government followed like India the policy of non-alignment and 
refused to accept the protection offered by the SEATO. 
India and Cambodia were anti colonial and denounced military alliances with 
either bloc, particularly SEATO. Both countries willingly accepted economic aid from 
the East and the West, and opened their doors to welcome dignitaries from the 
Western World as well as from the Communist countries on major international issues 
in the United Nations and elsewhere, where the choice lay between the communists 
and the "free World". 
During 1957 and 1958 Cambodia's disputes with Thailand and South Vietnam 
reached a critical level, leading to exchanges and a breach of diplomatic relations. 
India was apprehensive that these squabbles along Cambodia's borders might disturb 
the peace in Southeast Asia. From India's point of view, Cambodia's need for security 
had been met by the Panchsheel doctrine, which put Cambodia's relations with the 
DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and Communist China on a friendly footing. 
India did not have enough influence on Thailand or South Vietnam to help to resolve 
Cambodia's differences with them. 
Despite lack of special attention to Cambodia in Indian Policy and its inability 
to assist Cambodia in the latter's disputes with its neighbors, India's influence was 
still more significant than was China's in Cambodian official circles until 1959. 
Cambodia actually followed a neutral foreign policy, which were closer to Indian than 
to Chinese policy. India's support and friendship on certain issues were taken for 
14 
granted, and Norodom Sihanouk continued to acknowledge Nehru's superior stature 
among the non-aligned nations as well as in overall World affairs. 
In fact, in the late fifties and early sixties, tension in the super power relations 
and the resulting deterioration in the international situation, more than any other thing, 
came to attract Nehru's attention. The level of Political, economic and cultural 
relations with the Southeast Asian countries stagnated and ever showed a downward 
trend. At the first Conference of heads of state and government of non-aligned 
countries in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) in September 1961. Nehru sought priority for 
World peace through super power negotiations. Seeking priority for World peace 
conflicted sharply with the Indonesian president Sukarno's emphasis on elimination 
of colonialism and imperialism from the World. The publically expressed divergence 
of the World view held by the two leaders at the Belgrade Conference ultimately led 
to a loss of personal rapport between them and put India in a collision course with 
Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia. 
India's role in the Laotian crises of 1963 and 1964 best indicates the 
diminished importance of India in World affairs. In 1960-61, when the ICC was not 
even functioning in Laos, Nehru's good offices had been eagerly sought by the East 
and the West in trying to extinguish the flames of War in Laos. But in 1963-64, 
despite ICC's existence under India's chairmanship India figured little in the 
peacemaking efforts. 
India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962 exposed her economic and 
military weakness, which greatly undermined her prestige. The setback received by 
India during the Sino-Indian war and her tilt towards the Western countries created a 
feeling among countries of Southeast Asia that this may lead to greater interference 
by the Western countries in the Asian affairs. The Pro-West countries of Southeast 
Asia tried to utilize this opportunity to build a broad alliance against China with 
Indian Collaboration. The non-aligned countries were reluctant to develop close 
relations with India at the cost of straining their relations with China, which emerged 
as a mighty Asian power. Soviet Union, however, showed greater understanding of 
the Indian problem. In short as a result of these developments a sort of stalemate was 
created in India's relations with countries of Southeast Asia. 
India's relations with the countries of Southeast Asia entered a new phase 
after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. During the war Indonesia extended wholehearted 
support to Pakistan and described India as an aggressor. North Vietnam and 
Cambodia also criticized India, largely because of her failure to take a firm stand 
against the U.S. aggression. Malaysia, however, maintained neutrality. However, the 
victory scored by India over Pakistan restored her lost prestige in Southeast Asia. The 
Indonesian policy towards India underwent a change following coup of 1965. The 
new leadership abandoned pro-Peking and pro-Pakistan posture and showed 
eagerness to normalize relation with India. 
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PREFACE 
India's link with Southeast Asia reached back into history and 
legend. All over Southeast Asia one finds numerous symbols of these 
ancient ties. Indian philosophy, culture, religion. Buddhism art, 
architecture and language, all these left an abiding impact on many 
countries of Southeast Asia. Indeed Indian and Chinese cultural 
influences met in the outer reaches of Southeast Asia, therefore India's 
relations with Southeast Asia are of abiding importance to her. Next to 
South Asia, India has vital stakes in Southeast Asia whose independence 
and security are bound up with her own. As Jawaharlal Nehru pointed 
out, India was the gateway to both West and Southeast Asia and 
therefore, inevitably came into the picture. The independence and 
security of Southeast Asia served to strengthen India's own independence 
and security and any serious set back, there constituted a potential threat 
to India's too. It was with this understanding that the region occupied a 
central place in India's Foreign Policy perspectives and consideration. 
The Central theme of my thesis is to survey and analyse India's Policy 
Towards Southeast Asia: A Study of Nehru Era. 
The thesis consist of five chapters and the conclusion. 
The first chapter of the thesis deals with historical, political, 
economic and strategic importance of Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia's 
importance to India in terms of its foreign policy objectives and its 
strategic interests that India has, for the security environment of 
Southeast Asia is based on its broad foreign policy frame work. 
The second chapter refers to India's policy towards Southeast Asia 
during post independence era. Nehru's significant role during the Dutch 
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Police Actions against Indonesia and Eigiiteen Asian nations C'onference 
compelled Nehru to support Indonesia, this aspect has been dealt with 
details. 
The third chapter takes into account India's policy towards 
Southeast Asia during 1951-56. In this chapter India's role towards 
Geneva Conference for the settlement of Indochina crisis has been 
discussed in detail. And also may objections to SEATO have been 
examined. 
The fourth chapter provides an insight into the emergence of 
Malaysia and two Vietnams. India took keen interest in the constitutional 
advancement of Malaysia and Singapore. When Malaya joined United 
Nations, India expressed her happiness, India's formal defacto 
recognition of the Republic of Vietnam is the subject of discussion and 
also the role of ICC (International Control Commission). 
The fifth chapter provides an analysis of Chinese aggression and its 
impact on India's foreign and defence policy. The impact of aggression 
on India's neighbouring states of Southeast Asia has also been discussed 
in details. 
The study has made use of all the available official documents on 
the subject. I have also utilize Indian and other Southeast Asian Articles, 
Newspapers, books and other publications in my thesis. 
The methodology adopted is primarily analytical, it has become 
historical wherever historical perspective was necessary for a right and 
logical perception. 
V 
CHAPTER-1 
Introduction 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
India has over two thousand years of mutually beneficial and cultural 
relations with the countries and people of Southeast Asia. The vague 
memories flowed from centuries of interaction from the relationships 
established through Indian immigrants to these lands across the Bay of 
Bengal. 
The first step in the direction of spreading knowledge about Southeast 
Asia was taken with the establishment of Greater Indian Society in Calcutta 
in 1926. This was the first scholarly attempt by Indians themselves towards 
rehabilitating their ancient history of cultural expansions in Java and other 
islands across the Bay of Bengal. With India's freedom was linked the 
freedom of Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina. At the Brussels 
Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru, Secretary-General of the Indian National 
Congress had an opportunity to meet, among others, the Indonesian and 
Indochinese delegates. He evinced keen interest especially in the Indonesian 
representatives, in understanding the Indonesian people, their names, their 
religion and culture. 
These early contacts, at later stages, rendered the freedom struggles in 
India and Southeast Asia mutually complementary. With Nehru having been 
greatly influenced by the deliberations at the Brussels Congress, the attitude 
of the Indian National Congress towards foreign policy issues, particularly 
those relating to the freedom struggles in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in 
Asia, had grown quite assertive. A substantial input into India's relations 
with Southeast Asia came from the establishment and operation of the Indian 
National Army towards the end of the Second World War. Inspired by the 
speeches of Subhash Chandra Bose, many overseas Indians in Southeast Asia 
(especially in Thailand, Malaya, Singapore and Burma) joined the INA (Indian 
National Army) and also offered considerable financial support. For the first 
time, Indian communities in the region came to have a closer feeling of 
belonging to one mother country. 
On the eve of India's freedom from British colonialism, all factors, such 
as history, geo-politics, strategic security environment vast economic potential 
of the area, pointed to the necessity of a new thinking and a new approach to 
the region. The enormous fund of goodwill as bequeathed by a long history of 
commercial interaction provided a sounds basis for evolving a new Southeast 
Asia policy. As compared to China, another major Asian power, having 
centuries' old relationship with the countries of the region, India had a decisive 
advantage. It could start with a clean state, since with only one exception in the 
eleventh century, India had no record of imperialistic ventures in the area. 
India's relations with Southeast Asia had all along been based on peace and 
harmony with virtually no discordant note in this symphony of harmony. If the 
basis of this relationship in the past was provided by cultural exchange, the 
core content of it for the present was bound to be trade and commerce. It also 
required a deeper understanding of the forces at work in the region and the rest 
of Asia, such as those of nationalism asserting to break the chains of colonial 
slavery and emerging as independent political entities on the World scene.' 
Different people of different countries used different terminologies. For 
example the early Indian navigators and merchants identified the region by 
names as Suvernadvipa (Island of Gold). Suvemabhumi or Kanakapuri (land or 
city of gold) variably referred to Burma, Malaya and Sumatra.^ 
On the other side the Chinese and Japanese miners and traders marked 
the region as Navyang and Nango respectively, it means South Sea to indicate 
rather vaguely or nebulously their sense of direction and location. Not only 
this, people of Southeast Asian region even did not accept the region as a 
political entity. For example the 14"" century poets and writers like Prapanea, 
author of old "Nagara Kertagma" also observed the whole of Southeast Asia, 
excluding Vietnam, more as a geographical concept than a political, cultural 
and otherwise.'^ In modem period, the Europeans, during their colonial period, 
used the term 'Farther India' denoting the region as an extension of Indian 
influence and also an appendage of Far Eastern Tropics [China, Korea and 
Japan]/ 
Geographically, the present Southeast Asia is divided into two parts, 
continental Southeast Asia comprising Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, 
Vietnam, and Malaysia. And insular Southeast Asia comprising the island 
republics of Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia. In the 19"^  century 
continental Southeast Asia became the arena of confrontation between the 
British and French colonialism. Since the 18' century insular Southeast Asia 
was the scene of British and Dutch colonialism. They were three "super-
powers" playing their game of power politics of the 19' century in Southeast 
Asia later on joined by the Americans, the latecomers to the Southeast Asian 
stage. 
The term Southeast Asia is of recent origin. It gained currency as 
political entity only during World War II when the territories, the South of 
tropics were placed under Lord Mountbatten's Southeast Asia command to 
repulse the Japanese forces from the region. Thus the region owes initially its 
first perception to the strategic requirements of external powers. The region 
became more significant after the end of World War II because of its strategic 
location. The region consists of a vast stretch of land in the East of India, South 
of China and in the North of Australia.^ 
It lies between pacific and Indian Ocean and China sea and serves as a 
bridge connecting the Southeast Asian countries on one side and Australia and 
New Zealand on the other.^ Logically Southeast Asia region was not perceived 
as an area having any geographical unity, but was essentially an expression of 
convenience over a zone of extreme human diversity. 
The whole of Southeast Asia covers an area of 4.2 million km. of total 
26.8 million km. area of Asia. It is smaller than Europe, America and China but 
larger than India. In terms of population Southeast Asia ranks fifth in number 
and from density point of view Southeast Asia represents a region of low 
demographic pressure between China and India. During the Western Rule, the 
regions served as an immigration ground for both the Indian and the Chinese. 
Since the region lies in the close proximity of India and China, both the 
countries have influenced Southeast Asian political and cultural life to a great 
extent. India's cultural relations with these countries date back in B.C. era. But 
the known history of first Indian Kingdom began in second century A.D. The 
oldest and best-known kingdom founded by Indians known as Funan the 
predecessor of Cambodia and Champa [present Vietnam]. ^ 
But the most prominent period, when Hindu influence and Hindu 
dynasties flourished, started from 4 '^' century and lasted till 13"' century in 
various parts of Southeast Asia, i.e. Sailendra dynasty flourished in central 
Java, from 5' century to 9^  century and exercised its hegemony over whole of 
Southeast Asia, where as Kingdom of Srivijaya flourished in Sumatra from 7"^  
to 12^ ^ century. Small Hindu kingdoms also flourished in this region.^ Along 
with dynastical influences, Indian religion and culture also had great impact, 
both on mainland and insular Southeast Asia. Burma, Thailand and Laos were 
brought under Indian cultural influence through Budhism. Monuments like 
'Angkarvat' in Cambodia and 'Borobudur' in Indonesia are the living 
manifestations of Indian cultural influence."^ The impact of Hinduism and 
Indian culture on these countries was so great. The major features of Hinduism, 
which left deep marks on Southeast Asian states, are as follows: 
(i) The concept of royalty based on Hinduism and Buddhist culture, 
(ii) The mythology of Puranas, 
(iii) The observance of Dharmashastras, 
(iv) The use of Sanskrit word as a means of expressions, 
(v) The use of alphabates of Indian origin, 
(vi) The pattern of Indian Law and Administration, 
(vii) The persistence of certain Brahmanic Traditions even in countries 
converted to Islam or Singhalese Buddhism, 
(viii) The presence of monuments having impact of Indian architecture and 
bearing description in Sanskrit. 
As against Indian influence, Chinese influence remained mainly in 
North Vietnam from 111 B.C. to 939 A.D. The mangol also attacked on this 
region under the leadership of Kublai Khan, the grandson of Jenghi? Khan who 
led expedition against Java at the end of M"^ century and admiral Cheng Ho 
Odyssey over the parts of Southeast Asia and beyond'^ which paved way for 
Chinese entry into the region. But the advent of Islam and later arrival of 
Europeans thwarted Chinese penetration into the region. Nevertheless to restore 
its influence and to hold the lands of Southeast Asia, the Chinese adopted new 
tactics of spreading minorities in Southeast Asian region, during colonial era. 
In Singapore, the Chinese are about 2/3 of the total population where as in 
Malaysia they are about 35% of the population. They are in lesser percentage in 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines.'' 
The principal agencies of cultural change in Southeast Asia, since the 
mid 19"^  century, came from the highly industrialized states of West. The 
Western countries took over the direction of colonialism from Chartered 
companies and from traditional cultural influence emanating from India and 
China. The European control brought many far-reaching changes in the 
political, economic and cultural life of Southeast Asian nations. They put to an 
end the persisting dynastic rivalries in interstate relations by bringing the 
region under their rule through negotiations, intrigues or force or through a 
combination of all the three. In order to serve their colonial objectives these 
Western powers introduced many changes in the existing political, 
administrative, social and cultural systems of the countries in the region. For 
achieving their economic objectives the colonial powers enlisted the 
cooperation of elite minority groups including the Chinese and thus promoted 
basic social changes in structures of Southeast Asian nations. Further the 
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colonial regions also set up artificial barriers, which fragmented national and 
ethnic entity by introducing their own political, economic and educational 
system. Not only this the indigenous cultural, economic and educational 
associations were channeled towards their respective metropolis.' Thus 
Southeast Asia became a composite of various ethnic and cultural and religious 
influences which provided a touch of vi\ idness to the region and also effected 
the politics and political functioning of these countries. 
In the post-colonial era, because of the new alignments among the ex-
colonial powers, the region emerged as an area of substantial importance from 
strategic, economic and political perspectives. 
INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA- A STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE 
The strategic importance of Southeast Asia can not be overemphasized. 
If this area goes completely under the influence of any one power totally the 
balance of power in Asia will be completely altered. 
The strategic importance of Southeast Asia to India was evident to 
India's prospective policy-makers and strategic thinkers even before the 
transfer of power from British to Indian hands. The events of the Second World 
War, especially the dramatic Japanese sweep through archipelago and mainland 
Southeast Asia in a remarkably short time, have driven home the lesson to 
India's nationalist elite that India's eastern Flank and the seaward approaches 
to the subcontinent were as important for India's defence as the land 
boundaries of the northern-west and the north which have been traditional 
concerns of strategists during the days of British Raj. The later attitude was 
understandable in the context of the British Indian Empire because Britain was 
the unchallenged master of the sea around the subcontinent until the Japanese 
drive into Southeast Asia, however, it had to change under the dual-impact of 
Second World War and the withdrawal of British power from India. 
The events of the war also increased Indian awareness of, and concern 
with, maritime strategy and the great importance of the Indian Ocean to the 
defence of the Indian peninsula. The lesson that India had lost its independence 
to European colonists because of the latter's control of the sea was re-learnt by 
the Indian nationalist elite as a result of the experiences of the Second World 
War. In this sense, the strategic importance of Southeast Asia to India was 
enhanced in Indian perceptions, especially since it commanded the choke 
points from which hostile naval forces could enter the Indian Ocean, 
particularly the Bay of Bengal. This point can be better understood in the light 
of the fact that India's island territories in the Bay of Bengal lie barely 90 miles 
from the straits of Malacca. Writing as early as 1945, one of the pioneers of 
strategic thinking in modem India, K. M. Panikkar, stated, "The Gulf of 
Malacca is like the mouth of a crocodile, the peninsula of Malaya being the 
upper and the jutting end of Sumatra being the lower jaw", "the entry to the 
Gulf can be controlled by Nicobars and the narrow end is dominated by the 
island of Singapore". 
The emergence of China as a major power in Asia bordering both India 
and Southeast Asia added another important dimension to Southeast Asia's 
strategic importance for India. From hindsight it becomes clear that, even 
during the heyday of Sino-Indian friendship in the mid 1950s, the Indians were 
both uneasy about the long-term prospects of the Sino-Indian relationship as 
well as aware of the importance of Southeast Asia. 
The Indian cultivation of both Indonesia and Malaya (later Malaysia) 
was important in this context. Unfortunately, from India's point of view, when 
these two countries fell out with each other over the issue of the Malaysian 
Federation, its relations with Indonesia deteriorated, especially because Jakarta 
teamed up with Bejing in an attempt to destabilize the Southeast Asian 
situation. Malaysia reciprocated Indian support for the Federation by extending 
strong support to New Delhi on its border conflict with China. 
It is also interesting to note that India's attitude towards the anti-British 
insurgency following the Second World War and the re imposition of British 
control in Malaya was remarkably different from the one it adopted in regard to 
the anti-colonial insurgencies in Indonesia and Indochina. This difference can 
be directly traced to the nature of the Malayan insurgency, which was 
Communist, largely confined to the ethnic Chinese in the country and with 
close links to the Chinese Communist Party."' 
Strategically Southeast Asia is an area of great importance as it lies 
across the World's most important links of sea and air communications. It 
contains some of capital land routes leading northwards into China or 
Southwards from China towards Indian Ocean. As E.H.G Dobby writes: 
The region stands at the zones of convergence for 
transoceanic routes between the densely populated areas 
of India and China and also between the areas of Europe, 
Australia and North America, so that International 
shipping convergences upon Southeast Asia, 
independently of colonial considerations which once drew 
the Philippines in the United States shipping circuits, the 
East India into Dutch and the rest of Southeast Asia into 
British. 
The main sea route from Europe and Africa running through the Indian 
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Ocean towards pacific and the Far East passed through the Strait of Malacca. 
Besides there are many other important sea links like 'Sunda straits', the 
'Lombok straits' and, the 'Madassar straits' which have been facilitating trade, 
commerce and communications of big powers from the Pacific Ocean region to 
the Indian Ocean and vice-versa. Malacca straits is more important as it 
provides the shortest sea route in the region and connecting the Andaman Sea 
with Gulf of Thailand, the Malacca straits will remain the dominant sea lane of 
the pacific and Indian Ocean regions. About 15,000 to 20,000 ships of different 
categories (including military vessels of U.S.A. and USSR and oil tankers of 
Japan) pass through the Malacca straits annually.'*^ 
Besides the sea routes, the region consists many naval bases. Singapore 
serves both as a major port and naval base. Cam Ranh Bay, on the Southern 
coast of Vietnam, is another naval base big enough to harbour a whole fleet. 
Further in South Surabhaya, in Indonesia, is another important harbour on the 
sea route from India and continental Asia towards Australia. To East stands the 
Philippines, with which its air and naval bases Clark Field, Subic Bay and 
Songley point, (Clark Field is air base) - have a strategic position whose vital 
importance was demonstrated during World War II, Korean War and later 
Indochina War. 
Besides naval bases many important air routes also lie in Southeast Asia 
connecting East and West, North and South. Bangkok and Saigon lie on the air 
lanes linking Europe and Middle East, Africa with Far East and Pacific. Both 
Manila and Singapore are important airports linking the West with Pacific and 
North Asia with Australia. 
The important land routes, which connect Southeast Asia with mainland 
Asia, pass through China. The two important routes leading from China 
towards Southeast Asia are the first running along Vietnamese seacoast, with 
both rail and road facilities, and the second through Laos along Mekong 
Valley.^' It is this linkage that facilitated China to involve itself actively in 
Southeast Asian politics. 
The Indian policy of bolstering Burma politically and militarily 
immediately after the latter's independence can also be explained to a large 
extent with reference to Indian political and military concerns regarding the 
emerging power of communist China in the common vicinity of both Burma 
and India. The Indian support to Burma, which included military supplies, 
economic assistance and political endorsement of the U Nu government was 
aimed both at preventing destabilization in its own volatile northeastern region 
(where tribal populations often straddled the India-Burma border), which could 
be taken advantage of by a strong China if it so desired, and at maintaining a 
friendly buffer between India and China. 
These consideralions were of paramount importance to New Delhi 
because it was fully cognizant of the fact that an unstable Burma, not in full 
control of its peripheral regions, could provide an ideal conduit for Chinese 
interference on India's tribal northeast. The fact that Burma was plagued not 
only by ethnic but by communist insurgencies as well, added greater weight to 
Indian concerns in this regard, particularly because communist China was 
involved in supporting the Communist party of Burma in the latter's efforts to 
destabilize the Burmese government by force. 
Burma's strategic importance to India is also evident by the fact that the 
Japanese invasion of the northeast Indian territories of Nagaland and Manipur 
during the Second World War took place through Burma. Furthennore, the 
separation of East Bengal, now Bangladesh, from India in 1947 has added to 
the strategic isolation of the northeast from the rest of the country, especially 
from its centres of military power, and enhanced the logistical problems for 
New Delhi of meeting an external threat to these territories. This has, on one 
hand, made the northeast more vulnerable to external intervention and on the 
other, added to the significance of Burma as a strategic buffer between India 
and China. K. M. Panikkar had made the point as early as 1944 that, 
The defence of Burma is in fact the defence of India, and it 
is India's primary concern no less than Burma's to see 
that its frontiers remain inviolate. In fact no responsibility 
can be considered too heavy for India when it comes to 
the question of defending Burma. 
The presence of the people of Indian origin in Southeast Asian 
countries, principally in Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore, also formed an input, 
although a relatively minor one compared to the political-strategic factors 
mentioned into Indian policy towards the region. 
In fact, the position of the sizeable, visible, and relatively prosperous 
Indian minority in Burma (a legacy of the fact that Burma was administered as 
a part of British India until the mid-1930s) had come under increasing attack 
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from the early years of Burmese independence and a set of policies aimed at 
reducing their economic and political clout within the country had been 
followed by the Burmese government since that time. 
However, despite the fact that these policies had begun to be 
implemented under U Nu, who was himself considered to be a great admirer of 
Nehru and a staunch believer in strong Indo-Burmese economic and security 
ties, the Indian government, to the considerable chagrin of certain special 
interest groups and some of its domestic opponents, did not allow the visibly 
deteriorating status of Indians in Burma and the discriminatory policies aimed 
at them to interfere with its policy of firm support to the Burmese government 
both in economic and security terms in order to help the country emerge as a 
viable nation-state. This Indian support was tied to its broader objective of 
preserving a stable and united Burma on its eastern flank. 
Although people of Indian origin in other parts of Southeast Asia did not 
suffer from the degree of overt discrimination that they did in Burma, the 
occasional problems that arose in this connection were always treated by the 
Indian government as minor irritants in India's relationship with the host 
countries rather than as major issues of national prestige. The overseas Indians 
in Southeast Asia soon came to realize their own minimal importance in the 
Indian foreign policy framework and, therefore, adopted themselves to the 
changing local situations more rapidly than would have been the case if active 
Indian support had been available to them in their struggle to preserve the 
privileges accumulated under colonial rule. As a result, the issue of overseas 
Indian did not affect India's relations with Southeast Asian governments in any 
major way and certainly could not be compared to the effect that the problem 
of the overseas Chinese had, and continues to have, on China's relations with 
some countries of Southeast Asia.^ ^ 
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE: INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The economic relations with Southeast Asia formed an important, although 
secondary, component of India's overall pattern of economic transactions with the 
outside World. A pattern of interdependence based on mutual needs of different 
primary commodities with which India and the various countries of Southeast Asia 
were endowed, coupled with easy access to each other markets formed the 
bedrock on which this superstructure of economic relations was constructed. 
Immediately after Indian independence, the Southeast Asian region, taken as a 
whole, ranked third, after the United Kingdom and the United States, in terms of 
India's foreign trade.^'' 
Nature has been very kind to Southeast Asia with important minerals and 
raw materials. The abundance of raw materials has made Southeast Asia an 
important region for World powers. Among the important minerals which are 
found in Southeast .Asia are crude petroleum, tin concentrates, gold, copper ore, 
nickel, coal, antimony ore, bauxite and chrome ore.^^ The region is also major 
producer of some important international commodities like rice, copra, coconut 
oil, sugar, teak wood, coffee, tea, tobacco, quinine and stickle. It also supplies 
many other products consumed by Asian masses such as cattle, poultry, hogs, fish 
and other dried seafood and medicinal plants.^^ 
Production of rubber and tin concentrate is major source of income for 
countries like Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia alone produces and exports about 
40% of tin concentrate of total World production. Thailand and Indonesia ranks 
third and fourth respectively in total world's tin production. Burma and Laos are 
the other countries, which are rich in tin concentrate. In the entire region 
accounted for about 64% of the total world output in 1971. With regard to crude 
petroleum, Indonesia is the largest producer of crude petroleum in the region 
accounting for slightly less than 2% of the total World production and other 
countries are Malaysia and Burma, which have less reserve than Indonesia. 
Indonesia and Burma are the only countries in the region which 
produce nickel, where as bauxite is produced in Indonesia, Malaysia and North 
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Vietnam. The Philippines is the largest producer of copper ore. iron ore is 
produced in the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. Gold is another important 
mineral produced in the region, which accounts for 1.6% of total World gold 
production. 
Besides production of minerals the Southeast Asia is a cause of 
attraction for big markets for finished goods of developed countries. Since all 
Southeast Asian nations belong to developing economies they provide a 
substantial grounds for huge investments for manufacturing industries mainly 
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for import substitution. 
POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REGION 
The region became politically significant only after World War II. The 
strategic location of the region and the emergence of China as Communist 
nation in the close proximity of the region made the region prone to cold war 
conflagrations. Nehru's prophesy that, '"the Pacific is likely to take the place of 
the Atlantic in the future as the nerve centre of World politics proved to be 
true.^^ Moreover the weak political and economic system of the newly 
independent states, their sense of insecurity and numerous internal and external 
pressures provided incentives to external powers to involve themselves in the 
region.^° It is because of strategic, economic and political significance of the 
region that it was made a theater of cold war and the integrity, independence 
and security of the region was threatened. 
Southeast Asia constitutes a major area of concern for Indian policy 
makers. Highlighting Indian concerns for the region Jawaharlal Nehru in his 
very first policy statement had said: 
We are of Asia, and the people of Asia are nearer and 
closer lo us than others. India is so situated that she is the 
pivot of Western, Southern and Southeast Asia. In the past 
her culture flowed to all these countries and they came to 
her in many ways. The contacts are being renewed and the 
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future is bound to see a closer union between India and 
Southeast Asia on the one side, and Afghanistan, Iran and 
the Arab world on the other. 
India, being in the neighborhood of Southeast Asia, has substantial 
strategic economic, cultural and political stakes in Southeast Asia. 
Strategically like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal or Bhutan, India shares a 
long land border with Southeast Asian nations. Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, 
Manipur, Mizoram and Assam, all lie along the Indian Burmese frontier. India 
cannot remain unaffected by the political or security situations in these 
countries. There are problems of insurgency in all these states [even in recent 
times]. Next Andaman and Nicobar islands of India make it a maritime 
neighbour of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. The distance between 
the Great Nicobar Island of India and Indonesian island of Sabang is less than a 
hundred miles. The great channel between these two islands provides access to 
Malacca straits. India thus shares long land border with one country - Burma, 
and maritime boundaries with four countries: Burma, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Hostility of any of these countries can pose a credible danger to 
India.'^ ^ Highlighting the importance of the region from Indian Security angle. 
Major Anthony Strechy, a former officer of Indian Army wrote that this area 
was comparable to Tibet and Nepal. According to him, 
That either of these two states could come under influence 
of any hostile power would mean an intolerable threat to 
New India's Security. Looking at Southeast Asia the same 
applies to Burma, Siam [Thailand] French Indochina and 
the East Indies [Indonesia]. The lesson of the last war is 
surely that India must always take adequate precautions 
that her eastern neighbours do not become the 
springboards for yet another attack on her.^^ 
Moreover, most of India's coal mines iron and steel, heavy installations 
and two of metro cities - Calcutta and Madras lie on the east and Southeast 
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coast of Bay of Bengal in the east of Southeast Asia. Hence in order to, (a) 
keep Bay of Bengal clear of belligerent strains from east, (b) Maintain security 
of Andaman and Nicobar and (c) keep the passage between India and Pacific 
Ocean clear, it is necessary for India to see that Southeast Asian region should 
be free from any power hostile to India/ 
Besides strategic stakes India has sufficient economic stakes in 
Southeast Asia. It is evident that the region fascinated Indian traders and 
merchants in the past because of its richness. The independent India remained 
dependent on these countries (in the early, years of her independence) for some 
of the items such as farinaceous foods, sugar, palm oil, tea, petroleum, tin, 
rubber, rice and other tropical materials, which India imported from these 
countries. In 1952 India imported 71% of its total imports of Rice. Petroleum 
and Wood were other important items, which India imported from these 
countries. India's exports to these countries consisted mainly cotton, textile, 
jute material, coal and vegetable oil. 
Besides all countries of Southeast Asia have a sizable Indian 
community. Largest number of Indians lives in Malaysia and Singapore where 
they are about 11% of the population while they are less in number in other 
countries. Although India does not harbour any contact with these immigrants 
against these countries as China does, yet at the same time India should be 
vigilant about the protection of rights of Indian Community. 
Apart from strategic, economic and cultural consideration the region 
occupied a significant position in India's foreign policy calculations. As 
politically India had established democratic, and socialist institutions, the 
development of these institutions depended, to some extent on the political 
development in Southeast Asia. Whatever India's plans to develop, it could do, 
only when favorable conditions prevailed in India's surroundings. "The 
development of India" said Nehru, "necessitates the development of countries 
around India. It is obvious that prevalence of instability, chaos and insecurity as 
well as development of Communism or the continuance of colonialism in 
Southeast Asia would make difficult for India to function peacefully and 
achieve her goals at home or abroad. Since colonialism in Southeast Asia was 
coming to end and communism on the contrary was becoming a virulent force 
which by its militant character was to upset not only the stability in the region 
but even created a situation unfavorable to India's development also. 
Besides the dangers posed by Communism the other factor which also 
posed a substantial threat to Indian political security was the frequent 
interference and intervention by external powers in Southeast Asian region. 
The military presence of Western powers and the cold war maneuverings were 
to restrain Indian action of freedom. Hence it was desirable for India to develop 
cordial relations with the states of the region so that external power influence 
could be reduced. Therefore India tried to spread the concept of non-alignment 
in the region. Unfortunately India did not succeed in its attempts because of the 
growing sense of insecurities among the nations of region created by 
insurgency and expansion of communism. Except Indonesia, all non-
communist countries went under western defence umbrella. Hence India find 
that because of the alignment with big powers India, for a short span of time, 
lost her interest in Southeast Asia which in a way encouraged anti Indian forces 
which considerably had effected Indian security also. 
Thus the conflicting vested interests of various external powers not only 
brewed conflicts like Indo-China war and tensions like insurgencies and 
economic exploitations, but also even kept Southeast Asia divided, communist 
and non-communist Southeast Asia. The increasing rivalry among these powers 
and their impact upon the regional politics made Southeast Asian nations, 
particularly, the non communist world, realized that they can not protect 
themselves and their political and socio-economic systems so long a clash 
among external powers exists in the region. Moreover it was also felt that they 
should remain exploited as long as they remain dependent upon external 
powers. 
India has vital stal<es in Southeast Asia whose independence and 
security are bound up with her own. As Jawaharlal Nehru pointed out, India 
was the gateway to both West and Southeast Asia and, therefore, inevitably 
came into the picture. The independence and security of Southeast Asia served 
to strengthen India's own independence and security and any serious setback in 
these countries constituted a potential threat to India too. It was with this 
understanding that India played an active role in mobilizing opinion against the 
Dutch Government's effort at reimposition of colonial rule in Indonesia and the 
active interest taken by India in various phases of the struggle in Indochina.'' 
There was yet another dimensions to India's relation with Southeast 
Asia- the presence of Indian communities in sizeable numbers. There was a 
large concentration in Malaysia: merchants, traders and labour prepared by the 
British during its imperial rule over India as well as in many other parts of the 
region, almost 15 percent of the population of Malaysia, holding a precarious 
balance between the Malay and the Chinese. 
India developed relations with the other member-countries of Southeast 
Asia too, with Singapore the relationship was naturally of a slightly different 
quality because of its peculiar characteristics. On the one hand, Singapore was 
predominantly Chinese but on the other hand, out of a population of 2 million, 
some 120,000 were of Indian origin, traders, merchants, entrepreneurs and 
labourers. The leaders of Singapore have needed to keep a tight leash over 
militant Chinese nationalism, for its eruption would have kindled finding 
expression in loyalty to mainland China, and to develop a multi-racial society 
in which the Chinese enjoyed a strong majority. Singapore's own perceptions 
of the situation in Southeast Asia and attitude towards various other powers 
have gone through two distinct phases which in a way determined approach to 
an equality of relation with India too during each of the two phases.""' 
With Thailand and the Philippines relations had not developed until to 
the extent that they did with Indonesia and Malaysia. The outlook on World 
affairs had been wide apart and their alignment had created difficulties in 
reaching greater understanding and cooperation. With Thailand, India had 
unique ancient ties that defy the contemporary aloofness. Thai language, 
culture, religion, art and architecture all bear the heavy imprint of Indian 
influence. Sanskrit and Pali can be said to be the progenitors of the Thai 
language. The Buddhist influence radiated from India during the Ashoka period 
(329 B.C.) created an enduring bond. The Hindu influence is evident in 
painting and music and dancing and in the architecture of temples and palaces 
and in literature. Thailand was indeed the cultural and intellectual offspring of 
India. 
Yet the contemporary period did not bring them, as it normally would be 
expected, closer to each other. Their perceptions on World developments had 
little in common with each other. 
Thailand took shelter in the military alliances of the West, while Indian 
vigorously advocated non-alignment. Thailand did not stand for appeased 
anti-Communism, whether it was China, the Soviet Union or Vietnam. India 
regarded the approach to be oversimplified and advocated the peace area 
approach. In any case the understanding about the international situation was 
diametrically opposite. 
As with Thailand, independent India's relations with the Philippines 
remained in a limbo for many years. The reasons were much the same. The 
Philippines sought security in a military tie-up with the United States, 
somewhat because of the American bases built during the war and the 
consequent American presence that left little choice to the island Republic, and 
somewhat because of a communist armed revolt in the fifties. The Philippines 
occupied a strategic position in the Asian-Pacific region and the Americans 
would not have left it alone in any case. The nature of the Philippines regime 
made it staunchly anti-communist and in the initial years it did not look upon 
the non-aligned movement. 
India had ancient cultural links with the Philippines too, though not as 
strong and direct as with Thailand. Cultural influence had percolated, some say 
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during the first millennium B.C. and others say during the fourth or fifth 
century A.D., but the fact of the cultural infiuence was undoubted, that was not 
enough in contemporary times. There was no contentious or unresolved issue 
between the two but they differed sharply in their foreign policy approaches 
and stances and, therefore, did not evince too great an interest in each other in 
the early years of independence. 
India's policy towards and relations with Southeast Asia and especially 
with Vietnam have been evolving over the years, but India appeared to have 
recognized rather early the importance of Vietnam in any emerging situation in 
Southeast Asia, sense, sentiment and sensibility all seem to have gone into the 
making of India's Vietnam policy. There was the appeal of a small Asian 
country struggling against mighty empires and mightier powers and 
demonstrating a kind of grit and determination that had few parallels. 
Jawaharlal Nehru once described Ho Chi Minh as a part of Asian history, there 
were more hardheaded reasons too. India believed its interests to lie in the 
emergence of independent, nationalist countries in Asia so as to resist external 
dominance and to establish a heal their balance of forces in the region. The 
Government of India had concluded that Vietnamese communists had 
succeeded in identifying themselves wholly with Vietnamese nationalism, 
spearheading an authentic Vietnamese nationalist movement-just as in the case 
of the Chinese communist party and the Chinese revolution. They were not 
going to be any one else's camp follower, nor was these any likelihood of any 
other force arising in Vietnam capable of swaying the minds and hearts of the 
Vietnamese people.''^ 
India's relation with countries of Southeast Asia viz., Burma, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia 
(Kampuchea) are to be viewed in the content of her overall foreign policy and 
her relations with the big powers. The importance of India's relations with the 
countries of Southeast Asia lies in the fact that her role in the Southeast Asia 
largely influences policies of the major powers towards her. Except for North 
Vietnam, which alHed itself with Soviet bloc and Thailand, Philippines and 
South Vietnam, which joined the American bloc, most of the other countries of 
the region preferred to remain neutral. An other notable feature about the 
countries of Southeast Asia was that most of them adopted anti-imperialist 
postures because they were always scared that the imperialist powers may not 
stage a comeback. The existence of close cultural bond between Indian and the 
countries of Southeast Asia also contributed to closer relations between India 
and countries of the region. 
India from the very beginning felt the need of developing intimate 
relations with the countries of Southeast Asia and to prevent the domination of 
the region by the Communist or Western powers. Indian particularly looked at 
the armed struggles in the region as a positive threat to her stability and 
emphasized the need of keeping the countries of Southeast Asia free from the 
influence of the super powers. Nehru particularly wanted India to play a 
prominent role in the region and said in the course of his inaugural address to 
the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947: 
It is fitting that India should play her part in this new 
phase of Asian development. Apart from the fact that India 
herself is emerging into freedom and independence, she is 
the natural centre and focal point of the many farces in 
Asia. Geography is a compelling factor and 
geographically she is so situated as to be the meeting 
point of Western and Northern and East and South Asia. 
India has maintained intimate relations with Burma (Myanmar) since 
earliest times. Burma fell under the influence of Buddhism, which still 
continues to be a dominant element in Burma's social life. The country was 
conquered by the British and made a part of the Indian Empire. The conquest 
of Burma by the British started with the conquest of Arakan and Tennasse 
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coast in 1826, followed by annexation of lower Burma in 1852 and upper 
Burma in 1856. 
During the British rule over Burma the Indian merchants and money 
lenders greatly exploited the country, which gave rise to anti-Indian feeling 
among the people. An uprising was organized against the Indian and Chinese 
settlers, which culminated in the separations of Burma from India in 1935 and 
it became a separate entity within the British Empire. 
During the Second World War Burma declared itself as independent 
with the assistance of the Japanese in 1943. After the surrender of Japan, 
Burma again passed under Allied Forces. The Burmese people launched 
struggle for complete independence and firmly rejected the offer of 'Dominion 
status' made to them by the British in 1945. Ultimately the country achieved 
independence in January 1948 after the colonial rule of 122 years.''^ 
Southeast Asia's importance to India in terms of its foreign policy 
objectives and its strategic interests that India has, for the security environment 
of Southeast Asia, is profoundly based on its broad foreign policy framework 
and its overall strategic perspective. This is extremely important because, to 
evaluate the type and amount of capabilities that India is likely to devote to the 
protection and furtherance of its interests in the region. It is imperative to take 
the entire range of India's interests in Southeast Asia under consideration. 
The basic framework of Indian foreign policy that can be distilled from 
its actions in World affairs after the independence comprises the following 
major elements: 
(a) A World-view shaped both by the movement for national 
independence and by the nationalist leaders' perception of India's 
past and their aspirations for its future, 
(b) The coincidence of the emergence of a bipolar world following the 
Second World War, with India's emergence as an independent actor 
on the World scene. 
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(c) The threats to, and the problems for India's security that emerged 
directly from the partition of the British-Indian empire and, 
therefore, the disruption of India's strategic unity that had been 
accepted as a given fact during the period of the British rule, 
(d) The emergence of China as a major Asian actor following the 
Communist victory of 1949, two years after India's independence, 
and China's annexation of Tibet the following year (1950) thus 
bringing Chinese presence and power in direct contact with India on 
the latter's northern and northeastern borders, 
(e) The need for fruitful economic interaction with the rest of the world 
in terms of trade, aid, and investment, which was considered crucial 
for India's developmental goals. 
The enmeshing of these fundamental concerns in various forms and at 
different times has, by and large, determined the broad contours of Indian 
foreign policy, including its policy towards Southeast Asia as a whole and 
towards the individual countries that comprise this region. It is, therefore, 
important for us to examine the major consequences for Indian foreign policy 
that have emerged out of the interplay of these variables over a period of 
time.'*^ 
Southeast Asia has been important for Indian foreign policy for a 
number of reasons: 
First, the nationalist leadership, i.e. the first generation of India's post-
independence leaders, had perceived the anti-colonial struggles in Southeast 
Asia as indivisible from their own fight for freedom from colonial subjugation. 
The Indonesian and Vietnamese freedom struggles, especially the former, had 
been followed with great sympathy by the politically conscious Indian public 
during the last years of the British Raj. The Congress leadership, with 
Jawaharlal Nehru as its foremost articulator on international issues, was 
convinced that the future of India was indivisible from the future of Asia, and 
particularly of Southeast Asia. It was no coincidence, therefore, that even 
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before the formal dawn of independence, the interim Indian government 
organized an Asian Relations' Conference in March 1947, and independent 
India performed its first high-profile act in international affairs by convening 
the Conference on Indonesia attended by fifteen nations in January 1949. 
Second, the strategic importance of Southeast Asia was evident to 
India's prospective policy-makers and strategic thinkers even before the 
transfer of power from British to Indian hands. The events of the Second World 
War, especially the dramatic Japanese sweep through archipelago and mainland 
Southeast Asia in a remarkably short time, had driven home the lesson to 
India's nationalist elite that India's eastern flank and the seaward approaches to 
the subcontinent were as important for India's defence as the land boundaries 
of the northwest and the north which had been the traditional concerns of 
strategists during the days of the British Raj. The latter attitude was 
understandable in the context of the British Indian empire because British was 
the unchallenged master of the seas around the subcontinent until the Japanese 
drive into Southeast Asia, however, it had to change under the dual impact of 
the Second World War and the withdrawal of British power from India. 
The events of the war also increased Indian awareness of, and concern 
with, maritime strategy and the great importance of the Indian Ocean to the 
defence of the Indian peninsula. In this sense, the strategic importance of 
Southeast Asia to India was enhanced in Indian perceptions, especially since it 
commanded the choke points from which hostile naval forces could enter into 
the Indian Ocean, particularly the Bay of Bengal. This point can be better 
understood in light of the fact that India's island territories in the Bay of Bengal 
lie barely 90 miles from the Straits of Malacca. 
The third reason why Southeast Asia has been important for Indian 
foreign policy is that the emergence of China as a major power in Asia 
bordering both India and Southeast Asia added another important dimension to 
Southeast Asia's strategic importance for India. From hindsight it becomes 
clear that, even during the heyday of Sino-Indian friendship in the mid-1950s, 
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the Indians were uneasy about the long-term prospects of the Sino-Indian 
relationship as well as aware of the importance of Southeast Asia, especially its 
non-Communist component, as a source of potential alliances against presumed 
Chinese expansionism. The Indian sense of unease was increased by the 
Chinese Premier's masterly performance in April 1955 at the First Afro-Asian 
Conference in Bandung, especially his conciliatory approach towards Western-
aligned Pakistan. Thus Jawaharlal Nehru and his advisers considered an 
exercise in 'one-upmanship' at India's expense, particularly in the context of 
the fact that India had worked hard to overcome the apprehensions of several 
Asian countries regarding China's participation in that meeting. 
Fourth, the presence of people of Indian origin in Southeast Asian 
countries, particularly in Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore, also formed an 
input, although a relatively minor one compared to the political-strategic 
factors mentioned above, into Indian policy towards the region. 
Fifth, economic relations with Southeast Asia formed an important, 
although secondary, component of India's overall pattern of economic 
transactions with the outside world. A pattern of interdependence based on 
mutual needs of different primary commodities with which India and the 
various countries of Southeast Asia were endowed, coupled with easy access to 
each others' markets, formed the bedrock on which this superstructure of 
economic relations were constructed. ^ 
Indian interest in the Southeast Asian region: 
Thus the Indian leaders did much groundwork before the independence 
of the country. The factors like history, geo-politics, strategic security 
environment, vast economic potentials of this area necessitated a new thinking 
and a proper approach to this region. There was large number of immigrants of 
Indian origin in various Southeast Asian countries whose interest could not 
have been ignored. The Congress before national independence had voiced its 
concern for the rights and privileges of those people, who came as labourers 
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and agriculturists to tliese countries after being forcibly recruited by the British 
in India. So it was a moral question before the Indian government to see to their 
well-being and just treatment. The rapid advancement of Japanese forces in 
Southeast Asia and the threat to British Indian during the World War II only 
reveals that the security of India to a great extent depends on the security of 
this region. The Nagas living in the area on the border of Burma were a 
constant irritant to the Indian government for quite a long time and for their 
suppression Indian needed Burma's co-operation or at least neutrality. It was 
recognized that Burma's membership in a hostile anti-Indian camp would 
endanger the latter's security. The security of the Indian Ocean and the pacific 
were seen as being largely dependant on a strong Indonesia. The entire 
landmass from India to the North Eastern extreme of China and Japan would be 
economically and strategically at the mercy of any power which would succeed 
in entrenching itself in Indonesia. The straits of Malaya and Singapore 
dominate the sea-routes and thus assume significance in Indian strategic policy. 
So the defence needs of India make it virtually concerned about the neutrality, 
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stability, peace and prosperity of this region. 
Economic interest of India also demanded a well-measured Southeast 
Asian policy. As Nehru himself correctly understood: 
Ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of economic 
policy, and until India has properly evolved her economic 
policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather 
inchoate and will be grouping. Southeast Asia was 
colonized by European power because of a vast market for 
their finished goods, procuring foodstuff to feed the ever 
increasing European urban people and exploiting their 
immense natural resources like tin, rubber, oil and other 
commodities. Moreover, the economy of India and the 
Southeast Asia are inter-dependent and complimentary 
and not competitive.^'' 
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India's liberation struggle was a great source of constant inspiration to 
Southeast Asian countries, which they readily acknowledged. They were 
indebted to India for setting in move decolonization through her unique style of 
struggle against European imperialism. In the process it would definitely 
strengthen India's position in the regional as well as global sphere provided 
both move in the same direction on friendly terms. 
These priorities had to be well placed in the minds of the Indian leaders 
before they formulated the policies towards Southeast Asia. India had earned 
tremendous goodwill of the countries of this region not only because of her 
own liberation struggle, but also because of her policy of consistent anti-
imperialism anywhere in the world and supporting liberation struggle, the 
World over. 
Before independence, when Nehru was the Vice-President of the Interim 
government India hosted the Asian Relation Conference where almost all the 
Asian countries participated. It provided Nehru a unique opportunity to 
pronounce future independent India's policy towards the Asian countries. 
Nehru called for reassertion of Asia's role in World politics and economy and 
declared that, 
India should play her pari in this new phase of Asian 
development, she is the natural centre and focal point of 
many forces at work in Asia. Geography is a compelling 
factor and geographically she is so situated as to be the 
meeting point of Western and Northern, Eastern and 
Southern of Asia. Because of this the history of India is a 
long history of her relations with the countries of 
Southeast Asia. 
However, Indian failed to pursue a coherent, consistent cultural policy 
towards the region as a whole. And without it, no new and durable bridges of 
friendship and cooperation could be built. Perhaps, colonial psychology and 
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fixations of our leadership and bureaucracy are to be blamed for it. 
Nevertheless, during the first decade or so of its independence, India did show 
quite a deep and meaningful involvement in the affairs of some Southeast 
Asian countries. This Indian involvement was by and large on the side of 
nationalist forces fighting for freedom from European colonialism.^^ 
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CHAPTER- 2 
INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING POST 
INDEPENDENCE ERA 
Independent India's foreign policy was largely formulated by Jawaharlal 
Nehru. He was first Prime Minister and also the Foreign Minister of the 
country. Throughout his political career he was absolutely identified with the 
foreign policy of this country. 
The Indian foreign policy had been evolving through a pretty long 
period of her struggle against colonial rule in which Nehru's contribution is 
quite significant and decisive. Naturally, therefore, he is viewed as the 
architect, the engineer and the voice of his country's policy towards the outside 
world. Micheal Breacher impressed with Nehru's personality and said India's 
Foreign policy appeared to be his personal monopoly. 
Hov/ever, Nehru refuted this perception and emphasized the fact that the 
foreign policy of India was not his creation nor was his personal policy. In his 
view, it was the product of the demands of the national interest of the country 
and of such determinants as geography, history, national and international 
situations prevailing at the time of India's independence. In Nehru's own 
words: 
// is completely incorrect to call our policy as "Nehru" 
policy. It is incorrect because all that I have done is to 
give voice to that policy. I have not originated it. It is a 
policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in 
the past thinking of India, inherent in the conditioning of 
the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom and 
inherent in the circumstances of world today. I come in by 
mere accidental fact that during these few years I have 
represented that policy as a Foreign Minister. I am quite 
convinced that whoever might have been incharge of 
foreign affairs of India and whatever party might have 
been in power in India, they could not have been deviated 
very much from this poUcyr 
Although Nehru may be right in his observation but the fact remains that 
throughout his tenure as Foreign Minister there was only one person visible and 
shining on the canvas of international landscape of India and he was Nehru and 
practically Nehru alone. This is a fact, which has been accepted by his admirers 
as well as his critics. 
The establishment of Indian National Congress (I.N.C.) in 1885 and 
Nehru's emergence on India's political scene from 1920s onwards marks an 
important landmark in the evolution of independent India's foreign policy in a 
systematic way particularly of its anti-colonial outlook. The leaders of I.N.C. 
consistently watched the situations with keen interest and the developments of 
international scenario and reacted them from time to time. I.N.C.passed 
resolutions on all matters relating to injustice, political domination and 
subjugation, oppression and racial discrimination to express its concern. In the 
process of evolution, Jawaharlal Nehru played a direct supervisory role 
throughout the evolutions. Because of his keen personal interest and deep 
insight into world history, he was made in charge of the foreign affairs of the 
I.N.C. as such all the resolutions on international issues were prepared by 
Nehru. These resolutions served as the foundation stone of independent India's 
Foreign Policy. 
The Congress declared its full adherence to the principles underlying the 
Charter of the United Nations and added that it would be the constant aim of 
India's foreign policy to maintain friendly and co-operative relations with all 
nations and to avoid entanglements in military or similar alliances which tend 
to divide the World into rival groups and thus endanger World peace. The 
Congress would welcome her free association with the independent nations of 
the Commonwealth for their common well being and the promotion of World 
peace. 
Jawaharlal Nehru outlined the basic elements of India's foreign policy 
aims in his speech broadcast to the nation on 7 September 1946, he said, 
fVe propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the 
power politics of groups, aligned against one another, 
which have led in the past to world wars and which may 
again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. We believe 
that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of 
freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and 
lead to conflict and wars. We are particularly interested 
in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries 
and peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice 
of equal opportunities for all races... we seek no 
domination over others and we claim no privileged 
position over other peoples. But we do claim equal and 
honourable treatment for our people wherever they may 
go and we cannot accept any discrimination against 
them. 
In the interest of economic development of the country, for maintaining 
the independence of action in foreign affairs, for safeguarding the security of 
the nation and for working effectively for world peace, India decided to keep 
away from the rival power blocs and follow an independent foreign policy. In a 
speech delivered at the Indian council of World Affairs, New Delhi, on 
22 March 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru said: 
When 1 say that we should not align ourselves with any 
power blocs, obviously it does not mean that we should 
not be closer in our relation with some countries than with 
others. That depends on entirely different factors, chiefly 
political and economic. At the present moment, you will 
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see that as a matter of fact we have far closer relations 
with some countries of the Western World than with 
others. These close relations will no doubt develop and we 
will encourage them to develop. 
The basic idea that dominated Nehru's mind in the field of foreign 
poUcy was that the United States of America and the Soviet Union, both have 
emerged as the prime move of contemporary history. Nehru did not seem to 
regard China in any way different from India in terms of actual power to 
influence history. Nehru inspired hopes to develop multi-sided relations with 
Asian and African countries in general and with China in particular on the basis 
of Panchsheel. Nehru was of the opinion that India had hardly any thing to 
conceal. Nehru professed to stand whole-heartedly for a grand link up of forces 
of peace, independence and democracy. 
The post Second World War period witnessed the liquidation of 
colonialism in most of the Asian countries. The Western imperialists who 
managed to keep these colonies under their sway by following the policy of 
'divide and rule' for centuries followed the policy of either 'combine and go' 
or 'break and leave' in the process of granting independence to the colonies. 
For example, India, the former British colony was divided into two separate 
entities of union territory of India and Pakistan and independence was granted. 
Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak got their independence through merger with the 
Malaya Union, which got independence earlier in 1957. In the wake of partition 
or combination and independence, these colonies were left to face the social, 
economic and political dislocation that resulted in the encroachment upon 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the neighbouring countries. The sudden 
exposure to the international politics with a free hand to handle their foreign 
policies, the competition over filling up the vacuum created by the extinct of 
imperialists among the former colonies drove these states either to form one 
group against another or to join the already existing world blocs, to find only in 
opposite camps. 
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The importance of India's relations with the countries of Southeast Asia 
lies in the fact that her role in the Southeast Asia largely influenced policies of 
the major powers towards her. Except for North Vietnam, which allied itself 
with Soviet bloc and Thailand, Philippines and South Vietnam, which joined 
the Anglo-American bloc, most of the other countries of the region preferred to 
remain non-aligned. Another notable feature about the countries of Southeast 
Asia was that most of them adopted anti-imperialist postures because they were 
always scared that the imperialist powers might stage a comeback. The 
existence of close cultural bond between India and countries of Southeast Asia 
also contributed to closer relations between India and countries of the region. 
India from the very beginning felt the need of developing intimate 
relations with the countries of Southeast Asia and to prevent the domination of 
the region by the Communist or Western powers. India particularly looked at 
the armed struggles in the region as a positive threat to her stability and 
emphasized the need of keeping the countries of Southeast Asia free from the 
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influence of the super powers. 
Nehru's approach to colonialism was not limited to national boundaries 
of one country. Rather it was a worldwide phenomenon. It was the root cause 
of injustice and thus the main threat to peace in the world. Therefore, he 
believed that India's nationalist struggle was not an isolated one-rather he saw 
an obvious link between the nationalist movements all over the World. Nehru 
was overtly conscious of the fact that India's independence was an important 
landmark in the history of decolonization in Asia and Africa because it was the 
linchpin of the British colonial empire, which in turn was the mightiest of all 
the empires. Hence he, repeatedly referred to India's Central geographical 
location and to its past history of close relations with the neighbouring 
countries as being compelling factors for playing an active role as a torch-
bearer in their struggle for freedom from colonial rule. Because of this in the 
post independence period, opposition to colonialism and foreign domination in 
whatever forms it may be became one of the most important postulates of 
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Indian foreign policy for about a decade. During this period India lent full 
moral, diplomatic and to some extent also some material support to the Asian 
and African countries which were fighting against the forces of imperialism 
and colonialism in order to achieve their cherished goal of national 
independence. 
The year 1945 marked a dramatic climax in Indonesia's freedom 
movement. Immediately after the surrender of the Japanese to the Allied forces, 
Indonesian independence was proclaimed on 17"" August 1945 by Sukarno and 
Hatta and the Republic of Indonesia was established with the former as the 
President and the latter as Vice-President. But the Dutch Government was in no 
mood to relinquish its control over Indonesia. In order to help the Dutch 
Government in its endeavour to re-impose its rule, the British government 
signed a Civil Administration Agreement, which revealed the real intentions of 
the colonial powers in Indonesia. 
Although India herself was under alien rule, she was keenly interested in 
the developments taking place in the neighbouring countries particularly 
Indonesia. India's immediate reaction was to express its concern over the 
attempts of the colonial powers to re-subjugate the people of Southeast Asia 
through a resolution passed by the Indian National Congress at its Bombay 
session in September 1945. The resolution further stated that the continuation 
of imperialism in any guise or form was a violation of U.N. Charter. 
Moreover, the Indonesian nationalist leaders got full support from their 
Indian counterparts in the event of the use of Indian troops by the British 
Government to suppress the newly bom Republic of Indonesia after the 
Japanese defeat in order to help the Dutch Government to re-establish their 
rule. The working Committee of l.N.C. passed the following resolution in 
support of Indonesia: 
.... This Committee emphatically condemns the Wanton 
invasion of Java and other parts of Indonesia in order to 
impose Dutch imperialist domination on their unanimous 
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demand for a free stale. Any support from any quarter to 
imperialist designs in Indonesia, Indochina and elsewhere 
is resented throughout Asia as culpable violation of the 
professed aims of the United Nations and undeniable 
rights of the Asian nationals... .The Committee regrets 
that United States of America have their passive attitude... 
this committee are particularly distressed to find that units 
of Indian army arrayed against the Indonesians and 
Indochinese and views with deep indignation this 
mischievous use of the Indian forces by the British 
Government. 
In addition Nehru, in an interview to the Associated Press of India, 
while observing that British government had ignored the A.I.C.C. resolution 
warned the latter of the grave and far-reaching consequences. Finally, 
keeping in view the reaction of the Indian leaders and the resolve of the 
Indonesians, the British modified their approach to the Indonesian question and 
persuaded the Dutch to start negotiations. As a result the two parties signed an 
agreement called Linggadjati Agreement on 25 March 1947. India lent its 
whole-hearted support to the Indonesian Republic consistently and firmly till 
the complete transfer of power to them, which took place in Dec. 1949. 
Asian Relations Conference and Indonesian freedom movement 
India's anti-colonial policy found further expression at the Asian 
Relations Conference held at New Delhi from March 23 to April 2, 1947 under 
the auspices of Indian Council of World Affairs with full support and blessings 
of Nehru. Attended by 29 Asian countries, the Conference had five topics on its 
agenda. Apparently, the discussions on nationalist movement were of vital and 
immediate importance to the delegates because several of the countries were 
still in political bondage.'^ Few of them were at the threshold of freedom while 
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others had slill to reach the goal and only some out of them had achieved 
independence. Thus, the Conference proved to be big boost to them. 
The specific objective of group discussions on national movements was 
to spell out the problems, understand each other's difficulties and devise ways 
and means by which different countries of Asia could win their freedom. 
Nehru assured the Conference of India's whole-hearted support to the 
freedom movement in Southeast Asia but pointed out that as urged by some 
countries, active intervention on her part was far from realism because it was 
likely to enlarge the area of conflict, thus, go against their interests.'" Despite 
some degree of precaution, he forcefully declared that "the countries of Asia 
can no longer be used as pawns by others, they are bound to have their own 
policies in world affairs". 
As far as Indonesians were concerned, the synchronization of the 
Conference with their own struggle against colonialism suited them admirably 
as it provided them with an opportunity to let the World know the situation in 
their country by their own representatives. Nehru sent a special plane to fetch 
Indonesian Prime Minister Sultan Sjahrir to enable him to participate in the 
meet as he was delayed due to the signing of Linggadjati Agreement with the 
Dutch.'^ 
The exposure to the rest of the World filled the Indonesians with zest 
and self-confidence. For them the most important aspect of the Conference was 
the fact that it was able to lay principles of co-operation among Asian nations 
which eventually would prove of inestimable value for the struggle of 
Indonesian people, of equal importance was that independent Asian countries 
would form a strong force for the promotion of World Peace.'^ 
India and the first Dutch Police Action against Indonesia 
India's anti-colonial policy further got crystallized when the Dutch 
launched their military attack on the republic of Indonesia on July 20, 1947. 
This happened Just when India was to become an independent nation after a 
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month. Indian Govemmenl adopted a very stern attitude towards the Dutch 
action. Nehru criticized it strongly and observed that the Dutch mihtary action 
had "shocked not only the so called liberal elements in other countries but even 
those who normally would not be in sympathy with colonial people."'^ His 
immediate concern was to stop hostilities in Indonesia. He got in touch with the 
U.S.A. and Britain in this connection. He was approached by Republic of 
Indonesia along with Australia and the Arab League for intervention and 
mediation to prevent the war.'^ Nehru responded positively, took personal 
interest in Indonesian problem and provided all possible facilities and 
assistance to the leaders of Indonesia. Hatta paid a secret visit to India, in a 
plane owned by Biju Patnaik violating Dutch Air blockade, to have discussions 
with Nehru. Sahrir also utilized this facility to visit some other countries 
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besides India to explain their situation and seek international support. After 
talks with Sjahrir Nehru again criticized the Dutch action at a press Conference 
as "astounding thing" which "the spirit of New Asia will not tolerate". He 
further said: 
Apart from the merits of the case, no European country, 
whatever it might be, has any business to use its army in 
Asia. Foreign armies functioning on Asian soil are 
themselves an outrage to Asian sentiment. The fact that 
they are bombing defenseless people is a scandalous 
thing. If other members of United Nations tolerate this or 
remain ineffective then the United Nations Organization 
ceases to be. 
This statement of Nehru has been often described as Nehru's Munroe 
Doctrine for Asia. 
Besides, he took some solid steps to help Indonesians such as to ban the 
passage to the Dutch Air Craft through Indian air space and refused landing the 
refueling facility to the Dutch airlines. Further, India lost no time in bringing 
the Indonesians question to the attention of the U.N. Security Council. A few 
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hours before the U.N. was to discuss the Indonesian problem Nehru declared 
on 30"' July 1947 "Indonesia has become a symbol of Asian freedom and test 
for all powers and more specially for limited Nations". The Indian 
representative at the U.N. warned and reminded the Security Council: 
The members of the old League of Nations were guided by 
shortsighted expediency and the desire to avoid 
unpleasant situations, looked the other way when Japan 
started her undeclared war on China early in the interwar 
period. We all know what it cost the world afterwards. We 
can only pray that similar hesitation and vacillations now 
may not lead to similar tragedies . 
As a result of International pressure to resolve the Indonesian issue 
Renville Agreement was signed by the Dutch Government and the Republic of 
Indonesia on 10 January 1948. Although the agreement was inclined towards 
the Dutch the Indonesians accepted it only to be violated again by the fonner in 
even more blatant manner later. 
Second Police Action by the Dutch 
The accommodating attitude of the Indonesians was of no avail, as the 
adverse Dutch behaviour did not show any attitude of change in its 
fundamental policies. Soon after the Renville Agreement, situation started 
deteriorating while the U.N. Committee of good offices remained a helpless 
spectator. 
There were serious differences between the two parties over the 
interpretation of some issues, which led to the second military attack on the 
Republic of Indonesia and arresting Sukarno and his six cabinet colleagues in 
December 1948. The news caused much consternation in India. Jawaharlal 
Nehru who was attending the All India Working Committee session at Jaipur 
considered that Dutch military attack was contrary to all the principles of U.N. 
Charter and said: 
Thai no one can prevent the tide of independence in 
Asiatic countries. The police action of the Dutch will have 
serious repercussions in India, in Asia and perhaps in 
some other countries too. We cannot remain idle 
spectators.... Our foreign policy is that no power should 
rule any Asiatic country...and we will have to consider 
what we will have to do under the circumstances." 
A resolution was also passed by the A.I.C.C. in support of 
Indonesian cause. Once again India banned the K.L.M. Airlines (Dutch 
Aircraft) flights through Indian air space. It was also reported that India went to 
the extent of considering of breaking diplomatic relations with Netherlands but 
did not take any action because of the advise of the U.S. that such a step should 
only harm the Indonesian interest rather that help them. 
Moreover, it was believed that Indonesian leaders were also thinking of 
establishing a government in exile most probably in India for which Nehru was 
reported to have extended invitation to Sukarno, Hatta and Sahrir. 
India went to the U.N. Security Council again and reiterated her stand 
that weapons and wars could not suppress Indonesian nationalism because it 
"epitomizes the spirit that is stirring the whole of Asia". The Indian 
representative urged the Security Council should meet this emergency by 
ordering immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of Dutch troops to the line 
demarcated by Renville Agreement and release of all Indonesian leaders. As 
usual Security Council passed a resolution on Indonesian question but there 
was no positive outcome.^^ 
Nehru calls Conference on Indonesia 
While the Indonesian question was being considered at the U.N., Nehru 
also convened a Conference of 18 Asian nations at New Delhi to discuss it on 
20' January 1949. Naturally, the Indonesian leaders hailed this step as "the 
most encouraging manifestation of International concern" whereas the Dutch 
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govemmenl was stunned when it heard the news of Nehru convening a 
conference to discuss the "internal affairs of another country". 
The Conference passed three resolutions recommending the following to 
the Security Council - the release of all political prisoners, freedom to the 
republican government to function independently, formation of an Interim 
Government comprising of the representatives of Republic of Indonesia and 
non-republican territories by IS"* March 1949 which should enjoy full powers 
including control over its army and external affairs, elections to a Constituent 
Assembly to be completed by 1^ ' October, power over whole of Indonesia to be 
transfened by 1^ ' January 1950 to United States of Indonesia, and relations with 
Netherlands to be settled by negotiations. And finally, in the event of either 
party violating its recommendations, the Security Council should take effective 
action to reinforce them. 
Nehru sent these recommendations to the Security Council with 
assurance of full cooperation to end colonial rule in Indonesia. The Security 
Council could not ignore the demands of the New Delhi Conference and passed 
a resolution on 28"^  January 1949 embodying most of them. 
Having noticed that the Dutch did not pay heed to Security Council 
resolution, India took another initiative and with the support of Australian 
delegation requested the U.N. General Assembly to take up the matter on ll"^ 
May 1949. It urged that U.N. must strive to bring about a "just and honourable 
settlement of the question, which was of vital concern to the millions of 
inhabitants of Asia and was of paramount importance for the maintenance of 
peace in the World."^^ 
On the other hand, the Dutch Government was in a very difficult 
position in Indonesia. It was not able to control the situation either militarily or 
politically. Hence, there was a change in their attitude. Just 48 hours before the 
General Assembly debate on this question, it entered into an agreement with 
the Indonesian leaders and paving the way for a Round Table Conference held 
at the Hague from 23"* August to 2"'' November 1949. As a result of it the 
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prolonged struggle against colonial rule came to an end on 2?"^  December 1949 
with complete transfer of powers to the Republic of Indonesia. 
To sum up foregoing discussion one can say that India under the 
leadership of Nehru played a pioneering role in Indonesia's freedom struggle 
between 1945-49. India's independence proved to be a catalystic event in the 
process of decolonization in the post 2" World War period. Indonesian 
freedom struggle became a test case for India to prove the credentials of its 
anti-colonial posture in the world. India's crusade against colonialism 
continued in the subsequent years till most of the countries became free from 
the clutches of Western domination. 
Motivation Behind Nehru's Enormous support to Indonesia 
In the end, it seems quite relevant to examine various factors which 
propelled India, under Nehru's leadership, to spouse the Indonesian case in 
some details and explore whether Indian policy was motivated by the 
considerations of real politic or not? 
In this connection one can safely say that Nehru's policy was a fine 
picture of realism, idealism and sentimentalism so far as Indonesia was 
concerned. His personal friendship with Indonesian leaders especially Sukarno 
and Hatta was also an important factor to reckon with. Besides these elements 
he also, perhaps, seemed to be guided to some extent either consciously or 
unconsciously by the considerations of real politic if it is to be taken in the 
sense of influence politics or leadership. 
The most important factor behind India's deep interest in Indonesian 
case, of course, was the geographical position of the two countries. India and 
Indonesia, situated as they are in the Southern and Southeastern portions of the 
Asian continent, are close neighbours if not the next door. The distance 
between the Indian islands of Andaman and Nicobar and Indonesian Sabang 
Island in Sumatra is hardly about 100 miles. Besides, it is the third largest 
country of Asia and commands important sea routes between Indian and 
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Pacific Oceans. The trade between India and the rest of the world to a great 
extent passes through Strait of Malacca. Thus, the strategic importance of 
Indonesia to India from the point of view of defence and trade is enormous. 
Hence, it was in India's national interest that Indonesia remained free and 
peaceful with a friendly government in power. 
And lastly, there was question of leadership of Asia, though never 
openly acknowledged yet cannot be brushed aside without taking note of it. 
Nehru while discarding the foreign policy theories like balance of power and 
power - vacuum probably seems to be proceeding towards practicing a foreign 
policy with a goal of India's emergence as a great power in Asia which had 
potential to manage Asian affairs. During his speech in the Lok Sabha on 
foreign affairs on March 25* 1957 he said: 
What is the test of this vacuum idea, which is a dangerous 
idea, especially for Asian and African countries? It seems 
to me really to lead to the conclusion that where 
circumstances compel an imperialist power to withdraw, 
necessarily you must presume that it has left a vacuum. If 
so, how is that vacuum to be fdled? Surely if somebody 
else comes in, it is a repetition of the old story, perhaps in 
a different form. It can only be filled by the people of that 
country growing and developing them selves 
economically, politically and otherwise. 
Not only Nehru, the idea of leadership seems to be engrained in the 
minds of Indian elite and nationalist leaders even as early as 1918 when Bal 
Gangadhar Tilak wrote to Clemenceau, the President of Peace Conference, that 
India with its large population, resources and area could "well aspire to be a 
leading power in Asia, if not in the World". ^^  
K. M. Panikkar - an eminent writer, too expressed similar viewpoint about 
India's responsibilities in Asian affairs particularly in Southeast Asia. Any 
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because we are convinced that unless these basic problems are solved there 
can be no peace. 
In last it can be concluded that India through its poHcy towards 
hidonesia's Treedom struggle marked the beginning of a policy of positive 
intervention in international affairs in the interest of peace, security and 
stability which was carried forward successfully in the subsequent years. India 
emerged as spokesman of the dependent people in the World particularly in 
Asia through her exemplary role in Indonesian freedom struggle. This also 
established her sincere desire to cultivate friendly relations with her neighbours 
- not only with Indonesia but also with all of them. 
At the end of the Second World War, Indonesia, the largest country in 
Southeast Asia, came to be a test case for freedom from European colonialism. 
Finding the Indonesian Republic (Proclaimed on 17 August 1945) threatened 
with extinction and that too at the hands of British forces composed mostly of 
Indian soldiers, India, still in bondage, responded actively and positively to 
forestall the re-imposition of Dutch rule. The anti-imperialist and anti-
colonialist tone and temper of the Indian National Congress and its leaders 
could hardly brook the continuation of British imperialist policy in Southeast 
Asia. The all-Indian Congress Committee, on 23 September 1945, expresses 
deep resentment on "the continuation of an imperialist policy" in the region. It 
also took "strong objection to the use of Indian troops in maintaining 
imperialist domination over any of these countries." In a statement on 19 
October 1945, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, President of Indian National 
Congress, deeply resented the "use of Indian troops" in suppressing the 
"aspirations" of the nationalists "in Java and Indochina."^^ 
With the passage of time, as the Dutch continued their repressive 
measures against the leaders of the Indonesian Republic, India's moral and 
diplomatic support to the latter increased to suit the change in conditions in 
Indonesia. In September 1946, following the establishment of Interim 
Government in India, Jawaharlal Nehru, as the Vice President, made a major 
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policy statement clarifying India's attitude towards issues of regional and 
international importance. In this statement (on 7 September 1946) Nehru 
emphasized four essential tenets of free India's foreign policy, viz., non-
involvernenl in other people's quarrels, opposition to policing other countries 
and to the use of Indian resources, men and money, against the freedom 
struggle in any country, elimination of colonialism from all over Asia and 
Africa, and finally, promotion of racial equality."''' Within three months, the 
Indian Government ordered all the Indian troops out of Indonesia. This was 
the first major and practical step India took to strengthen Indonesian freedom 
before it was itself fully free. It also served to convince all the countries in 
Southeast and the West of India of its genuine desire to strengthen freedom 
movements against European colonialism. 
The (unofficial) Asian Relations Conference, which took place in New 
Delhi between 23 March and 2 April 1947 was an important landmark in the 
history of India, of the countries to the Southeast Asia of it and the rest of Asia. 
The Indonesians especially, were jubilant. After centuries of Dutch colonialism 
they were getting an opportunity to meet at New Delhi fellow Indians and other 
Asians and "participate" in a Conference "unaccompanied by alien advisers.""' 
From the Indian point of view, the Conference provided Nehru with an 
important occasion to set down in clear terms the basic objectives of free 
India's foreign policy. The "answering echo" and the "significant response" 
that India's invitation evoked from all over Asia prompted him to hark back to 
the past when all the Asian nations enjoyed mutually beneficial contacts. 
Foreign links broken during the colonial period and Asian recovery from the 
political, social, cultural and economic backlog of centuries of European 
domination appeared to be top-most in Nehru's mind. 
Fully realizing the importance of the emerging Asian nationalism as a 
new cohesive force in the international system, Nehru considered the dawn of 
As ian freedom as marking "the end of an era" and "the threshold of a new 
period of history." In his inaugural address, the Indian leader called for 
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reassertion of Asia's role in World politics and economy and declared ''Asia is 
again finding herself." He also stressed the important geographical location of 
India as "the meeting point of western and northern and eastern and Southern 
Asia" and also as "the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work 
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m Asia. 
In the framework of Nehru's Asia policy, the persistent Dutch efforts to 
smother the nascent Indonesian Republic and re-impose their colonial rule over 
Indonesia could hardly be brooked. Moreover, with Indonesia's independence 
was linked the question of India's own freedom. Dutch control over Indonesia, 
lying at a distance by sea of less than a hundred miles, could always pose a 
threat to the security and territorial integrity of India.^ ^ Besides, it could also 
imperil India's sea-borne trade across the Bay of Bengal. India thus took many 
steps to help to consolidate Indonesia's independence. Sultan Sahrir, the 
Adviser to President Sukarno, was smuggled out of Indonesia and enabled to 
participate in the Asian Relations Conference. Through this Conference, India 
also successfully endeavoured to internationalize the issue of Indonesian 
independence- something, in which the entire Asian continent came to have a 
stake.^ ^ 
Among some of the practical measures taken by Indian to strengthen 
Indonesian independence during thing period, were: (1) enabled the Indonesian 
Delegations and its leaders, including Sultan Sahrir, to participate in the Asian 
Relations Conference in New Delhi, (2) denial of Indian facilities to all Dutch 
aircraft and shipping, (3) persuading certain Asian/ Arab countries, such as, 
Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Saudi Arabia and Iraq to apply similar sanctions 
against and Dutch, (4) granting of de facto recognition to the Indonesian 
Republic and (5) dispatching a Red Cross medical unit to Indonesia. 
Under these pressures and the US threat to withdraw Marshall Aid, the 
Dutch ceased military action, resumed negotiations and finally agreed to 
transfer sovereignty to Indonesia on 27 December 1949. Thus, in the birth of 
Indonesia as an independent nation, India could certainly take legitimate pride. 
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But some cooling off was already noticeable towards the end of the 
fifties. Apart from the problem of ego and of leadership, Sukarno had 
developed closer links with China and gradually edged towards creating a new 
equation of China, North Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia and Pakistan, what he 
claimed to be a more radical conglomeration (although Pakistan hardly 
deserved that label) that would challenge the West, and perhaps the Soviet 
Union too, although this was not stated publicly, and constitute a more 
attractive fulcrum for Asian-African countries. India had fallen out with China, 
and Nehru also came to be as concerned with the issue of war and peace as 
with that of colonialism. These differences were apparent at the 1961 Non 
aligned Conference at Belgrade. 
Freedom Struggle in Indo China 
Another important issue that fitted well into Prime Minister Nehru's 
Asia policy was the Vietnamese struggle for freedom from French colonialism. 
Keeping in view India's all-out support to the Indonesian nationalists in their 
fight against the Dutch, it was very much expected that the Vietnamese 
freedom movement would likewise attract India's attention and active 
involvement. However, India's effort in this direction lacked the same 
enthusiasm. 
As the Vietnamese were in the process of what Mai the Chau, Ho Chi 
Minh's unofficial representative in India, described as "fight to death" against 
the French colonial forces in the beginning of 1946,'" Nehru ignored the 
Vietnemes appeal for help. Nehru also refused to agree to a plea by Sarat 
Chandra Bose (a member of his cabinet) requesting transport and passport 
facilities for his volunteer force organized by him for supporting the 
Vietnamese struggle. His argument was that India could not take action against 
a country until it was "at war" with it. 
The Indian leader, in fact, stressed the legal aspects of intervention in 
the Indochinese conflict and shied away from a situation, which was, in 
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essence, similar to tiiat in Indonesia. The Democralic Republic oC Vietnam's 
delegation to the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March-April 
1947 once again urged the Indian Government to accord recognition to the 
Government of Democratic Republic of Vietnam, use its influence at the 
United Nations to take up the Indochinese issue and take practical steps to stop 
French reinforcements. Although the Government of India took steps to limit 
the number of French aircraft flying across India and Nehru himself promised 
to bring sufficient pressure to bear on France, he failed to take measures 
comparable to those he took in support of the Indonesian struggle for 
independence. Nehru's attitude, which D.R. Sar Desai describes as one of 
"calculated circumspection" than one of "indifference or neglect," could be 
ascribed to several reasons. These include (i) the character of the leadership of 
freedom struggle in Vietnam, (ii) continued French control over five small 
possessions in India, and (iii) the emergence of a Communist regime in China 
in October 1949.^ ^ 
Nehru's enthusiasm was probably restrained by the fact that the 
Vietnamese nationalist struggle was dominated by the Communist leadership. 
The Nehi"u's Government aversion to Communist violence (as in India) was 
well known. This was particularly so where the local Communist rose against 
the nationalist leaderships fighting for freedom from colonialism. Within India, 
the Government had crushed the Telangana uprising with an iron hand. India 
did not show any aversion to the Indonesian nationalist leadership led by 
President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammed Hatta crushing the 
Communist-led Madiun revolt in September-December 1948. The Indian 
Govemme^nt supplied the U Nu Government in Rangoon (Burma) with arms 
and ammunition when the latter was threatened by the Communist-led revolt 
within three months of Burma's independence. India also contributed about 
one-sixth of the total amount of six million pounds given in assistance to the 
Burmese Government by five Commonwealth countries in March 1950 to meet 
the Communist threat. The Nehru Government openly condemned Communist 
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rebellion in Malaya. On his return from a lour of the region, B. V. Keskar, the 
Indian Deputy Minister for External Affairs, refused to treat the Malayan 
movement as a nationalist movement and observed that the insurgents in 
Malaya were nothing but bandits who did not care what or whom they 
opposed. Nehru personally and publicly denounced the Indian Communists in 
February 1949 for their violent activities and for their determination to "create 
a chaotic state in the country." His abhorrence of violence by Communists 
even prompted Nehru to treat communism as a negation of hard-won 
nationalist freedom. Nevertheless his anti-communism did not blur his 
understanding of the anti-colonial nature of the Vietnamese Communist 
leadership. It only tended to restrain his enthusiastic support. 
French dilatory tactics on the question of transfer of its authority on the 
five small colonial pockets to India was another likely reason that prompted the 
Nehru Government to be less enthusiastic to the Vietnamese question. These 
Indian territories were used by France for refueling and other facilities for its 
colonial v/ar in Indochina. India perforce had to adopt a less forceful attitude on 
the issue in its own national interest. In fact, France took seven years to grant 
freedom to its Indian territories, in October 1954. 
The establishment of People's Republic of China under Communist 
leadership of Mao Tse-Tung in October 1949 made India still more 
circumspect towards the Ho Chi Minh-led Vietnamese Communist movement. 
Vietnam's sharing a land border with China and its ideological affinity with the 
Chinese Communist Party held out the possibility of a southward push by the 
Chinese Communist movement. The historically indicated Chinese 
expansionist tendencies had been confirmed by China's forcible occupation of 
Tibet in 1950. Nehru was also fully aware of the historical fears of China in the 
minds of Southeast Asia. After all, Vietnam itself had suffered a long, one-
thousand-year tutelage under China's rule. For India itself, its northern borders, 
which had been dormant for centuries, had become suddenly alive. The 
emergence of Communist China added a new dimension to India's strategic 
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security environment. Indian fears were compounded by the repeated Chinese 
assertions that countries hke India, Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia were 
"semi-colonies" and that their freedom and independence was "'spurious". 
Nationalist leaders in India, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand and the Philippines 
were subjected to repeated condemnations. Nehru was frequently described as 
an "imperialist running dog," a "stooge of Anglo-American bloc", a "member 
of the political garbage group in Asia," and "the Chiang Kai-Shek of 
Taiwan. ""^ 
India's hesitation and circumspection as regards developments in 
Indochina continued until 1954, when it perceived a qualitative change in the 
international environment. One of the two Superpowers, the United States was 
committmg itself to giving military and economic assistance to France to 
enable it to carry on its colonial war in Indochina. By pursuing this policy, the 
Americans ostensibly aimed at checkmating the extension of communism, as 
also Chinese influence in neighbouring Laos and Cambodia and then in other 
countries of the region. On the other hand, China and the Soviet Union were 
committed to help, preserve and consolidate the gains achieved by the 
Vietnamese Communist leadership. The developments in Indochina thus 
showed possibilities of a Sino-American flash point at the regional as well as 
global level. Nehru's apprehension that the Sino-American conflict in Indo-
China would bring the war nearer home prompted him to take a sudden and 
renewed interest in the development in that part of Southeast Asia. He 
considered Indochina as "an Asian country and a proximate area". That is why, 
he stated, the "crisis" there "moves us deeply and calls from us our best 
thoughts and efforts to avert the trends of this conflict towards its extension and 
intensification and to promote the trends that might lead to a settlement." 
A significant development in the field of international politics, at this 
stage, prompted Prime Minister Nehru to shed his earlier hesitation and take an 
initiative with regards to the deteriorating situation in Indochina. Whereas in 
the eyes of the American leadership, India's policy of non-alignment continued 
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to be "immoral", in the framework of Soviet foreign policy. It was a policy of 
peaceful coexistence. Simultaneously, there was a degree of respite perceptible 
in the barrage of anti-Indian propaganda in the Chinese media. 
Indian official attitude to the Vietnamese question at the Asian Relations 
Conference in the following month, from March 23 to April 12, in New Delhi. 
This conference was attended by delegations from twenty-five Asian countries. 
Indochina was represented by two delegations, representing Ho Chi Minh's 
DRV and the French-backed regimes of Cambodia, Laos, and Cochin China. 
Both delegations had been invited by India, indicating that country's uncertain 
and noncommittal attitude toward the rival regimes in Vietnam. The DRV 
delegates attracted considerable curiosity and sympathy from other delegates, 
particularly as victims of recent French brutalities. They grimly told how the 
DRV messengers carrying the delegates' credentials were killed on two 
different occasions before the documents could be successfully smuggled to 
Bangkok, where the delegates awaited them."^ ^ Mai The Chau, the DRV 
representative in New Delhi, gave an up-to-date account of the Indochinese 
freedom struggle at the Round Table on National Movements of Freedom. He 
complained that insufficient help had been given his country when the French 
set up a puppet government in Cochin China, and that some Asian countries 
had even helped the French perpetuate colonialism by selling them arms and 
ammunition. He was grateful for the sympathy of Asian peoples, especially 
India, but added that sympathy and mere verbal support were not enough. The 
DRV delegation asked the Indian government to help the Indochinese 
movement in at least three positive ways: by recognizing the government of the 
DRV, by using influence at the United Nations to take up the Indochinese 
issue, and by taking practical steps to stop French reinforcements. 
The appeals of neither Bose nor the DRV delegation could convince 
Nehru, who then handled undivided India's portfolio of external affairs of the 
propriety of intervention of Indochina by outside countries, even on the 
grounds of a common struggle against colonialism and for Asian freedom. 
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Nehru emphasized the legal aspect of such intervention ifl Jjis^  reply to Bose, 
pointing out that "so long as the government of India is not at war with another 
country, it cannot take action against it" '^ and adding that in matters involving 
foreign relations the government of India must "rules and decorum". Replying 
to the charge by the Vietminh delegation that India's support to countries of 
Southeast Asia was more moral than material, Nehru said he did not see how 
the government oi' India or, for that matter, that of any other Asian country 
could be expected to declare war on France. His government had already taken 
steps to limit the number of French aircraft that might fly across India.^' He 
promised, however, to bring sufficient pressure to bear on France, which could 
not "obviously be done by government in public meetings."^ 
India did not take any comparable measures like Indonesia in regard to 
the Indochinese nationalist movement, despite direct appeals from the leaders 
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for joint Asian action to compel 
withdrawal of foreign troops and to take the issue to the United Nations. 
Instead, Nehru cautioned the Asian Relations Conference delegates against any 
outside interference. He advocated that the area of conflict be limited, in the 
interest of the Vietnamese themselves.^^ Had India's views changed enough in 
the period between March 1947 and January 1949, to justify Asian intervention 
in the Indonesian conflict? If so, would India be equally prepared to expose the 
Indochinese cause on similar lines after 1949? When some members of 
Nehru's own party contrasted the Indian attitudes in the two instances and 
urged Nehru to convene a Conference '^^  on Indochina as well, he parried the 
suggestion, his deputy, B. V. Keskar, indicated that he doubted that many 
Asiatic nations would attend if such a conference were summoned. Nehru 
ruled out intervention in Vietnam on the grounds that it would only be 
"theoretical"^'' and that the nationalist sentiment of the Vietnamese people 
would resent foreign interference even if it came with the best of motives. He 
added that such well-meaning interference could be used by colonial powers to 
discredit a nationalist movement as not bemg independent and indigenous but 
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controlled by external agencies. It is superiluous to point out that each of these 
arguments was equally relevant in the Indonesian context and that they did not 
prevent the Indian government's willing intervention in Indonesia's favor in 
January 1949. 
Of all the anticolonial movements in Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese 
struggle for freedom was probably the most complex." 
In 1949 India's attitude towards a communist-led Vietnam movement 
also underwent substantial changes. The Elysee Agreements of March 8, 1949, 
established the republic of Vietnam as an Associated State in the French union, 
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along with Laos and Cambodia. Unlike the components of the (British) 
Commonwealth of Nations, to which the arrangement was compared, however, 
the Associated states had varying degrees of autonomy. Thus Vietnam's 
foreign policy and military matters were retained under French control. 
Vietnam was given the right to appoint diplomats only to China, Thailand and 
the Vactican.^^ The accords had taken so long to negotiate that by the time they 
were ready for signature China had turned communist and India was 
substituted for China in the accords-a meaningless change, since India did not 
recognize the Bao Dai regime. The French authorities further made it clear that 
the measure of independence granted would not be permitted to jeopardize the 
French position in Indochina. French troops and French administrators were 
accordingly continued in Indochina. Because of such serious limitations, the 
Elysee Agreements instead of inspiring enthusiasm among the Vietnamese 
nationalists hardened the opposition of even those Vietnamese who were sworn 
enemies of Ho Chi Minh. Ngo Dinh Diem, for example, rejected the offer of 
premiership in the new regime. Speaking on behalf of a majority of the 
nationalists, who desired genuine independence and chose to remain neutral 
between Bao Dai and Ho Chi Minh, Diem commented the day after the Elysee 
accords v^ere formally accepted in Saigon: 
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The national aspirations of the Vietnamese people will he 
satisfied only on the day when our nation obtains the same 
political status which India and Pakistan enjoy.' 
The Indian government did not recognize the Bao Dai regime for 
various reasons. Not only was pubHc opinion adverse in India, the government 
itself was well aware that the emperor was only a French puppet who did not 
command any support from his people. ' In January, 1950, the Indian 
government accorded no courtesy whatever to Bao Dai's representative, who 
had especially gone to New Delhi to seek India's recognition of the regime. 
Nehru unceremoniously rejected him, stating, "He does not represent any body 
to us."" 
The internationalization of the Indochinese conflict, the clarification of 
the communist character of the Vietminh movement, and the shift of Indian 
international posture to a more neutral one in late 1949-these were important 
factors determining the altered Indian attitude toward Indochina. Recognition 
of either regime in Indochina would reflect Indian policy toward basic global 
issues, and between the East and West, and between the Communist and the 
anti-Communist blocs. Nehru would have perhaps preferred to remain silent, 
but his nonalignment policy by its very nature forced India to articulate her 
stand on every major issue arising from the cold war. When he was asked about 
his reaction to the recognition of the Ho Chi Minh regime by Communist 
countries and of Bao Dai by the United States and other Western powers, he 
replied: 
// is not for me to criticize other governments, they have to 
decide on what they think is right. But we have, after 
careful consideration of the situation in Indochina, come 
to the conclusion that we should not jump into the fray.^^ 
The Indian government, therefore, turned down the requests of both the 
Bao Dai and Ho Chi Minh regimes for recognition.^'' 
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Nehru's decision to abstain from interference in Indochina did not go 
unchallenged in hidia, where anticolonial sentiment often obliterated 
distinction between communism and anti-communism. Many congress party 
members, provoked by occasionally disturbing accounts of the Indochinese 
conflict, invoked their party's anticolonial resolution of 1948,''^  and urged the 
Indian government to intervene in the interest of the Indochinese people's 
freedom. In 1950 Indian nationalists strongly suggested the convening of an 
Asian Conference on Indochina on the same pattern as the earlier meeting on 
Indonesia in 1949. 
Nehru seemed willing to shut his eyes to this minimum foreign 
intervention, calnng the Indochinese sit^lation a civil war.^ ^ On the several 
occasions when the matter was revised in the Indian Parliament, Nehru 
defended with a number of excuses his government's policy of non-recognition 
of any regime in Indochina and of denial of any assistance to the indochinese 
freedom movement. Further, India's policy was to keep out of other people's 
troubles, because she had enough of her own. All these pretexts provided 
umbrage to the Indian non-interventionist attitude, which Nehru admitted on at 
least one occasion, was guided by "larger considerations."^^ The larger 
considerations were the real reasons for Indian inaction, and they certainly 
included India's national need for friendship with china and France as well as 
the broader interests of seeking to maintain world peace. India's policy of non-
intervention, not jumping into the fray and keeping out of other people's 
troubles continued until early 1954. 
Throughout the period of the Indochinese talks. New Delhi proved that 
the future of Indochina was being decided soon. Of all the visits of diplomats 
and statesmen to New Delhi in that connection, Chau En-Lai's was certainly 
the most significant.^^ 
Chau-Nehru meeting was therefore of great significance, marking a new 
era in Asian politics. The joint communique issued at the end of Chau's visit 
contained the five principles or Panchsheel, of which the most important was 
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peaceful coexistence. This was the culmination of a long-tenn effort on 
Nehru's part to arrive at a basis of sound relationship with China.™ 
India's support to Malaysia 
Prior to World War II, there was an Indian Advisory Board, a nominated 
body, whose responsibilities were to advise the Malayan Government on 
matters concerning the Indian population, amongst whom political activity was 
taboo. Therefore, it was not until the Japanese conquered the country that 
interest in politics was roused amongst Indians. Japanese propaganda 
constantly reminded Indians of their patriotic duty towards India, and though 
this was primarily for Japanese benefit, there was fair response. 
On the close of World War II, Malaya was put under a military form of 
Government by the British. A number of Indians were prosecuted for pro-
Japanese activities. The old office of the Agent of the Indian Government, 
which had been closed on the arrival of the Japanese occupation, again 
commenced functioning in September 1945. In order to have closer liaison with 
Lord Mountbattens's headquarters, the Indian Government appointed a 
Representative and liaison Officer in October. The appointment was necessary 
in order to watch Indian interests in Malaya in general, and in particular of 
those Indians, who had been prosecuted due to their connection with either the 
India Independence League or the I.N.A. Apart from this, the conditions of 
Indian labour had deteriorated, mainly because many had been transported by 
the Japanese to work on the construction of the ill-fated Burma-Thailand 
Railway.^' 
In order to have first-hand information the Government of India directed 
its Indian Agent in November 1945, to study the situation and report. Not 
satisfied with this, a non-official delegation was sent out there. Immediately 
afterwards, Nehru himself proceeded to Malaya in March 1946. His visit was 
very beneficial as he was able to achieve much for the Indian Community, 
especially in the establishment of a Trust. It was as a result of his efforts that 
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many Indians who had been arrested for collaboration with the Japanese were 
released. Those who were unable to pay their passage to India were assisted by 
the Indian Government, who also relaxed export regulations in order that 
succour in the form of new and old clothes could reach needy Indians in 
Malaya. Three medical missions, two sponsored by the Indian National 
Congress and one by the Government of India were sent to Malaya to render 
medical aid. Due to the above activities and interest taken by the Indian 
Government and the Indian public, the whole situation influenced the Malayan 
Government to revise their policy towards Indians in Malaya. In early 1953, 
initially the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) boycotted the government, but 
later called it off to give a fair chance to the working of the new constitution. 
The British also appreciated and realized the value of the presence of the Indian 
community, who in the past has all along played no mean part in the economic 
development of the country. 
At that time, the vital problem thai confronted Indians in Malaya was the 
question of citizenship: whether they should adopt Malayan citizenship or 
remain Indians? The crux of the question was that most of them then desired 
the benefits of both, that is, to remain Indian citizens, while simultaneously 
claiming certain rights by virtue of their residential qualifications. Dual 
citizenship for obvious reasons was neither desirable nor possible. The nail was 
hit on the head when Prime Minister Nehru made it clear and sounded a note of 
warning that in so far as citizenship was concerned, the Malayan Indians must 
choose one way or the other, and there was no middle way. The majority of 
Indians have since decided to remain in Malaya, the country of their adoption, 
and to be at one with the Malays for the future good of the country, in whose 
legislatures they have since been adequately represented. This wise move had 
actually placed them in a rather significant position, because they may well act 
as a balancing force between the indigenous Malays and the Chinese. 
In so far as India is concerned, the Malayan leaders are convinced of her 
lead in the ways of peace and mutual goodwill. Under suitable arrangements, 
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Malaya could obtain aid from India, which has already done so much in the 
matter and in the last decade has permitted emigration of a large number of 
educationists, doctors and engineers, all of whom could ill be spared from 
India. Indian textiles have since long found a ready and eager market in 
Malaya, and Malayans find Indian materials economically cheaper and more 
durable than imports from elsewhere. Malaya could also seek aid in the form of 
agricultural implements and machiners'. The visit of Malaya's Minister of 
Agriculture proved beneficial in this direction, and he has appreciated the 
tremendous strides that India has made in agriculture, and gave hints of 
adopting similar measures in Malaya's development in this sphere. 
That Malaya looks up to India with a spirit of friendship and mutual 
goodwill was reiterated in June 1957, when Malaya's Commissioner in India, 
Inche M. Ghazali Bin Shafie, addressing Delhi Rotarians, asserted: 
...the people of Malaya as you already know have always 
had close affinity with the people of your great country. 
From your leaders like Gandhi, we have drawn 
inspiration. You have taught the world by your examples 
that the struggle for independence could be carried out by 
peaceful and constitutional forces. ...your achievements 
will help us to give the answer alike to the challenge of the 
casual materialism of the ordinary man and the spiritual 
and ideological need which will satisfy the nation.... Like 
the people of India we too are not content with the existing 
state of things and it is the sincere aspiration of every 
Malayan to be pioneers oj a new Malaya and not merely 
survivors oj a decaying . 
A peaceful and progressive Malaya will indeed be an asset in Southeast 
Asia, a thing which India keenly desires in the interest not only of her own 
progress and development but also that of peace of the world in general. 
In December 1948, Nehru, Indian Prime Minister on the charge of 
Indian being involved in communist activities in Malaya asserted: 
I have gone into this matter of Indians arrested in Malays for alleged 
communist activities being deported to Madras, and then being kept in prison 
in Madras for interrogation.... He further stated that: 
We should make it clear to our own people as well as to 
the British authorities that we cannot act merely on 
British reports. We have to balance two factors: (i) 
danger to public security in India, (ii) effect on large 
sections of the Indian community abroad. If we irritate the 
latter by our policy, we create not only a difficult but also 
possibly a dangerous situation later on. Indeed, we drive 
many of them into wrong hands and our influence on them 
decreases. In such matters we have therefore to pay a 
good deal of attention to the views and recommendations 
of our Representative in Malaya. It must be remembered 
that it is perfectly open to any Indian in Malaya, 
Communist or not, to return of his own accord to India. If, 
therefore, any persons want to come here to create trouble 
they can normally do so, and there is nothing to prevent 
them.... 
Budh Singh, President of the Malayan Indian Congress, 1947-50, leader 
of the Malayan Indian delegation to the Jaipur Session of the Indian National 
Congress in December 1948, visited India in 1950, gave the memorandum 
stated that the planters and businessmen in Malaya were working in collusion 
with the Government to deny Indian labourers "the right of a united labour 
front." Indian labourers were financially discriminated against and harassed 
and, though not connected in any way with terrorism and the industrial unrest 
prevailing in Malaya, were subjected to detention and unfair treatment. The 
memorandum suggested several measures to be taken by the Government of 
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India and finally asked for an Indian officer to be stafioned permanently in 
Penang to deal with the issue of permits and passports for Indians in Malaya. ^ ^ 
Again Nehru stated that, 
Communism in Russia had achieved a great deal but this 
had been done at a tremendous cost About Malaya, he 
wondered why we were finding it so difficult to suppress 
the Communists and restore law and order. Was this not 
because the so-called bandits had support from the local 
population for nationalist or economic reason? Would it 
not be well? Therefore, to satisfy the nationalist urges and 
improve material welfare of the people at large. 
Further Nehru made a two days visit to Singapore from 17 to 19 June 
1950, on the foundation stone of the Indian Association he said: 
Malaya is a land of many races and if here they can 
evolve a nationality, they will have achieved something 
valuable. Indians in Malaya must be loyal to the land they 
live in and to integrate themselves with other communities 
inhabiting it. The Indians have not perhaps learnt this 
lesson well and have a tendency to function even on a 
provincial plane instead of the all-India plane. Wherever 
Indians went, they were in a sense ambassadors of India, 
taking a little of India with them. They must see that they 
do nothing that would cast a slur on their country. They 
should also function to bring about goodwill betM'een 
India and the country they lived in. In the present context 
of things we must not think of leadership but of 
cooperation among countries. Immediately we think of 
leadership, there are mental conflicts. India's desire is to 
be left to herself to work on her problems. She does not 
have resources to deal with the problems of others. // she 
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succeeds in solving her own problems, it will help in 
solving world problems. 
Again Nehru in his speech at a pubHc meeting in Singapore on 18 June 
1950 addressed: 
Malayan terrorism is excessively harmful and should not 
be tolerated. It passes my comprehension how a campaign 
of violence can lead to any good whatsoever, it degrades 
humanity. The basic ideals that Mahatma Gandhi has 
taught India are of the most essential importance for the 
World today, their central massage is that evil must not be 
done even if it might yield some good temporarily, 
because it must have its reaction and produce more evil. 
Cooperation between the different nations, races and 
communities is essential in the present World situation. 
Malaya with its Malay, Chinese, Indian and other 
population can set a great example to the world in such 
78 
cooperation. 
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CHAPTER-3 
JNDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING 1951-56 
India has always been interested in the region of Southeast Asia because 
of its proximity to India. But since independence India has been very much 
interested in the political developments and security aspects of the area. Early in 
1954 this interest was sharpened by the mounting tempo of the Indochina 
conflict, and Prime Minister Nehru had in fact suggested a cease-fire in February 
1954. In this context, India was informed by the British Government in April, 
1954, of the Anglo-American decision to take part in an examination of the 
possibility of establishing a collective defence system in Southeast Asia to 
assure 'peace, security and freedom' to the nations of Southeast Asia and 
Western Pacific. Paradoxically enough, this proposal which was aimed at 
countering potential Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia was sponsored on the 
eve of the Geneva Conference on Far East at which a settlement of the Indochina 
conflict was due to be discussed, with China as a participant, it was apparently 
not considered necessary during eight long years when the Indochina conflict 
lasted. 'The Government of India deeply regret and are much concerned," said 
Nehru in an important statement to Parliament, 'that a Conference of such 
momentous character, obviously called together because negotiation was 
considered both feasible and necessary, should be preceded by a proclamation of 
what amounts to lack of faith in it and of alternative involving threats of 
sanctions. Negotiations are handicapped, they start ill and they make chequered 
progress, if any at all, with duress, threats, slights and proclamations of lack of 
faith preceding them.' These developments were 'of grave concern and of 
grievous significance' to India. Their implications impinge on the newly won 
and cherished independence of Asian countries. The maintenance of 
independence and sovereignty of Asian countries as well as the end of colonial 
and foreign rule is essential to the prosperity of Asian peoples as well as for the 
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peace of the world. He further clarified his point that we do not seek any special 
role in Asia, nor do we champion any narrow and sectional Asian regionalism. 
We only seek to keep for ourselves and the adherence of others, particularly our 
neighbours, to a peace area and to a policy of non-alignment and non-
commitment to world tensions and wars. Thus, we believe, is essential to us for 
our own sake and can alone enabling us to make our contribution to lowering 
world tensions, to furthering disarmament and to world peace. The present 
developments, however, cast a deep shadow on our hopes, they impinge on our 
basic policies and they seek to contain us in alignments.' Nehru also underlined 
the ominous fact that the announcement of the proposal to set up the SEATO had 
been preceded by statements 'which came near to assuming protection, or 
declaring a kind of Monroe Doctrine, unilaterally, over the countries of 
Southeast Asia.'' Likewise, the Government reacted adversely to the move of the 
Thailand Government in May 1954 to approach the Security Council for a UN 
observer mission to Southeast Asia in order to forestall a potential Chinese 
Communist threat to the region. They considered the move ill-timed in view of 
the current discussions at the Geneva Conference on the Indochina issue. The 
Government also reportedly declined the invitation of the British Government 
for a conference of all the Colombo Powers plus Australia and New Zealand to 
discuss the proposal of setting up a Southeast Asian collective security 
organization.^ Furthermore, Prime Minister Nehru successfully discouraged the 
Ceylon Prime Minister who had proposed that the Colombo Prime Minister meet 
in September to consider the same proposal he is reported to have told the 
Ceylon Prime Minister that such a meeting was premature and inopportune since 
all the Colombo Powers had already declared their views in the matter."* 
In view of all this, there was no question of India participating in the 
Manila Conference, which was held in September 1954 to discuss the setting up 
of the proposed collective security organization. India's participation in such a 
Conference would have not only been incompatible with her policy of non-
alignment but also in view of her acceptance of the chairmanship of the 
Indochina commissions, it would have been 'totally inappropriate and 
unbecoming,' said Nehru. The setting up of the organization, India feared, was 
"likely to change the whole trend towards peace' that the Geneva Conference 
had created by the Indochina settlement and was rather likely to give 'a new and 
wrong, direction to that trend. Apart from this, the Indochina settlement was 
based on the fundamental assumption that the newborn states would remain 
neutral. If now anything was done which affected that basic assumption, 'the 
whole conception of the Geneva Conference decisions is shaken not only 
psychologically but practically'.^ 
Soon after the establishment of the SEATO, Nehru reiterated India's 
many objections to it with specific reference to the tenns of the treaty. While the 
treaty itself did not go very far, it was not limited to the area of the parties to the 
treaty, but extended to an area which these countries designated- 'a dangerous 
extension.' The treaty was 'looking dangerously in this direction of spheres of 
influence to be executed by powerful countries. By another provision, the treaty 
powers could intervene by reason of 'a fact or situation created within that area,' 
i.e. in some internal affair of a state. '...Does it not affect the whole conception 
of integrity, independence and sovereignty of the countries of this area'? asked 
Nehru.^ The whole approach of the treaty was not only a wrong approach but a 
dangerous approach from the point of view of any Asian country. The treaty 
converted a potential area of peace into 'an area of potential war.' Of course, 
India did not object to outside Powers taking interest in Southeast Asia, but 
when vital decisions were taken ignoring the vital parts of that area, there was 
something wrong in that procedure. Referring to the argument that China and 
Russia could not be trusted, Nehru observed that in the final analysis no country 
could trust the other. 'We need not live in a fairy world where nothing wrong 
happens. Wrong does happen. But we can create an environment wherein it 
becomes a little more dangerous to the other party to break away from the 
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pledges given. Surely, that is not only good morality but good commonsense.' 
What the SEATO tried to do was to warn others of strong action if they did this 
or that. But 'this business of carrying on diplomacy by threats' had not proved 
successful in the past and would not be so in future either. Such tactics resulted 
either in war or in humiliating surrender. 
Apart from these many-sided objections, India was directly affected by 
the establishment of the SEATO because India came under the 'treaty area' of 
the pact. Pakistan was the only 'Colombo Power' which participated in the 
Manila Conference and which also joined the organization. It was believed in 
India at least that the only reason for her joining the pact was her hostility 
towards India.^ That she joined it to achieve her own ends was proved by the 
reference, at the instance of Pakistan of the Council meeting of the SEATO in 
March 1956 in its communique^ refer to the needs for early settlement of the 
Kashmir dispute, a matter which, in the Indian view was wholly outside the 
purview of the organization. Naturally, the Indian Government reacted rather 
strongly against this reference. Nehru observed that this reference came to them 
as a 'great surprise' and that the reference to Kashmir had 'confirmed our worst 
apprehensions about the organization which it represents.' Since the subject of 
Kashmir had nothing to do with the declared object of the SEATO [to increase 
defensive strength of member nations against external aggression and internal 
subversion], the reference 'could only mean that a military alliance is backing 
one countr>', namely, Pakistan, in its disputes with India. For any organization to 
function in this way to the detriment of a country, which is friendly to the 
individual countries comprised in the organization would at any time be 
considered as impropriety.' India had therefore protested to all the countries 
concerned at the unusual procedure adopted by the Council. 
The Geneva settlement on Indochina was based on the recognition of the 
need and practicability of co-existence of states of differing ideologies, 
especially China vis-a-vis the Indochina states. The establishment of the SEATO 
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was the very negation of that recognition, i he two Big Powers, the UK and 
France, which tooic the initiative to negotiate the Indochina settlement should 
have also participated in the Manila Conference and agreed to set up the SEATO 
was all the more odd, if not worse. If their real object was to ensure security for 
the Southeast Asian region, then, suggested Nehru, the People's Republic of 
China must be recognized and allowed to come into the United Nations, thereby 
China would have assumed certain responsibilities as a member of the United 
Nations. Thai would have been a far better way of ensuring security than the 
creation of the SEATO. In fact, the Government and people of India strongly 
believed that there could be no settlement either in East or Southeast Asia unless 
the existence of China was acknowledged by the Western Powers and given its 
rightful place in the comity of nations. Perhaps, partly as a result of the belated 
recognition of this vital truth, the dominant powers of the SEATO allowed the 
Organization to languish slowly without achieving anything. It is significant to 
note that two years after the establishment of the organization it 'neither excited 
its supporters nor frightened its opponents' and that if the military arrangements 
of the SEATO were not to be 'politically disastrous,' a vigorous effort to reach a 
modus vivid with China should be made which would have the approval of the 
Southeast Asian nations. 
In relation to international peace and security, it is also a proximate area 
of vital concern to India- as India's interest in the resolution of Indochina 
conflict and opposition to the establishment of the SEATO demonstrated. Burma 
and Indonesia were associated with India in the Colombo Conference of 
Southeast Asian Prime Ministers, as well as in the Colombo Plan for economic 
development. Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia and Laos 
(the last two, after their admission to the United Nations in December 1955) 
were working with India in the Asian-African group at the United Nations. 
During the period of this survey, Prime Minister Nehru visited almost all of the 
countries in the region and the leaders olmany of them also visited India. Vice-
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President Radhakrishnan visited Thailand and Indonesia. In April 1954 India and 
Thailand formally agreed to terminate the state of war between them. India 
exchanged with many of the countries 01" the region goodwill, cultural, trade, 
defence and such other missions, and also concluded trade and cultural 
agreements. In the field of foreign policy, however, only Burma, Cambodia and 
Indonesia were the closest to India. 
There has always been a tremendous fund of goodwill and understanding 
in India for Burma which, before 1937 was a province of India. This was 
demonstrated in many ways during the period of this survey. In March 1954 
India made a deal for the purchase of 9 lakh tons of rice from Burma on 
admittedly generous terms - so generous that it evoked great appreciation in 
Burma. Even more generous to Burma was the terms of settlement in April 1954 
of the debt which Burma owed India arising out of separation with India in 1937. 
Both the rice deal and the debt settlement 'are an earnest of India's desire to 
place Burma on her feet [after the ravages of World War II] and strengthen the 
economic and political ties between the two countries. It is heartening to know 
that this is fully appreciated in Burma.' In October 1955, India also granted 
Burma a loan of Rs. 20 crores. Burma was the recipient of Indian aid under the 
Colombo Plan. India vigorously supported in the forum of the United Nations 
the Burmese complaint against the aggression of Kuomintang troops in Burma. 
Unfortunately, however, Burma did not fully reciprocate this goodwill 
where it concerned the 6-7 lakhs of Indians in Burma or the claims on Burma of 
former Indian residents. There was the question of adequate and fair 
compensation for nationalizing more than a million acres of Indian-owned land. 
As against the market value of Rs.70 crores assessed by Indian landholders, the 
Burma Government was expected to pay as compensation only about Rs. 1 
crore. As this was considered inadequate, the Indian Government had sent in 
December 1953 a delegation to Burma to discuss the question with the Burmese 
Government, but the latter declined to reconsider the scale of compensation. 
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Indian nationals also had a grievance against Burma on account of restrictions on 
travel between the two countries as well as restrictions on remittances to India. 
The position regarding the disposal of applications for Burmese citizenship by 
Indian applicants was not also satisfactory. The Burmese Government ignored 
the Indian Government's request for reimbursing Indian nationals who suffered 
during World War II in Burma an estimated loss of 73 million pounds Sterling, 
even though the Burmese Government itself was expected to receive reparations 
from Japan to the tune of some £250 miUion. For the sake of Indo-Burmese 
goodwill, the Indian Government did not take a strong stand on any of these 
issues. With the result, there was a feeling in certain sections of Indian opinion 
that the Government of India was paying a very high price for Burmese goodwill 
towards India. 
At the end of 1954, India gave de facto recognition to North Vietnam 
(similar recognition having been given to South Vietnam before) and Laos, and 
established a special political mission in Cambodia. With Cambodia, India 
renewed her ancient ties of friendship and culture. Prime Minister Nehru visited 
Pnompenh (Cambodia) in November 1954 and the Cambodian leaders visited 
New Delhi in March 1954. On the latter occasion, India offered to recognize 
Cambodia and provide help to preserve her independence and integrity, establish 
diplomatic relations and give her economic aid for development. On foreign 
policy the Cambodian Government followed, like India, a policy of non-
alignment and refused to accept the protection offered by the SEATO. 
During this period India and Indonesia acted in close liaison in 
international affairs, both following a policy of non-alignment and adhering to 
the principles of Panchsheel. They co-operated especially in the Colombo 
Conference of Southeast Asian Prime Ministers and in the holding of the Asian-
African conference of which Indonesia was one of the sponsors and the host 
country. The leaders of the two countries exchanged visits more than once. They 
co-operated in the training of Indonesian air force personnel. There was also 
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concluded between the two countries a cultural agreement in Deceqiber 1955. 
India gave energetic support to the Indonesian stand on the West Irian 
10 
question. 
India and Collective Peace Efforts 
India continued her policy of circumspection and noninterference in the 
affairs of Indochina until early 1954. Despite economic and military aid to the 
rival sides from Communist China on the one hand and the United States on the 
other, the Indochinese conflict had remained essentially a bipartisan conflict 
between France and the Vietminh. But toward the end of 1953 and early in 1954 
there were ominous signs of escalation of the conflict by direct participation of 
United States armed forces and the possible development into a Korean type of 
war in the region. It was primarily the concern for peace in an area so close to 
her own borders that dislodged India from her policy of non-inter\'ention in 
Indochina. There were also other reasons, including some subtle but sure 
alterations in Indian Foreign Policy about this time, which invited and 
appropriated for itself a larger share in world politics. India's role in the 
settlement of the Indochinese dispute and her detente with Communist China 
marked the beginning of a more forward stance, described by Nehru as "positive 
dynamic neutralism." 
Nehru's interest in peace was not entirely altruistic, but was guided 
primarily by India's national interests. According to him, India opposed war not 
only on principle basis but because of her selfish interest in peace, if a war broke 
out and even if India managed to keep aloof from it, the resulting economic and 
political repercussions would adversely affect Indian development plans.'^ As 
Nehru wrote to the Presidents of the state Congress Committees in July, 1954, 
the progress of India and other Asian countries depend upon peace, which may 
not be guaranteed indefinitely but was certainly worth striving for even if it 
lasted for a few years.'-^ "Peace to us is not just a fervent hope, it is an emergent 
necessity'', Nehru told the Indian Parliament earlier in April, 1954.''' It was 
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desirable to have world peace, but it was even more essential to have peaceful 
conditions nearer home in Asia. The difference in Nehru's protests about 
SEATO, MEDO, and American military aid to Pakistan can be contrasted with 
his attitude toward NATO. ' If the Korean problem interested him more than 
interested the German, it was because of the formers proximity to India and the 
prospect of Chinese and American intervention bringing war to Asian soil, 
similar possibilities in Indochina caused him greater concern because of its 
proximit)' to India. In his speech in the Indian parliament: 
Indochina is a Southeast Asian country and a proximate 
area. The crisis in respect of Indochina therefore moves us 
deeply and calls from us our best thoughts and efforts to 
avert the trends of this conflict towards its extension and 
intensification and to promote the trends that might lead to 
a settlement}^ 
The events of the latter half of 1953, foreshadowing internationalization 
of the Indochinese situation, clashed with Nehru's policy of enlargement of the 
area of peace and of nonalignment in neighbouring Southeast Asia. Then too, 
further intervention in Asia would force fresh policy assessments for the 
countries of Southeast Asia and disturb the vital balance of power in the region. 
In this context China was very much in Nehru's mind and India's policy 
since 1949 had been China-oriented, particularly with respect to China's 
neighbors and the spread of international communism in Southeast Asia. India's 
interest had so far been to limit the Indochinese conflict to the French and the 
Vietminh and to keep other powers, particularly the United States and China, out 
of the region. If American intervention increased, it was logical, on the basis of 
the Korean Precedent and Chinese Pronouncements, to expect Chinese 
retaliation, giving the latter an opportunity to enhance its influence not only in 
Indochina but elsewhere in Southeast Asia. India's policy towards China was 
one of seeking her friendship and getting her admitted to the United Nations, 
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thus making her more responsible to World opinion. At the same time, India had 
taken certain limited measures to reinforce the regimes of the States lying 
between India and China.''' 
Nehru's appeal for a cease-fire in Indochina must be viewed in this wider 
context of the fresh formulation of Indian foreign policy aims and the conflicting 
positions of the United States and India in regard to the character of the 
Communist threat to Southeast Asia and the methods to counter such a threat. It 
is possible to criticise Nehru for having made his cease-fire appeal rather 
prematuiely and probably even without adequate knowledge of Indochinese 
affairs. Indeed, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs was not so well informed 
on the internal situation of Indochina, particularly about the logistical position of 
the combatants, as it was about the international aspects of the conflict. 
Nehru had not asked the parties to give up their present positions he had 
asked for a cease-fire irrespective of the rights of the parties, which should be 
determined not on the battlefield but at the negotiations table. As it happened, 
the Vietminh intensified their campaign by launching a major all-out offensive 
on Dien Bien Phu in March 13, 1954, invading Cambodia in April 1954 and in 
general extending their positions throughout Indochina. And eventually when the 
cease-fire was agreed upon in July, 1954, it was despite the lack of a continuous 
fighting line. 
The Indian reaction was overwhelming in support of Nehru's appeal for a 
cease-fire. All leading newspapers editorially welcomed the initiative for the 
cessation of hostilities, which they considered "the essential minimum without 
which negotiations at the highest level will be entirely futile." 
American policy advocated a scrupulous exclusion of India from any 
share in the discussions on Indochina or in the general security arrangements for 
Southeast Asia. Both factors- the growing concern over the internationalization 
of the Indochinese conflict, and the American moves deliberately to exclude 
India- had the effect of enhancing India interest in the discussions concerning 
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Indochina. Soon India diplomacy seemed determined to push ils way to the 
Geneva Conference label, failing which it would at least compel the powers 
assembled there to lake adequate notice of India's views on this Asian 
problem. 
These diplomatic moves on the part of the United States to exclude India 
from all aspects of negotiations regarding Indochina and Southeast Asia irritated 
the Indian government and public opinion. If the earlier protestations of 
reluctance to get involved in Indochina were genuine, the desire now to be 
associated in any talks on Indochina was equally pronounced and evident.^' 
Nehru resented the fact that discussions on such an important issue affecting 
Asia were to be carried on in Europe, principally by non-Asian powers. The 
Geneva powers were compelled to take note of the viewpoint of the Colombo 
powers, particularly of Nehru's peace proposals as amended by the Colombo 
Conference. Nehru sent V. K. Krishna Menon, to Geneva, Indian peripheral 
participation at Geneva was so considerable as to lead French Premier Pierre 
Mendes-France to speak of the conference as "this ten-power conference-the 
nine at the table-and India." 
Nehru was certainly the most influential individual at the Colombo 
meeting, whose course he had predetermined four days before its formal opening 
on April 28, 1954, by announcing in the Indian Parliament a six-point proposal 
for an Indochinese settlement. With certain modifications this plan formed the 
core of the Colombo recommendations to the Geneva Conference and ultimately 
the basis of the Geneva Agreements. Nehru called for promotion of a "climate of 
peace and negotiations" by desisting from threats and refraining from escalating 
the tempo of the war, priority on the agenda of the Geneva Conference for a 
cease-fire, for "complete independence [of Indochina] beyond all doubt by an 
unequivocal commitment" by the French Government. 
"A solemn agreement on non-intervention denying aid, direct or indirect.... To 
which the United States, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and China" should 
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be primary parlies, requesting the United Nations to formulate a convention of 
non-intervention in Indochina embodying the proposed four-power non-
intervention agreement, to which other states should be invited by the United 
Nations to adhere and which should carry provisions for its enforcement under 
the United Nations auspices, and finally, seeking the good offices of the United 
Nadons "for purposes of conciliation under the appropriate Articles of the 
charter, and not for invoking sanctions."" 
Nehru's proposals in essence asked all foreign powers to keep their hands 
off Indochina, whose independence, peace, and neutrality were to be guaranteed 
by the major powers through the United Nations. Nehru saw the Indochinese 
conflict "in its origin and essential character as a movement of resistance to 
colonialism", and wanted its solution to come about through direct negotiations 
between the colonial power concerned and the indigenous parties to the conflict. 
His effort was thus to eliminate the "extraneous considerations of global strategy 
and ideological and bloc interest",^^ which had injected the cold war into the 
situation and had so far reduced the chances of a settlement. The maintenance of 
peace in the region by its being neutralised from Cold-war rivalries would have 
added a sensifive area of Southeast Asia to Nehru's concept of area of peace and 
nonalignment. Nehru was essentially trying to apply the five principles of 
peaceful coexistence, which had in the same week formed the basis of the Sino-
Indian agreement on Tibet. Behind his apparently simple plan of granting 
independence to the Indochinese states and guaranteeing it through a 
nonintervention Agreement lay a shrewd and subfle policy of promoting the 
Indian national interest of keeping China, the United States and France out of a 
region so close to India. Further, in proposing to bring the issue within the 
purview of the United Nations Indian participation. So far excluded from the 
Geneva parleys, could be ensured in the world body's deliberations on 
Indochina. 
Although Nehru directed his six proposals to the Geneva Conference 
powers, he wanted endorsement of them from his fellow Asian Prime Ministers 
at Colombo. He attached great importance to the expression of opinion by such a 
large segment of humanity, telling the assembled premiers that although their 
countries were not militarily or financially powerful, they could by their 
representing vast populations of a ^reat area a resurgent area, an area 
containing people who are full of this passion of going ahead and bettering 
themselves ...make a difference. He hoped the conference would have great 
impact on the powers assembled at Geneva. Despite foreign skepticism, the 
Colombo powers demonstrated unity in regard to Indochina. Their unanimity 
was especially significant because some of them were already committed. 
Pakistan was an ally of the west, having signed a military alliance with the 
United States, although she had not been invited to join the proposed security 
pact for Southeast Asia, she had shown her desire to fall in with the West. The 
Ceylonese premier, who had declared himself a stanch enemy of aggressive 
Communism, had granted permission to American aircraft carrying French 
troops to Indochina to land and refuel at Colombo. Burma was close to the 
Chinese frontier and had bitter experiences of communist insurrection and 
infiltration. It was largely Nehru's personality that succeeded in persuading the 
assembled premiers to adhere to a common plan. All of them shared his 
resentment over Asian exclusion from the Geneva Conference and in 
Kotelawala's words, wanted to demonstrate to the Geneva powers and the world 
that the only plan that would ensure peace in Asia would be the one formulated 
or approved by the leaders of free Asian countries, who knew what was good for 
Asians. Further, Nehru made them endorse, instead of collective security, what 
Menon later called "the doctrine of collective peace."^^ 
The Colombo Conference endorsed Nehru's six-point proposal, except 
that instead of the suggestion about reporting to the United Nations.^° The 
omission of the United Nations from the Colombo proposals was perhaps owing 
to know French reluctance and a suspected Chinese version to the bringing in of 
the organization, of which Communist China was not a member. ' Significantly 
enough, the Colombo Conference communique did not mention the Anglo-
American plan for collective defence for Southeast Asia, equally conspicuous 
was a lack of any specific reference to the Chinese threat to the region. On the 
contrary, the Colombo powers expressed themselves in favour of seating 
Communist China in the United Nations.^ India was not officially represented at 
the Geneva Conference, in fact, her presence was deemed undesirable by at least 
one major power. But the Indian lead at the Colombo Conference, her initiative 
in a concrete proposal for Indochina settlement, and more significantly- the 
special importance attached by Anthony Eden to her position of preeminence in 
South and southeast Asia- these made India's counsel desirable and valuable at 
Geneva. American opposition to Indian participation was considerably diluted. 
No one considered inviting India officially at that late stage, but everyone, 
including the United States, agreed on the importance of the Colombo proposals 
and the mediatory presence of Nehru's envoy V.K. Krishna Menon at Geneva. 
Such Indian readiness for active, even if unofficial, participation at 
Geneva or in the future maintenance of the settlement in Indochina, if and when 
reached, was hardly consistent with Nehru's assurance of February 25, 1954, 
when in his appeal for a cease-fire he had categorically denied any desire to 
"intervene in any way or intrude or involve ourselves". There is reason enough 
to believe that Indian reluctance to assume major responsibilities in Indochina, 
particularly after her unhappy experience in Korea, was genuine. But the 
proposal from Eden and Molotov that India assist in the supervision of a cease-
fire and the maintenance of the settlement in Indochina was too flattering to the 
mediator)', impartial role of a nonaligned country like India to reject. In 
justification of the changed attitude, Nehru explained: 
Nevertheless, we cannot just say, we wash our hands off 
this business. Therefore, being intimately concerned, we 
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cannot get away from the fact that if a situation arises 
which might require some kind of association on our part in 
any particular decision, we can not fust run away and say 
'no' and allow matters to drift.... We cannot shed the 
responsibilities that go with a great country.' 
India's presence at Geneva was not only useful but in a sense also vital 
the Geneva Conference was unusual in that it was the first attended by both the 
United States and Communist China, whose representatives were however, not 
prepared to concede to each other even ordinary countries commonly demanded 
by decency if not protocol. There was a total absence of normal diplomatic 
relations among a number of countries represented at the Conference. 
Krishna Menon arrived at Geneva at a time when the Geneva Conference 
seemed to be making no headway. Closely connected with the Korean armistice 
talks and with the Colombo Conference of April 1954, Menon was most 
intimately connected with Nehru's peace making efforts. He enjoyed Nehru's 
immense confidence, and during the mid-fifties had the reputation of being 
Nehru's alter ego in international affairs. Sent by Nehru to spend a couple of 
days to acquaint the statesmen at the Geneva with the Indian view point, Menon 
found the Geneva political atmosphere receptive enough for his role and 
extended his stay there to three weeks. During this first phase of the conference, 
Menon had sixteen meetings with Eden, eight with Chou En-Lai, five with 
Molotov, five with the Vietminh's Pham Van Dong, six with the United States 
representative, and two with the French, besides numerous meetings with 
ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives of European and Asian 
countries. " These meetings, alternating between the two camps, undoubtedly 
helped to clear up misunderstandings, to promote proper interpretations, and in 
general to narrow the difference both among the western countries and between 
the West and the Communist countries, so as to accommodate the wide spectrum 
of viewpoints in a common solution agreeable to most. It was no wonder that in 
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doing so, Menon was able to influence the outcome in such a manner that it 
reflected in its essentials the six-point proposal of Nehru as amended at 
Colombo. 
The representatives of North and South Vietnam to meet in July, 1955, to 
prepare for all-Vietnam elections, and the agreement about the withdrawal of 
communist troops and guerillas from Laos and Cambodia, where elections were 
to be held in 1955. Two Indian scholars credit Menon with modification of the 
earlier communist demand that Laos and Cambodia be treated as a package deal 
with Vietnam. But credit for this was also claimed by Eden himself as well as by 
Australian Foreign Minister Richard Casey, both of whom said they interceded 
with success. It would be more correct to agree with Madame V. Pandit that 
Menon did not have any specific plan of his own except of course Nehru's 
original proposals of April 24, 1954, and that his diplomacy lay principally in 
finding, the lowest common denominator of agreement among the viewpoints 
aired at Geneva.^ 
Not only was respect shown to Menon as a mediator acceptable to the 
rival sides, Indian impartiality was brought out in the prolonged discussions on 
the composition of the International control commission. India figured in all 
three principal proposals put forward by the opposite camps. China and the 
Soviet Union first suggested a team of four: Czechoslovakia, Poland, India, and 
Pakistan. Great Britain, representing the western powers, suggested the five 
Colombo powers, which again included India. But Russia apposed the inclusion 
of Ceylon, and the Communists insisted that at least two communist countries be 
nominated to the proposed commission. On June 15, 1954, Molotov proposed 
that India preside over the commission with a vote on all questions of 
T O 
deadlock. The final solution was reached, almost at the end of the conference 
on July 18, when Chou-En-Lai's proposal that the commission consist of India, 
Canada, and Poland was accepted by all three Western powers on the following 
day.^'' Th( ;re was some justification for Indian diplomats later to boast that it was 
85 
the world's confidence and trust in India's impartiality and integrity that won her 
the chairmanship of an important commission despite her comparative 
inexperience in international affairs and despite her not being a great power. 
From the position of an outcast at Geneva Conference, India had moved to 
occupy the crucial position of a custodian entrusted with the supervision of the 
Geneva settlement over Indochina. 
Since 1954 Chou has accumulated considerable mileage in Asia and 
Africa, but his New Delhi visit was his first to a non-Communist Asian country. 
It marked for China a prestigious debut into the Afro-Asian world from the 
ostracism to which United States diplomacy had relegated it since 1949. The 
Nehru-Chou talks during the three-days visit almost coincided with the 
Churchill-Eisenhower talks on Indochina in Washington. The Sino-Indian 
meeting was, in the words of Le Monde, "an extension of the Asian conference 
of Geneva," where China was an unwelcome invitee and India an official 
outcast. The Sino-Indian dialogue, an extension of Menon's conversation with 
Chou at Geneva, had for-reaching significance both for the progress of 
Indochina negotiations and for establishing a base for relationship between the 
two Asian countries.""^ 
The Chou-Nehru meeting was therefore of great significance, marking a 
new era in Asian politics. The joint communique issued at the end of the Chou's 
visit contained the five principles or Panchsheel, of which the most important 
was peaceful coexistence. This was the culmination of long-term efforts on 
Nehru's part to arrive at a basis of sound relationship with China. 
The Nehru-Chou communique expressed a hope that the five principles 
would be applied "to the solution of the problems in Indochina." Whereas Nehru 
saw in the statement an opportunity to achieve his goal of neutralization of 
Indochina, Chou sought Nehru's assistance in securing western guarantees of no 
American military bases in Indochina, thereby removing threats to Chinese 
security on her southern frontier. It was easy for Nehru to make the desired 
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assurance to Chou, since they suited his own plan Ibr solution of the Indochinese 
problem; to keep both China and the United States out of the region, which 
would be neutralized, thus extending the area of peace and nonalignment. In 
exchange for Indian assurances in this regard, Chou promised to persuade the 
Vietminh to withdraw from Cambodia and Laos and to accord recognition to the 
royal governments of the two countries. More subtly, through the Sino-Indian 
accord on amity, Chou-En-Lai assured himself of Nehru's neutralization in 
regard to SEA TO, which was then being actively contemplated against China. 
The importance of this historic meeting cannot be exaggerated. It helped 
Chou later to persuade Ho Chi Minh to withdraw from Laos and Cambodia by 
painting out that Indian and Asian opinion would be adverse toward the 
VietminJti's aggressive moves and continuation of conflict. The Sino-Indian 
agreement, which was the first between China and any non-communist state, 
manifested a Chinese desire for peace, at least for the immediate future. It paved 
the way for China's relatively conciliatory attitude in the better stage of the 
Geneva Conference. Chou En-Lai's proposal that India be nominated for the 
chairmanship of the international commission, whose task included supervision 
of imports of foreign armaments, including those of Chinese origin, was further 
indicative of new Chinese confidence in Indian friendship and impartiality, since 
it entrusted India with virtually policing China's southern frontier, whose 
security constituted a dominating factor in China's thinking at Geneva. It is 
conceivable that China had already decided to alter its policy and that the Sino-
Indian agreement was intended to flatter India and make her the spearhead for 
dividing South and Southeast Asia. If this, were not possible, the commission's 
chairmanship would reinforce Indian neutrality, precluding her from accepting 
the proposed pact membership. 
On the other hand, India's willingness to accept such policing duties on 
China's borders could be understood in the context of her desire to keep both 
China and the West out of Indochina. 
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The Geneva settlement on Indochina included three cease-lire 
agreements, eight unilateral declarations, and the final declaration of the 
conference. In effect, the settlement recognised the independence of Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam and the principle of Vietnamese unity. Vietnam was to 
be temporarily placed under two separate administrations, the provisional 
demarcation line being the seventeenth parallel. 
The region North of the line was to be under Ho Chi Minh"s Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, and the Southern area under Bao Dai's state of Vietnam. 
The future of the divided country was to be determined by a free and secret 
election to be held two years later, consultations about the election between the 
two administrations were to begin one year before the election date, July 20, 
1955. There was to be a cease-fire in all three countries, effective on different 
dates, and there were provisions for the withdrawal of French and Vietminh 
troops v/ithin certain time limits. The French were permitted to maintain two 
bases, in Laos, but they were to leave the state of Vietnam at the request of the 
government. Principal among the other provisions were those regarding the 
exchange of civilian internees and prisoners-of-war, assurances on both sides of 
no recriminations against participants on the rival side before the cessation of 
hostilities, and an obligafion not to allow establishment of foreign military bases, 
except in Laos and Cambodia for self-defense. The primary responsibility for the 
execution of the cease-fire agreements was that of the contending parties, to be 
carried out through a joint commission in each of the three countries. An 
international commission consisting of India, Canada, and Poland, with India 
presiding, was to supervise the armistice. The United States did not join in the 
final Declaration, but took note of all the paragraphs except number 13 and gave 
assurances of willingness to "refrain from the threat or the use of force to 
disturb" the settlement. 
Nehru characterised the Indochinese settlement as "one of the outstanding 
achievements in international diplomacy in the post-war era",'" pointing out that 
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for the first time since World War II guns had been silenced throughout the 
world, he welcomed the agreements in the "wider way" as marking the first time 
when the statesmen of great countries had come to grips with the problems of 
war and peace and had tried earnestly to solve them.''^ Failure at the Geneva 
Conference would have, in his opinion, led the world by stages to the deep 
abyss of a nuclear holocaust. He drew special satisfaction that the settlement was 
recognition that United Asian opinion could tip the scales in favour of peace. 
Nehru had many reasons for "Asianizing" the issue. He had used the 
Colombo Conference forum to draw the attention of the Geneva powers to his 
peace proposals of April 24, 1954. The United opinion of the Colombo powers-
Eden being in touch with them-had an impact on the course of the Geneva talks. 
But Eden at times preferred to communicate only with Nehru, and the latter had 
premised the Colombo powers that he would in turn keep them informed of 
developments. At Geneva, the Colombo powers were proposed to constitute 
jointly the supervisory commission. But the final outcome, in the words of the 
Ceylonese premier, was "a little embarrassing" to Nehru because "only his 
country among those represented at our Colombo Conference...[was] chosen for 
this purpose."'* 
In India, the Geneva settlement was hailed as a signal success of Indian 
foreign policy. In their essence the Geneva Agreements closely resembled the 
recommendations of the Colombo powers, which in turn were a minor 
modification of Nehru's six-point proposal. Indians had cause to feel elated that 
their country was chosen to head a commission entrusted with the task of 
keeping out those very influence that might threaten the area of peace. The 
settlement was also read in the context of the five principles that formed the 
new, basis of association between China and India. Nehru saw the Geneva 
settlement as symbolizing the achievement of peace in Asia through 
coexistence.''^ The Indochinese settlement was taken to represent a broader 
settlement betAveen democracy and communism in Asia, a retreat on communist 
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Chin's part from her earher resolve lo carry the communist creed through 
Southeast Asia. This was in exact contrast to the European reaction, which saw 
in the Geneva Agreements "as much a victory in the diplomatic field as Dunkirk 
in the military." '' In the United States, Geneva was condemned as a second 
Munich. 
Nehru and Chou had intended that the five principles would be "applied 
in their relations with other countries in Asia as well as in other parts of the 
World. Geneva was the first success of the Panchasheel policy, which Nehru 
declared in a triumphant mood, was "a challenge of Asia to the rest of the 
world." In the presidential address to Parliament, Nehru expressed the hope 
that example would be followed in the future for settlement of other international 
disputes and conflicts. Well might India have said to the American proposition 
that the road to peace is through strengthening common security: "one does not 
seek peace through security, but security through peace." 
Panchsheel was presented as a panacea for political ills of a power -
dominated world, bipolarized between Communist and anti-Communist blocs of 
nations. If these two could not coexist, the Sino-Indian agreement implied that 
Communist and nonaligned nations could. It was an hour of moral triumph for 
Indian foreign policy, which seemed to usher in an era of enduring peace and 
friendship among Asian peoples. The Indian delegations to the International 
Commission for supervision and control went to Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam 
riding on the crest of this wave of Asian amity, enthusiasm, and hope. 
India's Altitude towards SEATO and Bandung 
To India, at one time reluctant "to jump into the fray" the chairmanship of 
the International Control Commission (ICC), entrusted with the task of 
supervision of truce and of implementation of the Geneva agreements, seemed a 
great opportunity. The earlier resentment over non-representation at the Geneva 
Conference was replaced by a flattering feeling of nomination by both blocs of 
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nations, as a distinct recognition of the impartial peacemaking role outside the 
conference.^ 
In reality, the chairmanship of the ICC worked more to India's 
disadvantage than otherwise. India's chairmanship of the Neutral Nations 
Repatriation Commission (NNRC) in the Korean conflict had demonstrated the 
hazards of a nonaligned country's assuming international obligations that 
involved day-to-day decisions on issues involving the power blocs. The NNRC 
meetings had provided a forum for the two commands to indulge in their wordy 
warfare. The Czech and Polish delegates in Korea had told the communist line, 
whereas the Swiss and Swedish delegates stood together in opposition, leaving 
the Indian chairman to use his casting vote and exposing him to accusations of 
favoritisms from both sides.^' 
Nehru himself was aware of the delicate nature of the commission' work 
and had sought guarantees of cooperation from the Geneva powers. He was 
therefore able to say to the New Delhi conference of representatives of Canada, 
Poland, France, and the States of Indochina on August 1, 1954: 
/ am sanguine enough to believe that there will be full co-
operation not only by the members of the commission itself 
but also I hope, by the other countries concerned. I say that 
not merely as an expression of pious hope but because that 
is the impression I gathered from the proceeding at 
Geneva...! know that the decisions at Geneva were arrived 
at because eveiy party was actuated by desire to come to 
some agreement. 
There were certain advantages and disadvantages deriving from the major 
share of the operational responsibilities assumed by the Indian delegation in the 
commissions as compared with those of the other two member countries. India 
was the convener, coordinator, and chairman of the commissions. As convener, 
India called representatives of Canada, Poland, France, Laos, Cambodia, North 
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Vietnam, and South Vietnam to a conference in New Delhi in August, 1954. to 
study the terms of the Geneva Agreements, to determine the functions and duties 
of the ICC, and to initiate necessary principles for the working of the 
commission.^"' In the same capacity, the Indian chairman called ordinary 
meetings of the commission both on his own initiative and at the request of the 
other two member countries. As coordinator, the chairman of each commission 
was responsible for forwarding to the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference-
Britain and the Soviet Union through the government of Indian periodic reports 
on the working of his commission. Since some of the problems of the three 
Indochinese countries were interlinked, the three Indian chairmen met 
periodically to coordinate the work and to discuss common issues. 
Indian personnel thus dominated the commission's manifold activities 
and often became the target for hostility and animosity whenever an unpopular 
decision of the commission was to be implemented. The magnitude of India's 
share can be imagined from the fact that whereas Canada and Poland sent about 
160 men, but the Indian contingent num bered 1,086 on March 24, 1955.'^ The 
proportion remained the same in the subsequent years. The commission's Indian 
personnel also suffered a disadvantage because of the distorted image created by 
the Indian mercantile and money lending community in Indochina. And for some 
time the Indian personnel in military uniform stood as bitter reminders of the 
Indian troops under British command used in 1945 to crush Indochinese 
nationalism. The very nature of the commission's work was such as to inspire 
hostility rather than gratitude in the minds of the people it served. 
India was compelled to express an opinion on every major crisis in the 
Indochinese states even if at time when there have been politics in the national 
interest to maintain silence. Further, every such expression of opinion was 
seriously conditioned by the fact of her position in the ICC. In fact, in certain 
areas of diplomacy India's course was preconditioned by her custodianship of 
the Geneva Agreements. One of these was consistent opposition to any of the 
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Indochinese slates" entering into a military pact with SEATO or with the West, 
which in practice meant the United States. Further, since the United States was 
the only major power that had shown serious resentment at the Geneva accords 
(despite the American representative's Ibrmal assurance at Geneva not to take 
any action to Jeopardize the agreements), the latter's chief agency the ICC 
headed by India - came under severe American condemnation. 
Finally, Indian participation at Geneva and in the ICC affected her policy 
perspectives that had been responsible for the abandonment of her earlier policy 
of nonintervention in Indochinese affairs. Thus, India's initial intervention had 
been prompted by the policy objectives of averting escalation of the conflict in a 
region geographically close to India, keeping Communist China and the United 
States from major intervention in Indochina and minimizing their influence in an 
area that Prime Minister Nehru hoped to add to his area of peace. In the mean 
time, however, Sino-Indian relations improved markedly, being placed on a new 
amicable footing by the Sino-Indian agreement over Tibet in April, 1954, and by 
Nehru-Chou Panchsheel declaration when Chou visited India in June, 1954. In 
the Hindi-Chini bhai bhai (Indian and Chinese are Brothers) period that ensued, 
one of the twin policy aims-that of checking the communist advance in 
Indochina and Southeast Asia- was assumed to have been successfully fulfilled. 
Indian efforts were therefore centered thereafter on obstructing United States 
influence in Southeast Asia and opposing the chief instrument of that influence, 
SEATO. The old Sino-Indian rivalry was supplanted by the new Geneva spirit, 
establishing an identity of purpose bet"ween the two Asian powers to combat 
SEATO. In a sense, China's hope after the Korean War that Indian neutrality 
could be exploited for reinforcing opposition to United States in Southeast Asia 
was fulfilled in the Post-Geneva era. Thus, India was unwillingly drawn into a 
pro-Chinese and anti-United States position, which was not her objective at the 
time of he;r initial intervention in Indochina. 
93 
The Manila treaty was defended by among others,^^ some of hidia's 
Commonwealth colleagues, Great Britam, and Australia, as the one means of 
guaranteeing the Indochinese settlement.^' The treaty was explicitly designed to 
counter the advent of Communism. The division of Vietnam along with the 
seventeenth parallel made abundantly clear the intention of SEATO signatories, 
who included the three Western powers- the United States, United Kingdom, and 
France to mobilize their armed strength to protect South Vietnam from potential 
aggression by its northern counterpart and even more from Communist China. 
But since the Western allies, only the United States had refused to sign the final 
Declaration at the Geneva Conference, and because SEATO had come into being 
almost wholly owing to the efforts of Dulles, the treaty was seen by India and 
many others not so much as a symbol of the combined Western determination to 
contain Communist China as the result of an angry reaction of the United States 
to the Geneva settlement, which American diplomacy had been unables to 
prevent. The signatories did not include Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, 
but Article 3 of the treaty included them in the treaty area that would be 
protected by SEATO members in the event of a threat of armed Communist 
aggression.^^ In India's opinion, the treaty provisions and the timing of its 
conclusion went directly counter to the Geneva spirit, which had helped the 
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conclusion of a settlement of great importance. 
The Manila Treaty was not directed against India, but India's neighbor 
Pakistan was one of its signatories. This fact by itself was sufficient to inspire 
India's antagonism to the treaty. India's ire- already aroused by the signing of 
the United States- Pakistan military agreement in February, 1954,^'' followed by 
the statement of Pakistan's Premier Mohammad Ali that the strength deriving 
from the American arms aid would enable his country to obtain Kashmir was 
augmented by SEATO's inclusion of Pakistan, which was geographically not 
even a part of Southeast Asia. Pakistan's membership in that organization 
therefore, aroused justifiable apprehensions in Indian minds that Pakistan's 
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motivalion was to secure further Western assistance against India rather than to 
help contain communist China. EarHer Western aUiances, hke NATO, had 
managed to extend their scope to include the Portuguese colony ofGoa because 
of Portugal's membership in that organization. Nehru wondered whether 
SEATO's scope might not be extended to cover India as well. From the purely 
Indian nationalist point of view, SEATO was interpreted as one more American 
step to encircle India. 
Indian apprehensions over the United States- Pakistan military aid 
agreement were sought to be assuaged by President Eisenhower's written 
assurance to Nehru on February 24, 1954: 
/ am confirming publicly, that if our aid to any country 
including Pakistan is misused and directed against another 
in aggression, I will under take immediately, in accordance 
with my constitutional authority, appropriate action, both 
within and without the United Nations to thwart such 
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aggression. 
At the September, 1954, meeting in Manila, where the SEATO charter 
was drav^n up, the United States clarified in a special "understanding", that she 
would cooperate with SEATO in retaliating only against Communist 
aggression.^"' 
The subsequent ineffectiveness of SEATO is attributable to many factors, 
of which the Indian opposition was not the least. In the absence of diplomatic 
relations between Communist China and most countries of the region, the task of 
obstructing the formation and effectiveness of SEATO was left principally to 
India's diplomatic machinery. From among the countries of Southeast Asia, 
SEATO could enroll only Thailand and the Philippines. India's lead in 
condemnmg SEATO was certainly responsible for the absence of Burma and 
Indonesia from it. Even the avowedly anti-communist premier of Ceylon agreed 
with Nehru's approach that such military alliances would aggravate rather than 
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diminish tensions in the area. The attempts of Cambodia and Laos to join 
SEATO were frustrated partly by Indian diplomacy, which eventually won them 
over to the Indian point of view. 
Opposition to SEATO, however, succeeded better on the diplomatic plane 
with little assistance from the Indian delegations on the ICC. By the very nature 
of its work, the Indian delegation, interposed as it was between communist and 
pro-West delegations, was not suited to serve as an instrument of vilification of 
the policies of the west or the East. In South Vietnam, where the government 
functioned in the shadow of American influence, the Indian delegation was 
required to adopt an absolutely neutral and impartial attitude, otherwise the 
cooperation of the South Vietnam government, essential for the discharge of the 
commission's duties would be difficult to secure. India's neutrality in the 
commissions was further secured by her Canadian and Polish colleagues. Even 
within these limitations, the Indian delegation on the ICC was able to contribute 
to Indian policy implementation through its studious opposition to efforts by any 
of the Indochinese states to enter into military alliances with the west. Nowhere 
was this demonstrated better that in Cambodia during 1954 and 1955. 
Cambodia's concern for her security was primarily against the Vietminh, 
who had invaded that country in April, 1954. Although the country now has no 
common border with North Vietnam, there were until the end of 1954 remnants 
of Vietminh troops in the turbulent northeast area contiguous to Laos and North 
Vietnam. At the final meeting of the Geneva Conference representatives of 
Cambodia and North Vietnam had clashed over rival claims about the frontiers 
of Cambodia and South Vietnam. In the troublesome months after the Geneva 
settlement of 1954, with chaos and disorder reigning in South Vietnam, high 
Cambodian officials thought there was only a six month respite between them 
and the Vietminh's emerging dominant in the whole of Vietnam,^ "^  thus forging a 
common frontier with Cambodia. Cambodia's international position at that time 
was unfavourable compared with that of the other states of Indochina. North 
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Vietnam could count on Chinese help, and South Vietnam could hope to get 
United Slates assistance, Laos, unlike Cambodia, had not fully severed her ties 
with France, having permitted under the Geneva Agreements, Laos could also 
expect American assistance.*"^ But intense Cambodian nationalism had rejected 
French political and military presence without providing a substitute defense 
basis for the country. Cambodia's apprehension of Communist aggression and 
her desire for better security were reflected in her delegation's reactions at 
Geneva, where the draft of agreements had proposed the virtual neutralization of 
Laos and Cambodia on the basis of the private understanding between the Prime 
Ministers of Britain and France on the one hand, and that of Communist China 
on the other, not to interfere in the two Indochinese states. The Geneva talks had 
progressed on the basis of that understanding, to which Cambodia was not a 
party but that would limits the rights of Cambodia to defend itself On the night 
of July 20, 1954 when the agreements were all ready for signature and the hands 
of the clock were approaching the fateful midnight hour, which marked the 
deadline set by Premier Mendes-France for a settlement on Indochina, the 
Cambodian delegates created a serious crisis by refusing to allow their country 
to be neutralized.''^ This dramatic move succeeded in securing for Cambodian 
the right of a sovereign state to seek military alliances for its own defense. The 
privilege was extended by the conference to Laos, whose delegation was at that 
hour in bed blissfully ignorant of the windfall. Both Laos and, Cambodia 
separately declared the following day in the open session of the conference that 
they would not "enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations," as long as their security was not 
threatened. They further assured that they would "not solicit foreign aid in war 
material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defense 
of the territory." Cambodian diplomacy foiled Communist China's efforts to 
neutralize Laos and Cambodia, absolving in a sense Britain, France, India, and 
Burma of the assurances they had given to Chou En-Lai to neutralize Laos and 
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Cambodia. The Geneva Agreements, which incorporated these declarations by 
the delegates of Laos and Cambodia, were signed by China, indirectly accepting 
the right of Laos and Cambodia to enter into military pacts for their own 
defence. 
The unstable conditions in South Vietnam and the legitimate fear of its 
falling under the control of the Vietminh compelled Norodom Sihanouk soon 
after the Geneva Conference to approach the United States for a bilateral 
guarantee of territorial integrity and independence, whereby in an unprovoked 
attack on Cambodia the United States would immediately rush assistance and 
deal with the aggressor.^ ** If there was any constant theme in Cambodia's foreign 
policy in the first decade after the independence, it is this frantic quest for 
security and for a balance of power among her neighbors, particularly Thailand 
and Vietnam. So strong was Cambodia's fear of Communist advances in South 
Vietnam that the former declared that she would feel herself empowered to grant 
bases to the United States.^^ Cambodia applied for direct American military aid 
as well as membership in SEATO, her efforts met with encouragement from the 
United States. The joint communique of September 29, 1954, between France 
and United States, for instance, declared that the latter would consider the 
question of lending support to "the forces of each of the three Associated States" 
as well as general financial assistance to the French expenditionary corps. Even 
more significant was the announcement on October 2, 1954, of the decision to 
channel United States economic aid, budgetary support, and other assistance 
directly to each of the Associated States, including Cambodia, instead of through 
French as before. On the same day, the first American ambassador to Cambodia 
Robert M. Mc Clintock, brought Sihanouk a comforting message from President 
Eisenhov/er, who, after referring to Cambodia's struggle against "unwarranted 
communist aggression," assured Cambodia that the United Stales would be 
pleased to "consider ways in which our two countries can more effectively 
cooperate in the joint task of stemming the threats" facing Cambodia and 
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maintaining peace and prosperity in that country. If Cambodia's problem of 
insecurity, predicated as it was upon the future possibility of the Vietminh's 
conquest of South Vietnam and forging a common frontier with Cambodia, was 
hypothetical in nature, the threat to the integrity of Laos was real. Landlocked 
and bounded by six countries of varied ideological coloration, Laos shared its 
borders with both communist China and North Vietnam. Further, unlike 
Cambodia, in which the dissidents were strong in the Southwest part of the 
country, the Pathet Lao's stronghold northeast provinces were contiguous to 
North Vietnam and China. Considering the difficult terrain of the Laotian-
Vietnamese border and the mixed indistinguishable tribal population of Laotians 
and Vietnamese inhabiting it, there was immense potential far Communist 
infiltration and subversion, which complicated the Laotian situation in the 
succeeding years. The Laotian question had engaged the least attention at 
Geneva, and consequently the agreement on Laos was the most loosely worded 
document among the Geneva agreements. A part of the responsibility for this 
rests on the leader of the Laotian delegation, Phoui Sananikone, who maintained 
that there was no problem of a civil war in his country and that the "withdrawal 
of the foreign invaders [Vietminh] would mean defacto and the cessation of 
hostilities." It seems that everyone believed with Sananikone that the Laotian 
situation was really so simple, yet it was a gross underestimate of a problem that 
soon became complicated with the Pathet Lao's getting entrenched in the 
northeast provinces and demanding a share in the government of the country, 
interpreting the relevant but vague provisions of the Geneva Agreements to suit 
their demand. On October 17, 1954, when Nehru passed through Vientiane, he 
was presented with a memorandum by the Laotian Government complaining of 
Pathet Lao intransigence.^" There was optimism in November, 1954 inspired by 
a statement by colonel Singkapo, representing Prince Souphanouvong, 
recognizing in principle the authority of the royal government over the two 
disputed provinces. 
9') 
India did not like the efforts of Cambodia and Laos to seek military 
protection through SEATO or through direct alliance with an outside power and 
the American readiness to interfere in the region. Indian diplomacy, both at the 
mission level and through the delegation on the ICC, was directed toward 
dissuading the Indochinese states from joining such military pacts. The United 
States hesitation during the winter of 1954 and spring of 1955 to make a major 
military commitment to Cambodia, as well as the Anglo-French open reluctance 
to assume any further responsibilities in the Indochinese region, enabled India to 
sow the seed of neutralist argument in the Cambodian king's mind. 
On the diplomatic plane, the Indian efforts were, however, hampered in 
the beginning by a lack of any diplomatic representation in Phnom Penh or 
Vientiane. At the time of the Geneva Conference, none of the Associated States 
of Indochina had been recognized by India, although the existing consular 
representation in Saigon and Hanoi was continued. With the Geneva settlement 
granting independence to Cambodia, the latter had expected immediate 
recognition from India, which would help Cambodia secure recognition from 
other Asian and African countries. Such expectation was belied, and the 
Cambodian delegation to the preliminary conference of the ICC in New Delhi in 
August, 1954, openly expressed its resentment in the matter. The delegation 
regretted that India has forgotten that Cambodia "belonged to the great Indian 
civilization." The delay in Indian recognition was caused by some legal 
quibbling in the External Affairs Ministry in New Delhi, where the view 
prevailed that until 1950, limiting the economic and financial independence of 
the Indochinese states, were abrogated, the Indochinese states could not be 
deemed to have attained complete independence. When Nehru stayed in Phnom 
Penh on his return journey from China in November, 1954, the Cambodian 
premier drew the visitor's attention to the absence of diplomatic ties with India. 
There were profuse references to ancient cultural contexts between India and 
Cambodia in all the speeches from both sides during the visit. Nehru himself 
seemed to have been moved considerably by the visual impression of India's 
culture impact on the country. Cambodian hospitality, the countryside, and the 
magnificent monuments at Angkor Struck responsive chords in Nehru, who told 
the Indian troops serving the ICC "every blade of grass on either side of the road 
breathed Indian culture."^' One of the direct results of this visit and the cultural 
reminders on the occasion was the sudden Indian decision to single out 
Cambodia from among the Indochinese states for some kind of recognition. 
Accordingly, B. K. Acharya was sent to Cambodia to head a special mission 
with the personal rank of minister. Formal recognition of Cambodia and Laos 
followed on December 31, 1954, a day after the Pau Agreements were 
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abrogated. 
India was not oblivious to the threat posed by Communist China to the 
small states in Southeast Asia, and Nehru himself admitted that such fears may 
even be justified.^ '^  He did not, however, think much of the internal Communist 
menace. In fact, the policy of peaceful co-existence with Communist countries 
paid dividends in the internal field.^'' Nehru took the wind out of the Communist 
sails by adopting a socialistic pattern of society, by land reforms and community 
development projects, and-above all-by accepting economic aid from Russia. 
Basing his judgment on his own experience in dealing with Communist elements 
in India, Nehru tended to discount their potential ability for mischief 
elsewhere.^^ Difficulties arose, however, he said, when the Communist parties 
got "intellectually, mentally and otherwise tied up with other groups in other 
countries. The other country might well utilize that party for its advantage. That 
is the fear that comes to all these Southeast Asian countries."^*" Even after 
signing a Panchsheel agreement with China in June, 1954, Nehru entertained 
some marginal misgivings about China's honouring promises to abide by 
coexistence and refrain from interference in the small and weak nations of 
Southeast Asia, particularly Laos and Cambodia. Indeed, Chou had given similar 
pledges to Burmese Premier U Nu.^ ^ Nehru revealed his doubts in a circular 
letter to the presidents of the Pradesh Congress Committees, written soon after 
Chou Hn-Lai's visit to India, in which he pleaded that the Panchshcel approach 
had to be given a chance: 
Nehru said, how could we puljaith in such declarations? In 
international affairs, one can never be dead certain, and 
friends of today might be enemies of tomorrow. That may 
be so. Are we then to begin with enmity and suspicion and 
not give any approach a chance? Surely it is better with 
nations, as with individuals, to hope for and expect the best 
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but, at the same time, be prepared for any eventuality. 
But even as late as March 31, 1955, Nehru admitted that someone who 
has agreed to Panchsheel may not keep his word, yet he argued that this could 
always happen whether "one has a treaty or an alliance or a pledge." By some 
incomprehensible logic, he argued further that Panchsheel had an advantage over 
the military approach because "If a country agreeing to it does not keep its word, 
7Q 
then it gets into hot water much more than otherwise." 
On the other hand, there were certain facts-that warranted placing faith in 
Chinese promises. Such were Chou- En-Lai's assurances to Nehru, U. Nu, Eden, 
and Mendes-France in June, 1954, that China would not interfere on Laos and 
Cambodia. The successful conclusion of the Geneva agreements owed a great 
deal to China's attitude of cooperation, which added to India's assessment of 
Chinese sincerity about peace in Asia. Through the months following the 
Geneva Conference- India continued encouraging Peking and Hanoi to make 
more and more pronouncement along lines of the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence. Nehru's visit to North Vietnam and China in October, 1954, 
provided many such occasions. In December, 1954, at the Bogor Conference of 
the Colombo powers, India succeeded in securing the approval of other 
colleagues to inviting China to the proposed Asian-African Conference to be 
held in Bandung. Nehru and U Nu, who had earlier been cool to the suggestion 
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of such a conference, became enthusiastic about it from this point on.***^  The 
conference could at once be utilized for canalizing the considerable emotional 
resentment among Southeast Asian nations against SEATO, as well as for 
reassuring the assembled countries about the communist assurances of peaceful 
coexistence and non intervention. As Nehru told the Indian Parliament earlier, 
India wanted to "Create on environment wherein it becomes a little more 
dangerous to the other party to break away from pledges given." Bandung 
could indeed be that venue where in the words of Kahin: 
Thai environment could be created by China's reiterated 
public pledge of adherence to the principles against a 
background of the aroused and watchful scrutiny of Asian 
public opinion. Such an environment could continue a 
significant moral interdiction against China's deviation 
from these principles ...The Asian-African Conference was 
envisaged as providing optimal conditions for building this 
environment. 
In the open session of the Conference, Laos, Cambodia, and the DRV 
pledged adherence to the Panchsheel. The DRV Foreign Minister Pham Van 
Dong noted that the conference was the "very expression of the peaceful co-
existence of the Asian and African countries and they will work together under 
the auspices of peaceful co-existence." Laotian Premier Katay Sasorith noted 
that if the five principles were observed, "particularly the principle of non-
aggression and non interference, many of the difficulties which assail us would 
disappear and that is why the practical observance of these principles must 
engage our attention." Sihanouk declared that Cambodia was "independent and 
neutral" and had "determinedly steered its national policy toward the 
Panchsheel, toward the community of neutral nations among them India and 
Burma." He referred subtly, however, to the Communist threat, commenting that 
his country held "the dangerous privilege of standing the test and the application 
103 
of the Panchsheel," and that it would be the task of the more powerful nations to 
give froops and guarantees to smaller nations. 
Welcoming the Chinese statement and supporting amoassadorial talks 
between China and the United States, Dulles seemed to echo the Indian 
sentiment when he said, "whatever may be the differences which now divide 
countries, these differences should not be settled by recourse to force where this 
would be apt to provoke international war." In the course of the year, Sino-
American tension and the situation in Southeast Asia and the Far hast improved 
considerably. In world politics as a whole an unparallel period of relaxation of 
tensions opened with the summit conference at Geneva attended by the heads of 
the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, 
and France, in July, 1955. Characteristic of the new Geneva spirit of coexistence 
with Communism was president Eisenhower's opening statement: 
"The American people want to be Friends with the Soviet 
peoples. There are no natural differences between our 
peoples or our nations. There are no territorial conflicts or 
commercial rivalries.... We are here in response to the 
aspirations of mankind to start the kind of discussions, 
which will inject a new spirit into our diplomacy; and to 
launch fresh negotiations under conditions of good 
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augury . 
India's Attitude towards two Vietnams 
For at least two years after the Geneva Conference of 1954, India's 
relations with the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) were far more cordial 
than with the government of South Vietnam. Whereas the DRV had subscribed 
to the final Declaration at Geneva and had in words and deeds largely 
demonstrated its willingness to implement the Geneva Agreements, South 
Vietnam publicly avowed opposition to the Agreement. As one of the principal 
negotiators (though unofficially) at Geneva, as promoter of principles 
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underlying the Indochinese settlement, and, finally, as custodian of the armistice 
agreements. As Nehru had said in 1954, the Geneva Settlement on Indochina "is 
a great step forward, but it is only a step and it has to be followed by persistent 
efforts at further settlements to assure peace for the future." South Vietnam's 
reluctant if not hostile attitude, toward the agreements impeded further steps 
toward enduring peace in Indochina. And since the Geneva Agreements 
paralleled another settlement between India and China on peaceful coexistence 
and nonintervention in South and Southeast Asia, South Vietnam's 
uncooperative attitude potentially capable of disturbing the delicate balance of 
peace and power in Asia, could hardly be welcomed in India. 
A comparison of the political prospects of the two Vietnamese regimes 
also favoured better relations with the DRV. For more than a year after the 
withdrav/al of French political authority South Vietnam was in the midst of 
political chaos, its government fighting to eliminate the semi-political and 
religious groups, which challenged its authority. Many times its authority did not 
extend beyond the premier's palace in Saigon. The country was for the most part 
under the irregular control of the religio-military sects Cao Dai, Hoa Hao- with 
private armies estimated at fifty thousand men each-and the Binh Xuyen, which 
operated gambling houses, narcotic dens, nightclubs, and brothels in Saigon. 
or 
Every thing seemed to militate against the new premier, Ngo Dinh Diem. This 
was in contrast to the government in North Vietnam, which seemed to enjoy the 
confidence of its people, determined to give them a fair deal in economic and 
administrative fields. The governmental stability in North Vietnam sharply 
contrasted with the worsening conditions in South Vietnam, which almost 
threatened a complete collapse of authority. India, along with Britain and many 
other countries,^^ expected that the DRV would inevitably win in the elections 
scheduled for 1956, largely because of the personal popularity of Ho Chi Minh, 
thus it would be politic to cultivate independent friendly relations with a 
government that might emerge as the government of a unified Vietnam. 
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The DRV, on its part, made every effort to please India and Prime 
Minister Nehru. Its frequent pronouncements of full co-operation with the ICC 
and its determination to execute the Geneva Agreements were in sharp contrast 
to the cool indifference and sometimes open hostility to the ICC in South 
Vietnam. In October, 1954, when Nehru visited Hanoi on his way to Peking, he 
received a rousing reception in a city that had been transferred in the same week 
from French control to that of the Communists. Ho Chi Minh came out from 
his secret headquarters to meet the Indian leader- incidentally, the first foreign 
dignitary to visit the DRV. When the two leaders met. Ho clasped Nehru in a 
friendly embrace. Editorials, radio broadcasts, triumphal arches, and pamphlets 
hailed Nehru as a soldier of peace. Nehru's visit lent incalculable prestige to Ho 
Chi Minh's government, "emerging from the jungle after eight years of 
warfare." The Vietnamese leader assured Nehru that he would give the 
maximum cooperation to the international commission to implement the Geneva 
Agreements and would strive to solve all outstanding problems in a manner 
conducive to peace and independence of the countries of Indochina without any 
external interference. He believed fully in the five principals that had been 
agreed upon between the Prime Ministers of China and India, and wished to 
apply them in the relations of Vietnam with Laos and Cambodia as well as with 
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Other countries. 
In contrast, when Nehru landed at Saigon at the invitation of Premier 
(later President) Ngo Dinh Diem on his way back from Peking, he was greeted 
by hostile crowds and placards. At the airport, where Diem received him, 
pamphlets were distributed protesting the policy of coexistence signed by 
General Hinh and the commanders of the armies of the three sects-Cao Dai, Hoa 
Hao, and Binh Xuyen. Although Nehru received great hospitality from official 
quarters in South Vietnam, he could not avoid seeing the demonstrations, which 
were winked at if not actively encouraged by the government. Most pamphlets 
and placards, however, clearly distinguished the people's personal respect of 
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Nehru from their opposition to compromise with Communism. A 
representative sign immediately outside Diem's palace read: "Welcome to 
India's Prime Minister-Down with Coexistence." 
South Vietnam's hostility toward the Geneva Agreements and the ICC 
was partly feigned, partly real. Ardent nationalists in South Vietnam, like Ngo 
Dinh Diem, viewed the settlement as an ignominy, a defeat, a surrender of 
territory to the Communists, and '"enslavement of millions of compatriots". The 
magnitude of the loss and injustice was intensified by the fact that it was an 
imposed settlement, not approved by the South Vietnamese delegation but 
negotiated over its head by the French delegation at Geneva. Hardly five weeks 
before the Geneva Agreements had been signed, Ngo Dinh Diem, who had 
refused to hold office for twenty years because of French colonial hold over his 
country, had accepted the premiership of Vietnam because of the new 
agreements signed by France on June 4, 1954, recognizing the independence of 
Vietnam and its free association with France as an equal member of the French 
union. But the new political status of Vietnam did not bring any corresponding 
changes to the Geneva negotiations table, where Diem's Foreign Minister Tran 
Van Do was ignored by the French delegation, which continued to speak for the 
South Vietnamese regime without consulting him. Anti-French and anti-
Communist, the South Vietnamese delegation inclined increasingly to the 
American point of view. In addition, it reflected the opposition at home to the 
partition of Vietnam and the surrender of territory to the Vietminh. Tran Van Do 
had unsuccessfully opposed proposals for the division of his country, instead 
proposing a settlement under United Nations auspices. It was ironically owing to 
his insistence on Vietnamese unity that the principle of all-Vietnam elections in 
1956 was included in the final agreements, a fact that must have caused the 
South Vietnamese government considerable regret in later years. The attitude of 
the South Vietnamese delegation was truly ambivalent: the next day after 
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opposing the partition of Vietnam, the delegation told Eden that any settlement 
reached at Geneva would be favourably considered by its government. 
The most significant factor accounting for South Vietnam's cooperation 
with the ICC in this early phase of its operations was the human one of refugees 
from the north. Even while the Geneva Conference was in session, rumors of 
partition of the country had set in motion an exodus of people on either side, but 
principally from north to south. The exodus was greater among Catholics from 
North Vietnam, who migrated to the South to escape atheistic communist rule. 
The only method of transport was by sea, a slow method that would have 
exposed the evacuees to the mercy of the Communists had it not been for the 
help of the ICC team. The significance of this migration was more than purely 
humanitarian because of the projected election in all Vietnam two years later. 
Numerically, North Vietnam had a population edge over South Vietnam of some 
fourteen million to twelve million. Denied the military method of conquest and 
unification of the country, the DRV hoped to secure its goal through the peaceful 
method of the election envisaged for 1956. The very future of the regime 
depended upon the statistical outcome of this migration process and therefore 
demanded prevention of a large-scale exodus of population from North Vietnam, 
which, apart from signifying condemnation of the Communist regime, would 
affect the Communist fortunes at the polls in 1956. The importance of this 
question is underlined by the final figures of refugee movement, which, even by 
impartial official count by the ICC's teams, accounted for more than a million 
persons: 892,876 from north to South as against 140,000 from the South to 
north. Many more escaped the north without formally passing through the ICC's 
checkpoints. 
In sum, the South Vietnamese government extended reluctant cooperation 
to the ICC in the first few months of the latter's existence not out of enthusiasm 
for the Geneva settlement but for reasons of its own military and political 
security. This security could be guaranteed by consolidation of a cease-fire, 
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exchange of prisoners-of-war and civilian internees, evacuation of refugees from 
north to south, and an international assurance against the possibility of North 
Vietnam's taking advantage of instability in the south. Outwardly, however, the 
South Vietnamese government continued to scoff at the ICC, denying it official 
courtesy, eliminating its members from diplomatic parties, and discouraging its 
transfer of headquarters from Hanoi to Saigon as provided in the agreements. 
Yet in the day-to-day operation of the ICC during this period, it gave, in the 
words of ICC Chairman M. J. Desai, "fullest co-operation," equal to that of the 
North Vietnamese Government. The cooperative attitude of the South 
Vietnamese government lasted, however, only during this critical and 
transitional period, when it needed the commission's presence. It is pertinent to 
note that the commission's first report, covering its activities until December 10, 
1954, was the only one that did not contain complaints of the lack of cooperation 
from the government of South Vietnam. 
The first seven months of the ICC's working in Vietnam marked the most 
fruitful period of its entire history. The commissioners worked harmoniously 
despite verbal attacks and counter attacks between the rival parties in the 
country. Their decisions were all unanimous until the middle of March, 1955, 
when in both Laos and Vietnam the members of the ICC were divided and issues 
were decided by a majority vote. Such smooth working in the ICC could be 
expected to flow from the spirit of conciliation and compromise that had 
produced the Geneva settlement. During the period of the ICC, supervised some 
of the most difficult operations in the virtual partition of the country. The civil 
and military transfer of Hanoi from the French to DRV control was a complex 
operation, the difficulties of which had been anticipated at Geneva.''" 
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru, India, realized the 
intricacies of the complex World situation as well as the potential possibilides of 
interaction between India and Southeast Asia. This is obvious from the frequent 
exchange of visits between the Indian and Southeast Asian leaders, so also from 
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bilateral treaties and agreements signed in various fields between India and some 
countries of the region. For instance, India concluded Treaties of Friendship with 
Indonesia (3 March 1951), with Burma (7 July 1951) and with the Philippines 
(11 July 1952). India also entered into trade agreements with countries such as 
Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) from time to time. 
Of all the countries in the region, however, India came to have a special kind of 
relationship with Indonesia. After signing the Treaty of Friendship in March 
1951, India concluded with Indonesia a ten-year cultural agreement (29 
December 1959). Cooperation Agreements were also signed between the two 
countries; Air Forces (28 February 1956), Navies (3 December 1958) and 
Armies (3 June 1960). No such agreements were signed with any other country 
in the region during the nineteen fifties, even the cultural agreement with 
Indonesia remained unique. 
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CHAPTER-4 
INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING 
1957-1962 
The late fifties and early sixties, tension among the Superpowers 
relations and the resulting deterioration in the international situation, more than 
any other thing, came to attract Nehru's attention. The level of political, 
economic and cultural relations with the Southeast Asian countries stagnated, 
and even showed a downward trend. At the first conference of heads of state 
and Government of non-aligned countries in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) in 
September 1961, Nehru sought priority for World peace through super power 
negotiations. Seeking priorit}' for World peace conflicted sharply with the 
Indonesian president Sukarno's emphasis on elimination of colonialism and 
imperialism from the World. The publicly-expressed divergence of the World-
view held by the two Asian leaders at the Belgrade Conference ultimately led 
to a loss of personal rapport between them and put India in a collision course 
with Indonesia, the largest country in South east Asia. 
In the year following the Belgrade Conference, China invaded India's 
northern borders and occupied large chunks of Indian Territory. This 
demolished the entire Indian thesis that a country like China could be bound 
through the pledges of Panchsheel and peaceful coexistence. India viewed 
China's invasion with a sense of shock and bewilderment. Nehru had 
entertained hopes that anti-imperialist states could not commit aggression 
against the non-aligned states. He was disappointed to find China, an avowedly 
anti-imperialist state, invading the borders of nonaligned India. His sense of 
disillusionment with China was all the more bitter because it was he who had 
proposed to invite China to attend the first Asian-African Conference in 
Bandung in April 1955, and thereby, helped it in developing its contacts with 
other Asian and African nations. Since India had been pursuing a policy of 
peace and friendship with China. China's attack on hidia showed its disregard 
of the Panchsheel agreement, of the ten principles oi' the Bandung Conlerence 
and of the pohcy of nonaUgned and peaceful coexistence. The limitations of 
Panchsheel, which provided a pedestal for a sort of non-military defence 
system for India as well as the countries of Southeast Asia was exposed. Prime 
Minister Nehru was dismayed to find that India was living in a world of make-
belief Expressing his sense of disillusionment with the Chinese behaviour, he 
told his countrymen: 
We were getting out of touch with the realities of the 
modern World, we were living in an artificial atmosphere 
of our own creation and we have been shocked out of it. 
This was obviously a confession of failure of his foreign 
policy of peace and friendship with and of faith in China's 
bonafides. More than that, it marked a failure of Nehru's 
"peace area" approach towards Southeast Asia. 
Some of the Southeast Asian leaders, such as Prime Minister U Nu of 
Burma, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and President Sukarno of 
Indonesia, had shared Prime Minister Nehru's stance that adherence to 
Panchsheel, to a policy of nonalignment in the cold war and of faith in China's 
peace pledges, would provide a better security shield than a policy of alignment 
with the United States. By striking against India, China had demolished all 
these presumptions. Neither Panchsheel nor non-alignment had proved an 
effective instrument to save India from the Chinese aggression and the resultant 
humiliation. India lost its prestige in Southeast Asia and Nehru's "peace area" 
approach towards the region lost its credibility. Hereafter, how could the 
smaller states of the region look to India for protection and leadership? 
In fact, the Sino-Indian clash of arms in the Himalayan heights caused a 
flutter in Southeast Asia. Viewed from a historical perspective, the anxieties of 
many statesmen about China's southward expansion were confirmed and 
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strengthened. The nervousness of the Southeast Asian countries became 
obvious during the three-day dehbcrations of the six-Power nonahgned 
Colombo Conference between 10-12 December 1962/ With uncertainties and 
suspicions about China's motivations looming large over their security 
calculations, non of the three Southeast Asian countries, Burma, Cambodia and 
Indonesia, which participated in this Conference, was forthright in judging the 
issue on merits. Taking shelter under the plea that it would prejudice their 
efforts at mediation for peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute, 
they adopted a neutral, non-committal attitude. Burma and Cambodia quite 
under-standably, were the most cautious. Burma could not ignore the 
susceptibilities of the northern neighbour sitting on its head. Nor could 
Cambodia, which was seeking Chinese aid to protect its territorial integrity 
from being violated by the pro-American regimes in Thailand to its west and 
South Vietnam to its east, afford to do so. They showed a lot of verbal 
sympathy and concern for India, a victim of Chinese aggression, but none of 
them could afford to offend China. There was a sense of helplessness and fear, 
for instance, Norodom Sihanouk stated that his delegation was unable to 
suggest any compromise solution likely to assist in bridging the gulf between 
the positions adopted respectively by India and China...Our role seems to be 
limited, therefore, to an appeal to the noble sentiments of our two great friends 
exhorting them to consider the most grave danger threatening the future of 
their respective peoples and that of the peoples of the Afro-Asian group and of 
the whole world. 
Of course, because of geographical remoteness. Indonesia did not 
exhibit the kind of nervousness shown by Burma and Cambodia. It was 
however, equally less enthusiastic towards India's fate. Indonesia was, at this 
stage, in the process of consolidating its relations with China. As manifested at 
the first Conference on non-aligned States in Belgrade in September 1961, 
President Sukarno was giving a twist to his country's "active and independenf 
nonaligned foreign policy towards one described as "unidirectional-against the 
West." There was a clear divergence of priorities and approaches-Nehru 
putting emphasis on promotion of World peace through negotiations beUveen 
the two Super-powers and Sukarno putting stress on elimination of colonialism 
from Asia and Africa. As interpreted later, Indonesia was abandoning the 
"three-caimp theory in favour of the "two-camp theory" in which nonalignment, 
as understood by India, was becoming irrelevant. Put in the framework of 
President Sukarno's concept of struggle between New Emerging Forces 
(NEFOS) versus Old Established Order Forces (OLDEFOS) and under 
pressures exercised by the Indonesian Communist Party, Indonesian 
nonalignment was losing its focus and direction and tilting the country towards 
China and against India. Besides, personal rapport between the Indian and 
Indonesian leaders had suffered a serious setback as a result of the so-called 
"Sondhi affair" in the Fourth Asian Games in Jakarta in September 1962. It 
was in this atmosphere of diminishing goodwill between India and Indonesia 
that China attacked India. Thus, in view of the developing coolness between 
India and Indonesia, to expect Indonesia to come out openly in support of 
India, against China, was just out of the question. Yet, India had reasons to 
believe and hope that the Indonesian leaders would show a correct 
understanding of the Indian position in the Sino-Indian border dispute and 
demonstrate impartiality of judgment. But this did not happen. Like Burma and 
Cambodia, Indonesia remained neutral on the question of Chinese aggression, 
chose not to go into the merits of the case, and only concentrated on efforts to 
restore peaceful relations between China and India.^ 
A special emissary of the Indian Prime Minister visited the three 
Southeast Asian countries participating in the Colombo Conference in order, as 
Nehru told the Lok Sabha on 26 November 1962, "to explain more thoroughly 
our position and what we think about the situation." In the course of talks 
between Mrs, Lakshmi N. Menon, the Indian emissary, and the Indonesian 
leaders, the latter displayed keen interest in discussing the pros and cons of the 
dispute. They, however, showed reluctance to pass any judgement on the 
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righlness or wrongness of India's cause. The Indian emissary confirmed this 
while talking to newsmen in Jakarta, "I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic." 
While commenting on Indonesia's (and other Southeast Asian countries' 
reactions) in Singapore, in route to Ceylon, Mrs. Menon shed all hopes of their 
sympathy and support for India and merely contended herself by saying, "they 
all appreciate our stand, we do not urge any of the leaders to take sides in our 
fight with Communist China. We are interested to explain and convince the 
leaders of our view and the correctness and righteousness of our stand." It was 
an indirect admission of failure of her mission to Southeast Asia. While back 
home, she told newsmen in Madras that she had found "a great deal of 
understanding in Rangoon, Jakarta and Phnom Penh about India's case in the 
Sino-Indian conflict." She, however, added that there was conftision among the 
Indonesians and other Southeast Asians about the Indian and Chinese 
positions. 
Indonesia maintained its neutral stance. It also continued to seek points 
of concurrence between the two parties in order to arrange a peaceful 
settlement of the dispute. This became evident at the six-Power Conference at 
Colombo. Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio set himself against the stand 
taken by Foreign Minister Ali Sabry of the UAR. In the course of his speech at 
the Conference, the leader of the UAR delegation had said, "There must not be 
any territorial gain on account of military operations. This principle is in 
conformity with the spirit of Bandung Conference". It was a shrewd move on 
the part of Ali Sabry to prompt Subandrio to come out openly on the issue of 
Chinese aggression. But Subandrio opposed this forthright position and 
suggested instead a face-saving formula for the Colombo Conference, calling 
for proposal for settlement "without touching on the substance of the conflict, 
who is the aggressor and who is the expansionist."^ This way, he lent strength 
to the views of the other participants and thereby isolated the UAR 
representative, who had to yield in view of the consensus against him.^ 
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India played an active role in bringing about peace in Indochina. It is 
true that it was not invited to the Geneva Conference, but behind the scene 
activities of Krishna Menon in Geneva brought the parties closer to a 
settlement. The Geneva Agreement provided for three ceasefire agreements in 
respect of the three states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. 
To supervise and control the armistice agreements, three International 
Commissions for Supervision and Control were set up. They were composed of 
representatives of Canada, India and Poland, with India as chairman. Although 
this task was "complicated and difficult, a thankless one occasionally," India 
discharged it with utmost diligence and sincerity. It was believed that 
implementing the agreement would lead to the independence and sovereignty 
of the three states. 
As envisaged by the Geneva Declaration, the general elections took 
place in Cambodia in September 1955 and in Laos in December 1955. But no 
elections could take place in Vietnam, there was consequently no political 
settlement as was envisaged by the Geneva Agreement. 
After the supplementary elections in Laos had been completed the 
International Commission in Laos adjourned sine die on 19 July 1958. The 
work of the International Commission in Cambodia was considerably reduced 
as the major portion of its task had been completed. 
But the stalemate in Vietnam continued. A political settlement had not 
been reached and the Commission was faced with many problems. No progress 
had been made towards consultations between the competent representatives of 
the two zones on unification on the basis of elections. Besides the role of 
Chairman of the International Commission for Supervision and Control, India's 
opinion on vexed problems was considered valuable by the countries of this 
region.'" 
Cambodia's relations with his neighbours, the Republic of Vietnam and 
Thailand., were tense. Border incidents, territorial claims and press attacks led 
to constant tension on Cambodia's border. Under such conditions, Cambodia 
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had sought protcclion and support from India through the International 
Commission and by personal contact. 
The Prime Minister of Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, visited 
India on 11 August 1958. Explaining the reason for his visit, he said he had 
come for consultations with Nehru and "to seek his advice on the difficult 
relations his country was having with her neighbours." 
Reports from Cambodia suggested that one factor responsible for 
Cambodia's trouble was that its foreign policy of non-alignment had not found 
favour with its neighbours. This had led to border troubles and closure of 
frontiers, particularly those with Thailand. 
Till mid-1955, Cambodia was linked with the Western bloc. Soon after 
the Bandung Conference, Cambodia adopted a neutral course. Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk declared he was proud to adopt the policy of neutrality and adherence 
to Panchsheel after the Geneva Conference. About meeting Nehru, he told 
newsmen, "I gave Mr. Nehru the details of our many troubles... It was a very 
satisfactory conversation and I got advice on many points..." 
Later, speaking at Calcutta, he expressed profound admiration for Nehru 
and described Cambodia's foreign policy as being very close to India's in its 
acceptance of Panchsheel and antipathy to military alliances. He added: Our 
small and peaceful nation, too often threatened, has found immeasurable 
comfort in the comprehension shown and encouragement given by India by the 
contribution of her policy, which is a peace policy. 
Before coming to New Delhi, Prince Sihanouk referred complaints of 
Vietnamese troop incursions to the International Commission for Control in 
Cambodia. There was wide divergence of views within the commission about 
its competence to discuss such issues. The Canadian delegate was against such 
discussion in the commission. He was of the view that in order to respect the 
Cambodian sovereignty Cambodia should be allowed to deal with such border 
incidents. India and Poland stood for discussion. They said the border incidents 
had been referred by the Cambodian Government to the commission, and "if 
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the commission is to fulfill its responsibilities and to see that the Cambodian 
frontiers are respected as required under various article of the Geneva 
Agreement," it was necessary to discuss such skirmishes. "Failure on its part to 
take suitable action will tantamount to a failure in its duty," the Indian and 
Polish delegates said. 
Indian support to Cambodia in its troubles was moral. Its support to 
Cambodia in the commission was made ineffective by the Canadian delegate's 
attitude. Disappointed by the commission and India, Cambodia leaned towards 
Peking and established diplomatic relations with it. India could not keep 
Cambodia out of the Chinese orbit. 
Although no military alliance was concluded between Cambodia and 
China, Prince Sihanouk had hinted that "today China is a support of our 
sovereignty." '' 
At the time of signing the Geneva Agreement in 1954, the two northern 
provinces of Laos were under the control of the Pathet Lao, a rebel group led 
by Prince Souphanouvong. The Vietnamese crossed into Laotian territory in 
December 1952, and in April 1953 they helped the Pathet Lao to gain control 
of the provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. India, through the International 
Commission in Laos, tried to restore these provinces to the Royal Laotian 
Government. Though several agreements were concluded between the Royal 
Laotian Government and the Pathet Lao, the Political and military integration 
of the Pathet Lao into the national life of Laos was not possible. 
The commission continued to insist that the Laotian Government try to 
reach a political settlement with the Pathet Lao in the firm belief that this 
method vv'ould lead to an overall peaceful settlement in the kingdom. 
Its repeated intervention on behalf of the Pathet Lao finally gave 
Government a feeling that ICC was itself "practically a tool and a spokesman 
for the policy of the opposition," according to Sissouk Na Champassak, a 
member of the Royal Laotian Government. He added that though India 
sincerely desired to see Laos freed from its dilemma, it had not helped the 
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Laotian cause. In the first place, India looi<. a favourable view of the Pathet Lao, 
he said. Prince Souvana Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos, in a letter to the 
commission, required its winding up. 
The Canadian delegate moved a resolution at a meeting of the 
commission to this effect. The Indian and Polish delegations opposed this. The 
Canadian delegate was of the view that the tasks assigned to the commission 
had been completed while the Polish delegate considered that some tasks yet 
remained. What was needed was not dissolution but reductions of its activities. 
The Indian delegate also did not agree with the Canadian view and 
formally put forward for consideration the view that "the three international 
commissions have to continue till a political settlement is completed in all three 
countries" of Indochina. Therefore this resolution by the Canadian delegate 
"introduces discord and disharmony in the hitherto smooth and effective 
working of the Laos Commission." On 19 July 1958, the commission decided 
in favour of an indefinite adjournment, "with a provision that it may be 
reconvened in accordance with the normal procedure." 
India's role as chairman of the International Truce Supervisoiy 
Commission for Vietnam was greatly admired by North Vietnam. Hanoi gave 
all cooperation to the commission. The deadlock in Vietnam can be traced to 
the refusal of South Vietnam to assume any responsibility for the Geneva 
Agreement, to which it was not a signatory.''' But later on there appeared to be 
a softening on South Vietnam's part.'^ This was noticed in the visit of President 
Ngo Dinh Diem to New Delhi (4-9 November 1957). The Seventh Report of 
the International Commission in Vietnam (12 July 1957) also mentioned that 
Saigon was prepared to offer effective cooperation to the commission but it 
was not prepared to assume responsibility for implementing the Geneva 
Agreement. 
The Indian Government responded positively to this change and agreed 
to open a Consulate-General of South Vietnam in New Delhi in February 1957. 
In September 1957, Dr. Radha Krishnan, Vice-President of India, paid an 
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official visit to South Vietnam. On his visit to India, Diem had discussion with 
important leaders and also visited several development works and scientific 
institutions. 
India was sensitive to military pacts. An assurance from Diem that 
"Vietnam accepts neither foreign military bases nor foreign troops on its 
territory and it is not considering adherence to any military alliance." ' satisfied 
the Indian Government to some extent. After talks between the two leaders, a 
joint communique was issued on 8 November 1957. ^ It noted, among other 
things, the important contribution India had made to maintaining peace in 
Vietnam. "The President and Prime Minister have decided to continue and 
increase the cooperation between their two countries in the pursuit of their 
common goal of economic and social advancement of the people." 
With North Vietnam, India was closer. Both adopted non-alignment as 
the basis of their foreign policy. Nehru described President Ho Chi Minh as a 
"great revolutionary and an almost legendary figure." 
Ho's Government was anxious to make the Geneva Agreement a 
success. In a joint communique after talks with Nehru, they made the 
implementation of the Geneva Agreement and peaceful coexistence the main 
theme of their declaration. 
Ho Chi Minh visited India on 13 February 1958 on an invitation, the 
Vice-President of India also paid a visit to Hanoi in September 1957. On his 
visit. Ho Chi Minh praised India's role as Chairman of the International 
Commission. He regretted that, on account of colonialist interference, national 
reunification by free general elections, as provided for in the Geneva 
Agreement, had not yet been realized. With a view to reunifying the two zones, 
Nehru sti-essed the need to promote mutual understanding between them. 
In his talks with Nehru and later at a press conference on 7 February 
1958, Ho pointed out that the inclusion of South Vietnam within the protective 
zone of SEATO was a flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreement and an 
infringement of Vietnam's sovereignty and indepencence.'^ At the same press 
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conference, when asked whether North Vietnam believed in mihtary alHances, 
he said that the Geneva Agreement prevented Vietnam from getting entangled 
in such alliances. 
The Commission's attention was drawn to the alleged association of 
South Vietnam with SEATO. The Commission responded by saying that the 
matter was under consideration, a rather cold response. This showed a change 
in the Commission's attitude towards complaints from North Vietnam. 
The joint communique issued after the talks between flo and Nehru (on 
13'^  February 1958) noted their broad agreement on major international 
questions and reiterated their common faith in Panchsheel and peaceful 
coexistence. The two statesmen agreed that a high-level meeting for the 
consideration of ways of ending nuclear tests was necessary, that disarmament 
should be progressive and that world tension should be reduced. 
After the Bandung Conference (April 1955), of which Indonesia was the 
host country, the ties of friendship between India and Indonesia were 
strengthened further. President Sukarno and Nehru were instrumental in 
successfully holding the conference. India and Indonesia consulted each other 
often and informally on major world and Asian issues. They usually adopted a 
similar attitude at various Conferences. 
Although Indonesia did not take side on the Kashmir question, 
Indonesia friendship with India gave a fillip to India to maintain equilibrium in 
its relations with the Muslim countries of West Asia. Both countries followed a 
policy of nonalignment and adhered to the principles of Panchsheel. 
Indonesia claimed sovereignty over West Irian (Dutch New Guinea). 
India consistently supported Indonesia's claim at the Bogor Conference, the 
Bandung Conference and the UN. 
Whenever the question of West Irian came up for discussion before the 
UN, India gave its unequivocal support and expressed the view that West Irian 
should ultimately go to Indonesia. Nineteen nations, including India, 
cosponsored a resolution in the First Committee of the UN on 20"" November 
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1957 asking the Secretary-General to help Indonesia and the Netherlands settle 
their dispute over the territory. The Resolution was adopted by the First 
Committee on 26 November but failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority 
in the General Assembly on 29"' November 1957' . 
Before the vote was taken, Krishna Menon, said that in Various debates 
on this subject legal issues and all issues relating to the UN Charter and the 
transfer of sovereignty had been discussed. He declared, "We regard this 
problem merely as a completion of Indonesian independence." 
Nehru said in the Rajya Sabha on 12 December 1957 that the Indonesian 
claim to West Irian was "right and legitimate," but he hoped that the situation 
created by the "regrettable defeat in the UN of a moderate resolution on the 
subject would not be allowed to drift in such a way as to rule out a peaceful 
settlement." India was always for the peaceful settlement. 
India and Indonesia acted in close cooperation on many issues at the 
UN. In voting on a resolution on the situation in Hungary, both countries 
abstained. In a joint letter, India, Indonesia and 22 other nations requested the 
Secretar}'-General to include in the agenda of the 13"^  Session an item entitled 
"The Question of Algeria." But the move failed on 13 December 1958. 
India and Indonesia also voted against US-sponsored resolution in the 
UN (23 September 1958) rejecting India's request for inclusion of the question 
of the representation of China in the agenda of the 13"' Session of the General 
Assembly. 
On arrival in New Delhi (7 January 1958) in the course of a tour of 
several countries, Sukarno had prolonged talks with Nehru on the international 
situation and in particular developments in Indonesia. A statement was issued 
after the talks on 9'*' January 1958 regarding West Irian: 
In their talks the President referred to the strength of 
feeling in his country on the questions of West Irian. In 
this context the Prime Minister reiterated his view that 
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continuance of colonialism in any form was defmilely 
outmoded in the World of today.' 
Sukarno failed to sway Nehru to endorse Indonesia's policy of 
occupation of West Irian by force. Nehru tried to exercise a moderating 
influence on the Indonesian Government and expressed a wish to see the 
dispute over West Irian settled peacefully. 
A cultural agreement with Indonesia (signed on 29 December 1955) was 
ratified on II January 1958 and attempts were made by both the countries to 
coordinate their policies on regional and international issue or mutual interests. 
President Dr. Rajendra Prasad was accorded a rousing reception on his 
12-day visit to Indonesia (8-19 December 1958) at the invitation of Sukarno. 
At a banquet, Prasad said Indonesia and India had common ideals, hopes and 
aspirations. 
Military cooperation between the two countries was also very close. A 
large number of Indonesian officers were trained in India. India and Indonesia 
signed an agreement on 4"^  December 1958 ensuring closer cooperation 
between their navies. This agreement was for five years and provided for 
cooperation and mutual assistance and developing and improving the navies. A 
similar agreement between the air forces of the two countries was signed in 
February 1956. 
India's Policy towards Federation of Malaya 
The emergence of the Federation of Malaya, which is now known as 
Malaysia as a sovereign state on 31^' August 1957 was widely acclaimed in 
India. The Government of India always showed keen interest in the 
constitutional advancement of Malaysia and Singapore. Naturally this 
development caused great jubilation everywhere. New Delhi sent a ministerial 
level delegation headed by S. K. Patil, Minister of Irrigation and Power to 
participate in the independence celebrations held at Kuala Lumpur, the capital 
of Malaysia. India also raised the status of its mission there to a High 
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Commission. On the occasion when Malaya joined United Nations India 
expressed happiness at her becoming a member of the United Nations in the 
12"' session of UN General Assembly. Indian leader Krishna Menon said that it 
was a happy augury for the Assembly that it had admitted a new state so early 
in its session. 
Malaysia did not follow India's lead in espousing non-alignment. 
Although Malaysia did not join SEATO, or any other bloc, it generally 
followed the British line in foreign affairs and at the United Nations.^'' This 
identical approach of the two nations was mainly due to the clause of the 
agreement, which provided independence to Malaysia. According to it, 
Malaysia was not only to remain in the Commonwealth but was bound to Great 
Britain by a treaty of mutual alliance. 
India approved Malaysia's membership of the Commonwealth and its 
acceptance of a military alliance with Britain. There was all-round 
cooperation between the two nations. Soon after attaining independence, 
Malaysia faced an acute shortage of trained personnel. India assisted Malaysia 
in this respect. There were 80,000 Indians in Malaysia engaged in various 
professions. The Indian Government was concerned about the well being of the 
large number of Indians employed in the rubber plantations. The Indian 
immigrants had invested substantial sums in Malaysia. 
The Indian Government sought to secure equal rights for all Malaysian 
citizens irrespective of their origin. The question was all the more important in 
the case of Malaysia, as out of some 6,00,000 Indians about half were born 
there and eligible for citizenship. Some 2,00,000 Indians secured Malaysian 
citizenship up to December 1952.^ ^ But afterwards strict statutory provisions by 
the Government of Malaysia presented a large number of them IVom getting 
citizenship. An Indian Government representation on this was assured of 'full 
consideration', from the Government of Malaysia, but this did not satisfy it 
fully. On a visit to Penang in December 1954, Nehru told a mass rally of 
Indians that it was open to them to become Malaysian nationals and claim the 
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same rights and privileges as other people. But he said, "if you deeide to 
become Malaysian nationals, then love the country as your own". He 
reaffirmed the same policy regarding Indians overseas in parliament in 
September 1957. 
The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman said with a 
feeling of pride that Indians in his country were playing an active part in 
moulding the Malaysian nation. He expressed this in a speech on president Dr. 
Rajendra Prasad's visit to Malaysia (5-7 December 1958). Dr. Prasad express 
satisfaction at these remarks and advised Indian in Malaysia to bring to the 
service of that country "whatever they possess in material, moral and spiritual 
resources and serve as the unofficial ambassadors of their home". Expressing 
commonness of approach and cooperation between India and Malaysia in one 
of his speech, Dr. Prasad observed: "I fell convinced that we both in Malaysia 
and India will work together as friends and equals towards this future"." 
There was a dimension to India's relations with Southeast Asia- the 
presence of Indian communities in sizeable numbers. There was a large 
concentration in Malaysia: merchants, traders and labour drafted by the British 
during its imperial rule over India as well as in many other parts of the region, 
almost 15 per cent of the population of Malaysia, holding a precarious balance 
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between the Malay and the Chinese. 
The birth of independent Malaysia (which included Singapore for a 
short period) spurred the growth of more meaningful relationship. A particular 
phrase of Nehru used by him at the time of the visit of the King and Queen of 
Jehore, echoed in Malaysia for a long time: "he is a friend who is almost a 
relative". Malaysia's emergence coincided with the drifting apart of India and 
Indonesia. Indonesia under Sukarno was hostile to the emergence of Malaysia 
and claimed certain territories (like Borneo) presently part of Malaysia. 
Sukarno had given the conflict a somewhat ideological colouring too and went 
along with China in portraying Malaysia as a British creation and as 
subservient to the west. In the nature of the alignments at the time, with China 
stridently denouncing it, India's sympathies with the new state played 
significant role in a more meaningful and stronger relations with Malaya/' 
On 27 May 1961 Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya made 
a proposal for the establishment of a new federation of Malaysia that include 
Malaya, the British Southeast Asian colonies of Singapore, Sarawak, and 
Sabah (North Borneo territories), and the British protected state of Brunei. In 
course of time it led to a serious situation threatening peace and stability in 
insular Southeast Asia. To its sorrow India found Malaya, later Malaysia, a 
Commonwealth partner, and Indonesia, a friendly nonaligned neighbours in the 
region, embroiled in a conflict over the proposal. As the Tunku's proposal 
demonstrated Britain's willingness to terminate its authority over its South-East 
Asian colonies, India looked upon it as a viable proposition that would 
liquidate the remnants of British colonialism and make for peace and stability 
m the region. 
In the beginning Indonesia did not react unfavorably to the proposal for 
the formation of Malaysia. Foreign Minister Subandrio made his views known 
as early as 2 August 1961.^ '^  Later, in the course of his speech in the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 20 September 1961, he stated that 
Indonesia had told Malaya "that we had no objection to such a merger based 
upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned". ^'^ On this basis, 
Indonesia's stand towards the Malaysia proposal, at least at the early stage, 
tended to be interpreted as "benevolently indifferent", even "not unfriendly."'^ ^ 
Well before the issue of Malaysia came to have a bearing on Indo-
Indonesian relations, the two countries had witnessed a certain coolness 
developing between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President Sukarno, 
on both ideological and personal levels. The two leaders had openly manifested 
the differences in their approaches to the issues of colonialism and World peace 
at the conference of non-aligned States in Belgrade in September 1961.^ And 
there came a shift in Indonesia's attitude from one of acquiescence in the 
project of Malaysia to one of hostility towards it, while India looked upon the 
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formation of Malaysia as a welcome development in Southeast Asia. That 
India's attitude towards the proposed federation was favorable became 
manifest as early as December 1961. 
It is interesting to note that although Indonesia's initial reaction to the 
Malaysia proposal was one of "no objection", it was not without caution. This 
was clear from Subandrio's words "will for freedom of the peoples concerned". 
It was just this caution, which, at the time of the Brunei revolt in December 
1962, provided a justification for the Indonesian policy of confrontation with 
Malaysia. The Government of Indonesia perhaps wanted to watch the 
developments carefully for some time before taking a definite stand on the 
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issue of Malaysia. 
When Malaysia's Paramount Ruler visited India between 8-13 
December 1961, he was accorded warm welcome. In the banquet given to him 
by the Vice-President Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the Vice-President expressed his 
hope that Malaysia would be like a crescent moon stretching from Philippines 
to Indonesia and wished success in their efforts for uniting Malay-Singapore, 
North Boreno territories and Borneo.^^ 
During a visit by Yang di-pertuan Agong of Malaysia to India, Vice-
President S. Radhakrishnan reportedly gave his blessing for the Malaysia 
plan. India's attitude got further clarified during the three days visit of the 
Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, to India in April 1962. Since Tunku 
Abdul Rahman's proposal was yet to get underway, and it needed a policy 
decision with regard to the region at least for the time being, the Government 
of India chose to maintain near silence on the issue. The only public occasion 
when it made its attitude known at the dinner given by Lakshmi N. Menon, 
Minister of State for External Affairs, to Prime Minister and Madame Lee 
Kuan Yew. In her speech Lakshmi Menon observed that Malaysia was a good 
idea and expressed the hope that the efforts being made to establish the 
Malaysian federation would be crowned with success."*' 
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In his talks with Lee Kuan Yew on 23 April 1962 Nehru showed keen 
interest in the Malaysian plan. Being inconclusive, the talks were resumed on 
the next day and covered various aspects of the scheme and its regional 
implications/^ Nehru seems to have indicated that India would support the 
establishment of Malaysia. At the press conference in New Delhi on 25 April 
1962 Lee Kuan Yew observed that Nehru was "remarkably well informed on 
all matters connected with South Asia" and that he "understood my point of 
view very well and expressed sympathy with my view that Malaysia is taking a 
logical way for liquidating the British Empire in Southeast Asia". The 
Malaysia scheme, in fact, evoked appreciation in official circles in New Delhi. 
Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew's visit to India was 
important in as much as it enabled Prime Minister Nehru to exchange views on 
the Malaysia plan with the leader of one of the prospective constituents of the 
proposed federation. In view of the racial dimension of the Malaysia Scheme, 
the fact that Lee Kuan Yew represented Singapore, which was predominantly 
Chinese, and had come to India to canvass support for the scheme, made the 
occasion all the more important. Since it represented the willingness of the 
Singapore Chinese to join the new federation, discussion with Lee Kuan Yew 
led Nehru to believe in the viability of the Malaysian plan. 
The major significance of Lee Kuan Yew's visit, however, lay in the 
fact that it clarified certain grounds on which India's pro-Malaysia attitude 
would be based. India welcomed Malaysia for a variety of reasons. First, the 
emergence of Malaysia would mark the end of the remnants of British 
colonialism in the region. Secondly, Malaysia offered a sound and politically 
and economically viable alternative to instability in insular South East Asia. In 
fact, India believed that Malaysia "will be a factor for political stability" in the 
region.''^ Thirdly, Lee Kuan Yew is reported to have placed much emphasis on 
the anti-Communist content of the Malaysia plan during his talks in New Delhi 
and to have suggested that, viewed from that angle, the proposed federation 
would be in India's interest.'"' The fact that Nehru reportedly agreed with Lee 
134 
Kuan Yew on the various implications of the Malaysia plan meant the 
Government of India's acceptance ol the emergence of Malaysia as a 
stabilizing factor in the region. Following Lee Kuan Yew's visit, the 
Government of India came out openly in support of the formation of the new 
federation. In September 1962 it joined the other countries of the 
Commonwealth in expressing its satisfaction with the "great progress made 
towards the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia by 31^' August 
1963."^^ 
It is not certain however that how far the Government of India realized 
the domestic pulls and pressures inside Indonesia in tilting her towards a policy 
of confrontation with the proposed Malaysia federation. In fact, in October 
1962, when a broad consensus against the Malaysia scheme was emerging in 
Indonesia, India was preoccupied with the problem arising from the Chinese 
invasion on its northern borders. This restricted its initiatives concerning 
developments in Southeast Asia to a certain extent."*^  
Both Malaysia and Singapore had unreservedly and unmistakably 
supported India against China during the border war of 1962. Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, then Prime Minister had, infarct, setup a fund (The Fund was named 
save Democracy Fund) to assist India, of which he was himself the Chairman. 
Both Malaysia and Singapore regarded China as a subverting power and were 
most suspicious of it.'*^  However India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962 
exposed her economic and military weakness, which greatly undermined her 
prestige among the nations of Southeast Asia. 
The setback received by India during the Sino-Indian war and her tilt 
towards the Western countries created a feeling among countries of Southeast 
Asia that this may lead to greater interference by the western countries in the 
Asian Affairs. The pro-West countries of Southeast Asia tried to utilize this 
opportunity to build a broad alliance against China with Indian collaboration. 
During the visits to India by Yang-di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia in 
December 1961, and of Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore in 
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April 1962, India was well impressed by the viability of the Malaysia plan. 
India started showing favourable attitude towards the formation of Malaysia. 
The unblemished support of India was not a surprise one as she always 
championed the elimination of imperiahsm and colonialism. Also it should be 
noted that the Malaysia proposal had come in the wake of Chinese aggression 
against Indian territories in late 1962. Hence India's perception on regional 
issues was one of anti-Chinese and anti-Communist oriented. It did not want to 
see an unstable Southeast Asia falhng a prey to the Peking backed 
insurgencies. In the Malaysia plans it saw a promising element of safeguard 
against the possible efforts by China in converting the region of South East 
Asia into her sphere of influence. Had there been no barriers against Chinese 
expansionism through infiltrations and intrusions, India, it was feared, would 
soon find herself encircled by the pro-Chinese governments and consequently 
left in isolation in the wake of any encroachment on her territories. This was 
the underlying fact behind her favourable stance on the formation of 
Malaysia.^° 
INDIA AND THE TWO VIETNAMS 
India's formal 'de facto' recognition of the republic of Vietnam was 
preceded by a steady improvement of relations between the two countries. The 
development was in sharp contrast to the situation in the previous year, when 
the Indian delegation to the ICC had been attacked by Government-sponsored 
demonstrators in Saigon. On August 18, 1956, a trade delegation from South 
Vietnam, consisting of businessmen and Economic experts under the leadership 
of Nguyen Huu Chau, Secretary of State to the presidency of the republic of 
Vietnam, visited India at the invitation of the Indian Government. The mission 
was received by Prime Minister Nehru and other dignitaries of the Government 
of India. The ' Times of Vietnam' commented, it was not an ordinary trade 
mission but one of "the several Goodwill delegations to Asian Countries as the 
prelude to regular diplomatic relations....the delegation's aim was to dissolve 
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the misunderstanding of India about Vietnam and lay down tlie basis for a 
closer friendship between India and our country"'. With the establishment of 
'de-facto' diplomatic relations in October 1956, Indian diplomats slowly build 
up an atmosphere of "Friendly tolerance". In 1957 the relations between the 
two countries moved to a more cordial level. Ngo Dinh Nhu visited India from 
April 17 to 22 and was received by both Prime Minister Nehru and V. K. 
Krishna Menon. The Government of India soon invited Ngo Dinh Diem, the 
president of the Republic of Vietnam, who arrived in India on November 4, 
1957. Escorted from Aligarh to Delhi by Eight Jets of Indian Air Force and 
accorded full civil and military honours appropriate to a visiting head of state 
of an important friendly country, Diem was received by the president, the Vice-
President, The Prime Minister, and members of the Cabinet. 
Diem impressed most Indians as an independent-minded Asian 
nationalist, contrary to the general image of a puppet dictator tried to western 
apron strings, which had prevailed before his visit. India's attitude toward 
south Vietnam had been based primarily upon the latter's dependence on the 
United States and SEATO. In a speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs, 
Diem declared that although SEATO "may concern itself with us and give us 
protection, Vietnam has nothing to do with it." In a special communique on the 
subject of Vietnam's relations with SEATO, Diem added: 
Vietnam accepts neither foreign military bases, nor 
foreign troops on its territory. It is not considering the 
adherence to any military alliance at present. It is not a 
member of SEATO but its territory is covered by this 
organization. Vietnam needs internal security to recover 
from the ruins of war, and must struggle against the 
subversive man oeuvres ol the communist.... It considers 
that being covered by SEATO is a great advantage, for 
SEATO is purely defensive in nature and is interested in 
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economic development and the struggle against 
subversive measures. 
Diem's declaration was welcomed by most national newspapers, with 
the possible exception of the 'National Herald', which pointed out that Diem 
had not repudiated SEATO's protection and that South Vietnam could not be 
called an "unaligned state, because acceptance of SEATO protection means 
willingness to have SEATO bases in the country and submission to SEATO 
influence " 
The themes of the unity of Asian culture and Asian resurgent 
nationalism were underscored in the speeches of Diem and the Indian leaders. 
The Roman Catholic Visitor referred to "the great heritage of Asian culture 
which binds India and Vietnam together", pointing out India's lasting 
contribution to Vietnamese culture. In fact, Vietnam is situated at the far end of 
that vast area of Eastern Asia, which for fifteen centuries, Buddhist and 
Brahmanic Indian helped to awaken to art, thought and especially to the 
appreciation of moral and spiritual values. Diem acknowledged India's 
leadership in Asian nationalist movements and the "decisive importance of its 
destiny in the future of Asia and of the entire World." 
The significance of Diem's visit to India was threefold. First, in inviting 
and receiving President Diem as head of state and not mentioning the 
unification of Vietnam in any of the Indian speeches or communiques, India 
accepted the independent status of the republic of Vietnam. The 'National 
Herald' editorially noted, "India might not today be playing host to president 
Diem if there was any possibility of early Vietnamese reunification as provided 
for by the Geneva Agreements of 1954." Second, the event was an 
acknowledgment of Diem as a leader of an independent nationalist force in 
Vietnam distinct from the communist leadership of the north. As the Indian 
commentator Krishnalal Shridharani noted: thus far New Delhi had seen pure 
white in north Vietnam and pure black in South Vietnam. It was generally 
believed that Ho Chi Minh represented Asian nationalism driven to extremism 
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while Diem represented a puppet regime ...Diem's visit...eonvinced Delhi that 
it was not realistic to draw the Vietnamese picture in black and white and that 
intermediary shades should be recognized. Third, Diem's visit was the first 
major step by India toward befriending an absolute, anti-communist state of 
former Indochina, where American influence, so far spoumed by India, was 
increasing. 
The government experts and technicians who had accompanied Diem at 
the invitation of the Government of India visited India's industrial and 
agricultural projects and held discussion with members of India's planning 
commission on objectives and techniques. 
The inclusion of such a large number of technical experts in the visiting 
party indicated a desire to increase economic cooperation between the two 
countries. 
In early 1957- a group of Vietnamese engineers engaged in the Da Nhim 
project had visited India to study Indian hydroelectric project. Earlier, in 
August 1956, a South Vietnamese trade delegation discussed and drafted a 
trade agreement with India; it could not be concluded, however, because of the 
negligible Indian demand for Vietnamese products. Vietnamese exports 
consisted mainly of rubber, rice, and timber items, which India found it cheaper 
to import from Malaya and Burma. The trade delegations visit nonetheless 
resulted in India's exports to South Vietnam of fourteen tons of sugarcane 
sheats and "perfected species of milk cows, buffalo, sheep and milk-goats." 
Despite restrictive procedures on the licensing of imports into South Vietnam, 
such licenses to foreign countries being dependent on the volume of exports to 
these countries, the government of South Vietnam made special concessions in 
India's favor. Indian exports increased in value from 81.4 million piastres in 
1957 to 156.4 million piastres in 1958 whereas imports rose from 0.029 million 
in 1957 to 4 million in 1958. The Indian share in the total volume of South 
Vietnamese imports remained negligible, the major reasons for these were 
Japanese competition and exorbitant freight chargers from India to Saigon 
139 
because of infrequent and indirect sea communication. South Vietnam's 
interest in Indian industrial products was evidenced by the visit, of an official 
delegation in December, 1958, composed of Vu Van Thai, director-general of 
Budget and foreign aid, Ngufen Thai, director-general of the Vietnam Press 
Agency, and Tran-Van-Chieu, President of the Saigon Chamber of 
Commerce. On the other hand, two Indian delegations-from the Indian 
Engineering Export Promotion Councils and the Indian Jute Mills Association-
visited South Vietnam in the same year. 
Shortly after Diem's visit, DRV President Ho Chi Minh came to India 
on nine-days visit from February 5 to 13, 1958." He was accorded an official 
welcome of exactly the same magnitude as that accorded to Diem. Ho Chi 
Minh had of course noticed the change in Indian policy from its former pro-
north and anti-South positions to one of impartiality towards the tAvo Vietnams. 
The lack of mention in the Nehru-Diem communique of November 1957, of 
national elections and the reunification of Vietnam had certainly not escaped 
his notice. A part from the debate in the political committee of the United 
Nations, the question of the reunification of Vietnam had not been reopened 
either by the co-chairmen or by India. Typically, no one desired to disturb the 
peaceful status quo in Vietnam. Occasional demands in the British Parliament 
for reconvening the Geneva Conference or for measures to bring pressures on 
the South Vietnamese government to hold elections had, for instance, been 
brushed aside by the argument that such steps would "increase rather than 
diminish tension," which had been substantially reduced in the area over the 
previous three years. 
In the midst of general complacency over the Vietnamese issue, only the 
DRV leadership was interested in keeping the issue from being dead. Thus, on 
June 8, 1957, for the first time in nearly a year, the DRV sent a note to the co-
chairmen calling for nationwide elections.^'' The note remained unanswered. In 
the third week of July, Ho Chi Minh paid and unscheduled visit to Moscow to 
urge the Soviet leaders to keep the issue of Vietnamese reunification alive. 
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With the same end in view, on July 20, 1957, the third anniversary of the 
Geneva Agreements, the DRV Premier, in a note to Diem, reiterated his 
proposal to call a consultative conference on general election leading to the 
reunification of Vietnam. 
The appeals failed to evoke reaction of any consequence from the great 
powers, India, or the republic of Vietnam. The latter replied in a ritualistic 
fashion that it could not examine any proposal of the "Vietminh communists 
without proof and guarantee that they place the supreme interests of the nation 
above the interests of communist imperialism". In Ho Chi Minh's visit to India 
the DRV sought an Indian endorsement of its demand for the reunification of 
Vietnam. ^ ^ 
In India, despite Diem's visit, Ho Chi Minh was still held in high regard. 
Ho was much better known as a revolutionary than Diem, and his way of life, 
so simple and austere, impressed Indians iniluenced by Gandhian philosophy 
and practice. Nehru himself had described Ho as "one of the most remarkable 
men of our times, a man of peace, friendly, likeable, self-effacing, humble, a 
man of the masses". At the airport Nehru received Ho as "a great revolutionary 
and an almost legendary hero." Ho tried to endear himself to mingling with 
children and distributing pictures of Nehru and Gandhi to them. 
Against this background it was easy for Ho Chi Minh to impress the 
Indian people. It was also easy for him, without seeming to be hypocritical, to 
refer to common points in the foreign policies of India and the DRV. He 
stressed the Panchasheel, especially the principle of coexistence, and 
condemned all military pacts with the West. He expressed support for general 
disarmament and for the prohibition of the tests and the use of atomic and 
hydrogen weapons. He repeatedly thanked "brotherly India" for its work in the 
ICC and sought India's "sympathy and support" in Vietnam's "struggle for the 
consolidation of peace and for national reunification". Ho charged that 
reunification was prevented not by any differences between the two zones but 
by foreign interference. He struck a sympathetic chord in Indian hearts when he 
said, "we firmly believe that the Indian people are as eager lo see the 
Vietnamese reunified as the Vietnamese are eager to see a speedy return of Goa 
to the Indian Union. In turn, India agreed to Ho Chi Minh's request for 
endorsement of the DRV's demand for the reunifieation of Vietnam, but in 
doing so it did not condemn either South Vietnam or the United States for 
impeding the process. 
Judging from press comments. Ho Chi Minh was more warmly received 
in India than Diem had been. The Hindu hailed Ho as the "acknowledged 
leader of Indochinese nationalism against French rule". The Tribune extolled 
his courage. Patriotism, and integrity, which are "widely acknowledged even in 
the South". The Tribune, however, although supporting unification of the three 
divided countries of Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, realistically noted that 
"neither Prime Minister Nehru nor Dr. Ho Chi Minh nor any Asian statesman 
can do much" in the matter unless the great powers were able to agree on the 
basis for such a unification. Willingness to accept a political stalemate in 
Vietnam was also apparent in the ICC's (International Control Commission) 
avoidance of any decisions on important or controversial issues throughout 
1957 and 1958. Indeed, the co-chairmen's message of May 8, 1956, following 
their discussion in London, had the effect of Preempting Political aspects of the 
Vietnamese problem. Thereafter, until the end of 1958, the ICC did little except 
supervise the demarcation line and check the import of war material and 
personnel within the limits permitted by its personnel strength and the 
availability of logistic facilities. In this period there was no serious incident in 
the demilitarized zone on either side of the seventeenth paralle, but the causes 
of such a state of relative peace were attributable more to restraints imposed on 
both parties by external forces than to the efficiency of the ICC. The DRV, 
however, used the ICC as a sounding board for its complaints against the South 
Vietnamese government, charging the letter with violation of various articles of 
the Geneva. Yet during 1957 and 1958 the DRV did not press the ICC for its 
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opinions or recommendations in these complaints of violation of the Geneva 
Agreements by South Vietnam. 
After 1958 there were increasing instances of Communist activity in 
South Vietnam. With no prospect of reunification through political and 
diplomatic efforts, the DRV resorted to infiltration and subversion in South 
Vietnam. Among the prearmistice resistance fighters were a number of 
Vietminli members who became spearheads of a new policy of conquering the 
South Vietnam. The Diem regime, which was never liberal, even toward non-
Communist dissenting opinion, introduced a number of measures to repress 
"Subversive" elements in the state. Communist activity increased, followed by 
reprisals, which in turn occasioned more complaints from the people's Army of 
Vietnam (PAVN) high command to the ICC. The former sought refuge in the 
Provisions of Article 14(c), alleging that the South Vietnamese government's 
actions constituted reprisals against former resistance workers. From December 
11, 1955, to January 31, 1959, the ICC received 447 complaints from the 
PAVN high command as against 29 from the republic of Vietnam for violation 
of Article 14(c). The Commission's procedure in handling these cases was 
cumbersome. First, there would be a Prima facie discussion and, if all three 
commissioners, agreed, the complaint would be sent to the other party for its 
comments. On receipt of the reply from the other party, which sometimes 
required numerous reminders, the ICC often held prolonged discussions before 
deciding to send a team to investigate. Moreover, a deployment of a team 
needed the concurrence of the command concerned. The last team was so 
deployed by the commission in South Vietnam in September 1556. As the ICC 
reported to the co-chairmen on July 12, 1957, the majority of the cases under 
Article 14(c) were pending for more than a year since no mobile team could be 
deployed "because of the refusal of the Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam to give their concurrence." The South Vietnamese government 
maintained that the PAVN's complaints did not fall under Article 14(c), 
informed the ICC that it would not respond to the complaints under the article, 
and that it would not respond to the complaints under the article, and that it 
would not permit investigations of such complaints through the machinery of 
mobile teams as laid down in the Geneva Agreements. On April 1 i, 1957, the 
ICC complained to the co-chairmen: 
The Commission has not received the necessary assistance 
and co-operation from the Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam and has therefore not been able to supervise the 
implementation of Article 14(c) in accordance with the 
Geneva Agreement. In spite of the efforts of the 
commission, replies were not received from the 
Government of the Republic of Vietnam in the majority of 
the pending cases referred to it alleging reprisals or 
discrimination under Article 14 (c) and involving a large 
number of persons. The Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam not only declined to give concurrence to the 
deployment of eight mobile teams decided upon by the 
commission but also refused to permit the deployment of 
two mobile teams for which concurrence had already been 
given by them. 
The ICC was helpless in such conditions. All it could do was to resolve 
that "the party had not afforded all possible assistance and co-operation under 
Article 25" or, as a stricter measure, to "inform the members of the Geneva 
Conference under Article 43". Recording violations of the articles of the 
Geneva Agreements by the republic of Vietnam was, however, meaningless 
since that government had repudiated the agreements. Furthermore, the co-
chairman and the Geneva powers, when informed about the situation so many 
times in 1957 and 1958, failed to take any action to ensure implementation of 
the agreements. The commission continued to plod its frustrating path of 
examining complaints, deliberating at length over whether or not to send out a 
mobile team, and finding itself deadlocked for general lack of cooperation. 
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While South Vietnam withheld cooperation in the implementation of Article 14 
(c), North Vietnam was reluctant to help the ICC implement Article 14 (d). In 
August 1955, at the end of the extended period permilling a change of zone, the 
commission had decided upon procedures for resolving the residual cases. In 
November 1956, the freedoms committee of the ICC received 1,684 petitions 
from the Quynh Luu district of Nghe, a province in North Vietnam. The ICC 
considered that 316 of the cases belonged within the residual categories, 
whereas it was doubtful of 669 other petitions, which it referred to the PAVN 
high command for comment.^ ** The latter's reply, received a year later, was so 
vague that the ICC was unable to decide a single case. There were older cases 
too, like that of the seminarists of Xa Doai, who were not allov^ed to move 
south or to appear before the ICC's investigation team. The commission 
decided that the PAVN high command had violated Article 43, and informed 
the members of the Geneva Conference accordingly. But neither the Geneva 
Powers nor the co-chairmen acted in the matter. Throughout the period from 
mid-1956 to the end of 1958 the ICC's inability to reach any significant 
decision made it an ineffectual body, without drive, without authority, without 
encouragement, and even without expectations. 
Between 1955 and 1958 Cambodia's international position 
approximated that of India, although Cambodia used the term "neutral" as 
against India's preference for being called "nonaligned". Both countries were 
anticolonial and denounced military alliances with either bloc, particularly 
SEATO. Both countries willingly accepted economic aid from the East and the 
West, and opened their doors to welcome dignitaries from the Western World 
as well as from the Communist countries. On major international issues in the 
United Nations and elsewhere, where the choice lay between the Communists 
and the "free world", they voted for neither, preferring to stand with the Afro-
Asian bloc of countries, often led by India. But there were differences, India 
had been among the first to recognize Communist China, Cambodia did not 
recognize it even after an official visit by Sihanouk to Peking in February^ , 
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1956. but delayed the recognition until August, 1958, despite Sihanouk's 
support of Nehru's view that it would be in the interest of World peace if 
"China's rightful place in the U.N. is restored.'' 
More important was the basic difference in the motivation of the two 
countries in adopting the policy on neutrality. Cambodia had adopted neutrality 
after experiencing frustration in securing a firm commitment from the United 
States or SEATO to assign troops or to enter an alliance specifically for 
Cambodia's protection. For India, nonalignment was an article of faith, bom 
out of deep spiritual and ideological convictions. India's nonalignment had 
helped her to adopt an independent attitude on every issue, particularly those 
that tended to polarize the World. In doing so, she inspired and partly 
succeeded in acting as a major political power mediating between the two blocs 
in the larger interests of World peace. Whether the policy grew out of a 
parochial necessity for peace for India, or whether it was entirely motivated by 
global considerations, is an endlessly debatable question. On the other hand, 
Cambodia's interest in a policy of neutrality was more pragmatic and 
nationalistic. As Sihanouk himself, the chief architect and articulator or 
Cambodia's foreign policy, stated in an article in Foreign Affairs: 
Since we achieved independence, our policy has always 
been suited to our national needs. In our foreign relations 
we have favored neutrality, which in the United States is 
all too often confused with "neutralism", although it is 
fundamentally different. We are neutral in the same way 
Switzerland and Sweden are neutral- not neutralist like 
Egypt or Indonesia. Let anyone examine our votes in the 
United Nations; they are not often "aligned" with those of 
the bloc of "neutralist" nations. 
Our neutrality has been imposed on us by necessity. A 
glance at a map of our part of the world will show that we 
are wedged in between two medium sized nations of the 
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weslern bloc and only ihinly screened by Laos froDi the 
scrutiny of two countries of the Eastern bloc. North 
Vietnam and the vast People 's Republic of China. What 
choice has we but to try to maintain an equal balance 
between the "blocs "? 
During 1957 and 1958 Cambodia's disputes with Thailand and South 
Vietnam reached a critical level, leading to bitter exchanges and a breach of 
diplomatic relations. Passion and Anger were evident in the Cambodian press 
and governmental statements over numerous incidents along Cambodia's 
borders. India was apprehensive that these squabbles along Cambodia's borders 
might disturb the peace in Southeast Asia. From India's point of view, 
Cambodia's need for security had been met by the Panchsheel doctrine, which 
put Cambodia's relations with the DRV and Communist China on a friendly 
footing. Such a point of view would have been correct in 1954 and 1955, but 
from mid-1956 Cambodia no longer looked to China or North Vietnam as 
immediate sources of aggression against her borders. India failed, like most 
other countries, to recognize the intensity of Cambodia's feeling toward her 
neighbors and the changed concept of her security needs. Cambodia's historical 
fears of aggressive intentions on the part of her Thai and Vietnamese neighbors 
had been revived by their diplomatic and military collusion against Cambodia 
in 1956. In the nineteenth century, rival ambitions between the same two 
neighbors to terminate Cambodia's national identity had been checkmated only 
by timely French establishment of a protectorate over Cambodia. Historically, 
the Vietnamese march Southward had been at Cambodia's expense; the rich 
Mekong basin of Cochin China was lost to the Vietnamese in the eighteenth 
century, and Cambodia had survived as a state in the period thereafter by 
playing its aggressive neighbors against each other and recognizing the 
suzerainty of either or both. Apprehensions of Thai aggressive intentions were 
based on more recent history. Through diplomatic bargaining with France, 
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Thailand had secured Cambodia's iwo western provinces oi' Ballambang and 
Siem Reap in 1867. 
France recovered the two provinces lor Cambodia in 1907, but Thailand 
seized them again at the opportunity presented by the Japanese occupation in 
1941. Only at the insistence of the United States in a treaty signed in 
Washington did France recover from Thailand the two provinces for 
Cambod la. When the French granted independence to Cambodia and withdraw 
most of its troops from Cambodia's western border, Thailand quickly occupied 
the ruins of the ancient Khmer temple of Preah Vihear on the plea that the site 
was on the Thai side of the watershed in the Dangrek Mountains. The 
Vietnamese and Thai incursions into Cambodian territory in early 1956 and 
their stepped-up press and radio hostile propaganda paralleling it aroused 
justifiable fears in Cambodian minds, particularly since her foes derived their 
strength through alliance of one kind or another with the United States and 
other western countries. 
In the dispute between Cambodia and her neighbors, India supported 
the former. Any military support was out of the question. The confiict reached 
the point at which Cambodia needed outside assistance in arms. Cambodia 
never requested India for any such help in money or material. Even if such a 
request were made, it is inconceivable that India would have complied in the 
context of her larger policies. What Cambodia expected, however, was 
diplomatic support, and India gave it in the maximum measure within the 
narrow confines of nonalignment and her role as chairman of the ICC in 
Cambodia and Vietnam. As a non-aligned country India has had greater 
influence and diplomatic leverage with major powers than with smaller states. 
Although there have been numerous instances in international diplomacy in 
which India successfully mediated between the communist bloc and the 
western block, there have been few in which Indian mediation was sought for 
or exercised to settle a dispute between two small states-one pro-west and the 
other pro-Communist or neutral. India did not have enough inlluence on 
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Thailand or South Vietnam to help resolve Cambodia's differences with them. 
In 1957-58 India did improve her relation with South Vietnam, but efforts to 
mediate between the latter and Cambodia would have likely marred the new 
relationship. As for assistance through her chairmanship of the ICC, India was 
severely limited in her action by the attitude of her colleagues in the 
commission, particularly those from Canada, who questioned the ICC's 
competence in the matter. 
In 1957 alone, the ICC in Cambodia received from the Cambodian 
government twenty-three letters reporting thirty-seven incidents of violation of 
Cambodian territory by South Vietnam and five letters reporting nine such 
instances of violation by the Thai forces. The members of the ICC, aware of the 
differences among themselves over the Khmer-Vietnamese dispute, agreed 
merely to send copies of the complaints to the ICC for Vietnam "for 
information." 
A major incident in May 1957 on the Khmer-Vietnamese border, 
however, brought latent differences within the ICC to the surface. On May 14, 
about seven in the evening, the ICC chairman was approached by the 
Cambodian government to investigate an incident on May 2 in which sixty 
Vietnamese armed personnel had reportedly pillaged a village near Bathu in 
Svay Rieng, four kilometers within the Cambodian border. The prime minister 
of Cambodia reported that in the resistance one "raider" was killed and seven 
other were taken prisoner. He asked that the commission send its 
representatives to verify the facts on the spot. The same night the ICC met in an 
extraordinary session, and an ad hoc team proceeded to the site of the incident 
on the following day. Its unanimous reports confirmed that South Vietnamese 
military personnel had crossed the Cambodian border and raided the villages of 
Sam Pong and Bathu, had fired on the inhabitants, and had done damage to 
Cambodian persons and property. When the report came up for consideration 
before the ICC, Canadian commissioner L.H. La Vigne questioned that 
competence of the ICC in investigation border incidents between Cambodia 
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and South Vietnam. He had agreed to send a team for investigation because of 
"uncertainty regarding the identity of the invaders," but since the report "makes 
it clear that the incursion was carried out by regular troops of the South 
Vietnamese Army, the ICC is not competent...to lake any further action 
regarding the incident as it is not within the terms of reference of the 
Agreement.' 
Further, since the question of competence of the ICC in such matters had 
been referred to the co-chaimien in May 1957, and the latter had not replied, 
the matter was subjudice and commission therefore could not discuss it. The 
Indian delegate, Major-General Ghanashyam Singh, took the middle view. 
India clearly wanted to avoid a conflagration between Vietnam and Cambodia 
and any disturbance of the peace in Southeast Asia. The integrity of 
Camboldia's borders vis-a-vis the South Vietnamese and the Vietminh was, in 
India's opinion, a continuing responsibility of the ICC during the latter's 
existence in the country. He pleaded that the ICC should not prejudge the issue 
and that more information from independent sources would be required even to 
determine the facts of the case. He added. 
Investigation does not commit any of the delegations to 
action to be taken on it which can rightly be considered 
only on receipt of reliable reports such as I commend.... 
As for the Viet Minh escapees...we may well decide, if the 
persons are proved to belong to the former Resistance 
Movement to deal with the matters in co-operation with 
our sister commission in Vietnam. On the other hand, we 
might even leave it to the Cambodian authorities to handle 
the situation if that is our decision. What I want to stress 
is why do we prejudge the issue when we can investigate. 
In order to by pass the Canadian opposition, the Indian and Polish 
delegations used a procedural card. T hey pointed out that they were not 
discussing the matter under Article 21, which required unanimity; they were 
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merely proposing dispatch of a team for investigation under Articles 12 and 
13(a) as a routine duly of the ICC. Fhcy decided by a majority vote that the 
matter fell under Articles 12 and 13 (a). Hut the Canadian delegation declared it 
would not participate in any investigation without a consultation with its 
government, a procedural privilege for such delegation. The necessary 
instructions did not arrive from Canada for the next few days. In the fourth 
"extraordinary" meeting of June 28, 1958, the Chairman expressed the serious 
concern of both the Indian delegation and the Cambodian government, whose 
foreign minister had seen the Chairman twice, urging swift action by the ICC. 
The chairman assured the Canadian commissioner that if he allowed Canadian 
participation without waiting for the instructions of his government, his "stand 
on other points would not be understood to have changed." The Canadian 
commissioner agreed. On July 11, however, he told his colleagues that he had 
received his government's instructions, according to which he would 
"withdraw the conditional authorisation" he had given earlier for Canadian 
participation. 
Meanwhile, an ICC team visited the site of the incident, interviewed 
eighty-nine of the ninety Vietminh escapees, and returned on July 9 to Phnom 
Penh, where it processed the evidence and drafted the report. Its terms of 
reference included verification of the information supplied by the Cambodian 
government, particularly about the illegal entry of Vietminh personnel into 
Cambodia and to report its "appreciation of the possible development of the 
situation regarding violation of the Cambodian frontiers." The team's 
conclusions were unanimous: that South Vietnamese troops had moved with 
large vehicles and erected new boundary pillars 1,800 meters within 
Cambodian territory; that eighty-three of the ninety escapees were "members of 
the former Resistance Movement or have been somehow connected with it"; 
that they had been arrested by the South Vietnamese government between 1955 
and 1956 and made to work on an airfield, that they escaped in groups into 
Cambodia, which country they entered illegally without any promise of help 
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by Cambodia. As for the possibility of escalation of the eonflict, the team 
observed; 
// M'as considered unlikely that South Vietnamese Armed 
Forces will endeavour further intrusion into Cambodian 
territory in order to recapture the persons who escaped 
from the custody of South Vietnamese authorities, as these 
escapees have now been shifted by the Cambodian 
authorities from Bo Kheo to Stung Treng, where they have 
been kept under guard. On the other hand, so long as the 
South Vietnamese forces continue to remain in 
Cambodian territory, the possibilities of armed clashes 
cannot be ruled out. 
The team's report, submitted to the ICC on July 20, was approved by all 
three members of the team. The Canadian member, colonel A. Stocks, 
observed: 
Having collaborated in a personal capacity with the 
Indian and Polish members of the team of investigation in 
drafting this report, I am prepared in that capacity to 
signify my personal endorsement of the accuracy of the 
observations, which it records. I am unable formally to 
sign this report since, in my view, for reasons already 
explained, the investigation itself was outside the 
competence of this commission. 
The result of all these legal and procedural wrangles in the ICC, which 
had lasted four weeks, was a report that the Canadian delegation considered as 
having no legal status. The co-chairmen did not trouble themselves to enlighten 
the ICC on the latter's responsibilities in border disputes between Cambodia 
and South Vietnam. Moreover, after the adoption of the Stung Treng report by 
the ICC, the Canadian Commissioner warned his colleagues, that it should be 
clearly understood by all concerned that should another such border incident 
occur, the Canadian delegation will not only vigorously appose any proposal 
that this commission should investigate but will not. even if outvoted, agree to 
participate or to collaborate in any such investigation as the majority may seek 
to undertake.^ "^ It is relevant to point out that because of the Canadian 
delegation's refusal to participate in any investigation of Khmer-Vietnamese 
border disputes after mid-1958, and because of the co-chairmen's failure to 
give a ruling on the subject of the ICC's competence in the matter, India was 
not able to help maintain peace on Cambodia's western borders. India's 
limitations were even greater in the instance of Cambodia's borders with 
Thailand. Non-aligned India had little influence on pro-west Thailand, whose 
membership in SEATO had been condemned by India in the past. Then too, the 
Khmer-Thai conflict was clearly beyond the ICC's jurisdiction. India's help to 
Cambodia in the latter's conflict with Thailand was far more circumscribed 
than in Cambodia's disputes with South Vietnam. 
Ever since early 1956, when Sihanouk had visited Peking, I'hai-Khmer 
relation had been cool if not unfriendly. In 1958 relations deteriorated so much 
that the two countries withdrew their mutual diplomatic representatives and cut 
off, all communications. This period again coincided with Cambodia's 
demonstration of friendship for Communist China: Sihanouk's visit to Peking, 
the Sino-Khmer economic aid agreement, and the recognition by Cambodia of 
the people's Republic of China. 
On March 13, 1958, the Cambodian government sent the ICC a copy of 
their protest note to the Thai embassy in Phnem Penh alleging occupation by 
Thai armed forces of Daun Ton ruins and firing on the Cambodian patrol. The 
Cambodian government was prepared to conciliate its differences with 
Thailand if the latter's troops were withdrawn.^'' On March 27 there was a huge 
Demonstration in Phnom Penh outside the Thai embassy. In the following 
months press and radio criticism in the two countries reached the height of 
bitterness. Cambodia alleged encroachments on her territory by Thai armed 
bands supported by Thai air force planes. In July 1958, there was a thau 
153 
marked by Sihanouk's visit to Bangkok to discuss the Khmer-Thai diiTerences. 
llie talks were followed up by Cambodian Minister of Foreign AlTair Son 
Sann. But in the following week Cambodia announced its recognition of China 
and Sihanouk's visit to Peking on August 15.' Thailand at once alleged that 
"following closely upon the recognition of the people's Republic of China by 
Cambodia," Communist infiltration in Thailand had mounted, and that the Thai 
government had conclusive evidence of "intensified contacts between the leftist 
elements in Cambodia and certain aliens in Thailand".^^ The allegation was 
followed by proclamation of a state of emergency on the Cambodian frontier, 
augmenting the power of the frontier authorities to stop armed raids from 
across the border and to prevent "illegal entry into the country by such 
undesirable elements as those Cambodian-naturalised Communist Chinese".' 
Before going to Peking, Sihanouk and his foreign minister visited New Delhi 
on August 11 and 12, "to seek Mr. Nehru's advice in order to detennine our 
line of action to solve difficulties with our neighbors.'" 
Sihanouk told India about Cambodia's difficulties with her neighbours 
arising out of her determination to follow a policy of neutrality.^^ In his public 
statements he expressed satisfaction over his conversation with Nehru, 
declaring that he would "not venture to proceed ahead without taking 
advantage of the wise advice of Mr. Nehru." Nehru reportedly advised the 
visitor to make another effort to reconcile his differences with Thailand 
through negotiations. While in New Delhi Sihanouk announced that 
Cambodian Foreign Minister Son Sann would soon visit Thailand for 
negotiations on the border dispute. Son Sann arrived in Bangkok on August 14, 
the same day on which Sihanouk left for Peking on a fourteen-day state visit. 
The maze of diplomatic niceties and verbiage did not conceal the fact that India 
had not joined Cambodia in condemning Thailand. There had been no 
expression of moral or national support except some advice that the matter be 
settled through further talks between the two neighbors. India's diplomatic 
attitude contrasted sharply with China's reaction to Cambodia's border 
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problems. Sihanouk's joint communique of August 24 witli Chou En-Lai 
referred to Cambodia's disputes with her neighbors. Although India was 
inhibited from publicly condemning Cambodia's neighbors, there was no love 
lost between China and pro-West Thailand and South Vietnam. To the 
complete satisfaction of Sihanouk, Chou En-Lai unequivocally described the 
invasion and blockade of Cambodian territory by its neighbours as ''extremely 
unfriendly acts".'''^  Thailand at once alleged that Sihanouk was trying to 
intimidate her by bringing China into the picture. There is no doubt that 
Sihanouk utilized his Chinese visit to empress Cambodia's neighbors of 
Communist China's friendship for Cambodia. The support of the United State 
and the West against pro-West Thailand and South Vietnam was out of the 
question. India's support was not forthcoming in the desired degree. China's 
support was therefore gratifying to Sihanouk, although in 1958 it is doubtful 
that he would have accepted any Chinese military help even if it were offered. 
The negotiations between Cambodia and Thailand broke off on 
September 5, 1958. Two days latter about fifty thousand persons marched on 
the Cambodian embassy in Bangkok. Virulent press and radio attacks were 
resumed in both countries. An additional factor acerbating the relation between 
the two countries was a coup d'etat in Thailand on October 20, 1958, that 
Ousted Marshal Pibul Songram, who took asylum in Cambodia, Relations 
between the two countries deteriorated further; on 1 December 1958 the 
Cambodian government suspended its embassy in Bangkok.^" The Thai 
government immediately reciprocated by withdrawing its mission from 
Cambodia, closing the Cambodian frontier, and suspending air service between 
the countries. On December 3, 1958 the Cambodian government approached 
the Secretary-general of the United Nations, stating that troops on a war footing 
and large amounts of military equipment were being concentrated by the Thai 
government on the Cambodian frontier, and that it considered the situation 
constituted a threat to peace. On the previous day the Cambodia government 
wrote to the ICC requesting it to examine the possibility of sending ICC teams 
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lo Batlainbang and Siem Reap 'lo verify, even as passive witnesses of liie 
good faith of Cambodia." The government admitted that, strictly speaking, the 
conOict between Thailand and Cambodia was beyond the jurisdiction of the 
commission, but it observed also that since it was the commission's 
responsibility to maintain peace in the countries of former Indochina, attacks or 
threats against Cambodia, whatever their origin, should concern the ICC. 
For a whole week the ICC could not decide whether to meet and discuss 
the Cambodian government's latter of December 3. When it convened on 
December 10 the Polish delegate suggested, that the ICC send a team to the 
Thai border for investigation. India and Canada opposed the preposition on the 
grounds that since the Geneva Agreements did not included Thailand, the ICC 
could take no action regarding the relationship between Thailand and 
Cambodia. 
On that occasion chairman Chand N. Dash had maintained that any 
violation of Cambodian borders was a matter within the competence of the ICC 
to discuss. At Indian initiative, however, some indirect help was rendered to 
Cambodia. The ICC's reply to the Cambodian government certified that "the 
imports of war material by the Royal Government were not in excess of its 
effective defence requirements and that the commission continued to be 
convinced of the relevance of these statements up-to date. This statement was 
designed to help Cambodia defend its position that it had not built up 
armaments against Thailand. 
Thus we see India's role in the ICC in Cambodia from 1956 through 
1958 indicated her inclination to help reduce tension on Cambodia's borders. 
But there were severe limitations- The ICC was not competent to intervene in 
Khmer-Thai dispute, and its competence in regard to Khmer-Vietnamese 
conflict was challenged by one of its own members-Canada. After mid-1958 
the Canadian refusal to participate in the investigation of border violations by 
South Vietnam reduced the ICC to a paralyzed spectator of the deterioration of 
peace in the region. It was the worst period for the ICC in all three countries of 
156 
former (ndochina. In the third week of July 1958, I'he ICC in Laos had decided 
upon an adjournment sine die in the face of the Canadian threat to withdraw its 
member and inconformity with the Laotian government wish that the ICC be 
withdrawn. In South Vietnam, the situation created by the complete withdrawal 
of all French troops and the abolition of the French Union high command had 
made the ICC dependent for logistic and other facilities on the government of 
South Vietnam, which had never officially accepted obligations under the 
Geneva Agreements. The middle of 1958, therefore, marks the lowest point in 
the ICC's history and could have been the most suitable time for its dissolution 
in all three countries. India however, favoured continuation of the ICC in all 
three countries. At her insistence the resolution on dissolution of the ICC in 
Laos was changed into one proposing its adjournment sine die, technically 
keeping the ICC there alive and permitting its revival in 1961. In Cambodia, 
the government itself wanted the ICC to continue its presence could be 
beneficial; at worst it could be harmless. 
Throughout the period from 1955 to 1958 Cambodia's relations with 
India continued to be most cordial, whereas her relations with China could at 
best be characterized as formal. Cambodia trod the uncertain ground of 
neutrality/ until almost the end of 1959, when her relations with China grew 
positively friendly and she leaned progressively there after on her powerful 
Communist neighbour's support. It must be noted that after 1956 Chinese 
influence was gradually mounting in Cambodia, partly at India's expense. 
During that period India and China were on friendly terms, and India was 
complacent as to Chinese designs in Southeast Asia. In fact, Nehru's 
diplomatic exertions were directed toward bringing China and Cambodia 
closer. At Bandung, Nehru, and Chou indicated their common interest in 
Cambodian neutrality, and both were satisfied with Sihanouk's declaration on 
neutrality as the guideline for Cambodian foreign policy. After the great 
conclave, although India took Cambodian friendship and neutrality for granted, 
Chou En-Lai proceeded to strengthen the newly established friendship with 
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Cambodia on a priority basis. " In February 1956, despite Cambodia's non-
recognition of China, Sihanouk was feted with pomp and ccrcmon\ during his 
visit to F''eking. China showed great satisfaction at his repudiation of SEATO's 
protection and his preparedness to enter into a trade agreement with China. 
Following the conclusion of such an agreement in June 1956, Cambodia 
became the first non-Communist state to receive Chinese economic aid. 
Economic mission were exchanged between the two countries. Economic aid 
totaling 22.4 million dollars was to be delivered over the next two or three 
years to Cambodia, and was to be in the form of equipment and technical skill 
to construct factories in Cambodia- a textile mill, a paper mill, a cement plant, 
and plywood factory. China also undertook to supply a variety of other goods 
textiles, round iron bars, cement, paper, pottery and porcelain that Cambodia 
could sell in the local market to help finance economic development programs. 
The system resembled the American method of financing some developing 
countries through "counterpart funds." Later in the year, during his tour of 
South and Southeast Asia (which included North Vietnam, India, Burma, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Ceylon), Chou En-Lai visited Cambodia. Of 
the countries he visited, Cambodia, Nepal were the only ones that had not yet 
recognized, Chou En-Lai urged the local Chinese community, a thorn in 
Sihanouk's side, not to meddle in Cambodian politics. In July, 1958, at the 
height of Cambodia's dispute with South Vietnam and Thailand, Sihanouk 
announced recognition of China and followed the announcement by a fourteen-
day state visit to China. During this visit Chou-En-Lai assured Sihanouk again 
that China would not interfere in Cambodia's internal affairs. Moreover, China 
condemned South Vietnam and Thailand for their hostility towards peaceful 
Cambodia. Later in the year Chou En- Lai reciprocated by his second visit to 
Cambodia, during which he promised to build an iron and steel mill for 
Cambodia. During the same year the Chinese government also held an 
exhibition of their agricultural products, textiles, and heavy and light 
machinery in the Cambodian capital.^ "^  In 1959 a purchasing mission from 
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China visited Cambodia and stayed there for two months, during whieh it 
signed contracts with Cambodian firms for exports to China oi' 51,308 cubic 
meters of timber, fifty Citroen automobiles assembled in Cambodia, and sixty-
IS 
five tons of sub-factory products. 
As indicated above, Communist China cultivated Cambodia's friendship 
during the period of Sino-Indian amity. Nehru did not visit Cambodia after 
October 1954, despite Sihanouk's invitations extended in 1956 and 1958. 
Sihanouk, however, was a frequent visitor to New Delhi to consult Nehru on 
various issues, including relations with China. India's vice-president S. Radha 
krishnan, visited Cambodia in 1957, and President Rajendra Prasad followed in 
March 1959. Both visits were marked by great hospitality and grateful 
references to ancient cultural ties, especially of Buddhism, between India and 
Cambodia. In March 1959, even after Cambodia's realization that she could 
expect no assistance from India in her border disputes, the importance of Indian 
diplomatic support was knowledge. Welcoming Rajendra Prasad's visit as the 
first "since our independence of the head of a foreign state," the Cambodian 
king said, "Today, we have no stronger support and no keener understanding 
than yours of the policy of neutrality which the Royal Government follows, and 
its scrupulous respect of the principles of the Panchsheel." The India 
President's visit marked the fourth anniversary of the Signing of the 
Panchsheel agreement between India and Cambodia. Prasad stated: 
We know that the friendship of our two countries is based 
on a kinship of interest in peace and in the Panch Sheela, 
interested in the permanence of freedom. We know that 
friendship based on such kindred interests is bound to 
endure. 
Compared with China's calculated efforts to win Cambodia's friendship, 
Indian effort-diplomatic, economic, and cultural-were scattered. During his 
visit in October, 1954, Nehru had offered Cambodia technical help, "as much 
as Cambodia liked."" In 1955 India gave five thousand tons of rice to enable 
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Cambodia "to tide over local shortages." In the same year an Indian technical 
survey team visited Cambodia to assess the country's requirements of technical 
assistance from India. India also participated in an international exhibition in 
Phnom Penh "to promote economic, technical, social and cultural welfare of 
Cambodia." The technical survey team submitted its report and 
recommendations in 1956 to the Cambodian government. In 1957 the Indian 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry surveyed economic and commercial 
conditions in Cambodia to assess the possibilities of increased trade with 
Cambodia. Its report pointed out a number of reasons for the declining trade 
between the two countries. The report stressed that, in addition to the absence 
of direct shipping facilities and the lack of any importable item, the greatest 
handicap was the absence of a trade agreement between the countries. 
Cambodia had concluded bilateral trade agreements in 1956 with a number of 
countries.^^ In 1957 India opened negotiations for a trade agreement with 
Cambodia, but could not agree on the bilateral character of trade relationship 
and the negotiation were postponed sine die. Moreover, the Cambodian 
government restricted its import trade by asking importers to submit tenders for 
goods from the countries that executed trade agreements with Cambodia gave 
substantial economic aid to Cambodia, or imported substantial quantities of 
goods from Cambodia, India did not fall into any of these categories, making it 
difficult for India to export substantial quantities of good to Cambodia.^' 
The Chinese trade agreement with Cambodia in 1956 directly affected 
Indian trade with Cambodia. The only commodity India could export without 
fear of competition was jute, but the export of such other commodities as 
textiles, cement, paper and light machinery dropped from fourteen million riles 
in 1956 to "almost nil" in 1957.^ ^ In 1958 China followed an aggressive policy 
in trade by resorting to drastic price cutting in order to capture markets in 
Southeast Asia. It offered textiles and numerous other manufactured goods at 
prices 5 to 10 percent below the prices for comparable Japanese and Indian 
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goods, causing an immediate decline in Japanese and Indian sales throughout 
Southeast Asia, including Cambodia.'^ 
Despite official restrictive policies, India was favored by Cambodia. The 
Indian embassy in Phnom Penh reported in 1958 that although India did not fall 
in the normal categories of countries from which imports were permitted by the 
Cambodian government, Indian sugar and cement were allowed to be imported, 
thanks mainly to "the very friendly political relations between the two 
countries". The higher ceiling imposed by the Indian sugar mills association 
for the minimum export of sugar, however, prohibited the deliveries of that 
commodity to Cambodia.^^ Indian official reports indicate awareness of the 
Chinese competition. The concerted efforts by the Indian embassy helped 
revive Indian exports to Cambodia from 28.8 million riles in 1956 to 59.985 
million riles in 1958 and to 70.441 million in 1959. The principal commodities 
exported from India were jute, textiles, sugar, tobacco, cement and films. 
Comparable figures for Chinese exports to Cambodia were 83.3 million riels in 
1956 and 158.41 millions riels in 1959, most of which constituted economic 
aid. 
India devoted some attention to cultural exchanges as well. An official 
cultural delegation of dancers and musicians, led by India's foremost stage 
actor Prithviraj Kapoor, went to all the countries of Southeast Asia in 1956.**'^  
Numerous delegation from the Buddhist countries of the region visited India in 
1956 to celebrate the 2,500"" anniversary of the birth of Lord Buddha. In 1957 
the Indian council of cultural Relations, a government- supported organization, 
sponsored the visit of Manmohan Ghosh to Cambodia, where he taught for 
three years at the Buddhistic University. In 1958 one student from Cambodia 
was awarded a scholarship for higher studies in India. In 1959 fifteen 
Cambodian educators visited India for four weeks "to observe and study 
community development through education." 
Despite lack of special attention to Cambodia in Indian policy and its 
inability to assist Cambodia in the latter's disputes with its neighbors, India's 
influence was still more significant than was China's in Cambodian official 
circles until 1959. Cambodia actually followed a neutral foreign policy, which 
was closer to Indian than to Chinese policy. India's support and friendship on 
certain issues were taken for granted, and Sihanouk continued to acknowledge 
Nehru's superior stature among the nonaligned nations as well as in overall 
World alTairs. Cambodia's main preoccupation, however, was to leak for 
support in her disputes with Thailand and South Vietnam. There the 
alternatives in Sihanouk's mind were not between India and China but beUveen 
the United States and Communist China. As Barraclough put it, "Cambodia, 
sandwiched between two nations with western connections of which it had 
traditional fears... may have felt that relations with China and North 
Vietnam...ensured it against serious aggression by its neighbours.^^ 
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CHAPTERS 
INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER THE 
CHINESE AGGRESSION 
India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962 exposed her economic and 
military weakness, which greatly undermined her prestige. With the exception 
of the countries of region that were camp followers of the Western countries, 
most of the other countries preferred to remain neutral. These countries did 
take initiative to arrange direct negotiations betAveen India and China, but could 
not succeed. Thus India's strained relations with Indonesia and China 
prevented her playing a significant role in the Southeast Asia. 
The setback received by India during the Sino-Indian war and her tilt 
towards the Western countries created a feeling among countries of Southeast 
Asia that this might lead to greater interference by the Western countries in the 
Asian affairs. The pro-West countries of Southeast Asia tried to utilize this 
opportunity to build a broad alliance against China with Indian collaboration. 
The non-aligned countries were reluctant to develop close relations with India 
at the cost of straining their relations with China, which emerged as a mighty 
Asian power. Soviet Union, however, showed greater understanding of the 
Indian problem. In short as a result of these developments a sort of stalemate 
was created in India's relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. India's 
relations with the countries of Southeast Asia entered a new phase after the 
Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. During the war Indonesia extended whole-hearted 
support to Pakistan and described India as an aggressor. North Vietnam and 
Cambodia also criticised India, largely because of her failure to take a firm 
stand against the U.S. aggression. Malaysia, however, maintained neutrality. 
However, the victor)' scored by India over Pakistan restored her lost prestige in 
Southeast Asia. The Indonesian policy towards India underwent a change 
following coup of 1965. The new leadership abandoned pro-Peking and pro-
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Pakistan posture and showed eagerness to normalize relation with India. This 
was naturally viewed with great relief by India, which tried to cultivate more 
intimate political, economic and commercial relations with Indonesia. 
In the wake of the Cultural Revolution in China, there was an increase in 
the activities of the communists in the countries of Southeast Asia. This 
encouraged the non-communist countries to come closer. The ouster of 
Sukarno in Indonesia and end of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia 
paved the way for greater co-operation among the countries oi^ the region. This 
also paved the way for improvement of India's relations with these countries. 
However, her relations with North Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma continued to 
be formal. 
Against the boll ground of conflict between the U.S.S.R. and China: the 
partial withdrawal of the Americans from Vietnam and the polices of 
normalization of relations between China and U.S.A., also had its impact on the 
countries of Southeast Asia. The countries of Southeast Asia tried to gain the 
best advantage out of the World situation by keeping their bargains with all the 
big powers alive. This provides a good opportunity to India to cultivate better 
relations with countries of Southeast Asia. No doubt the countries of Southeast 
Asia attached more importance to their relations with China and Japan, but they 
could not completely ignore India on account of her close relations with the 
U.S.S.R.' 
The birth of independent Malaysia including Singapore spurred the 
growth of more meaningful relations with India. There was a time when 
Singapore's Lee Kuan-Yew would have welcomed an Indian naval presence in 
this region and after China's nuclear bang suggested that Indian should also 
explode a nuclear bomb, at least for the sake of Southeast Asia, even if she 
wanted to throw it into the sea later. They needed some power and quite 
obviously it would be far preferable to have an Asian power, to counter balance 
the strength and hostility of China. 
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India sponsored the membership o(" Malaysia lor the second Afro-Asian 
Conference scheduled to be held in 1964 (but subsequently called off), for 
which Sukarno was greatly displeased and China highly annoyed. By doing so 
India incurred the hostility of Indonesia and Sukarno discarded neutrality on 
the Kashmir issue and perceptibly tilted towards Pakistan. India's support to 
Malaysia too on the territorial issue of Borneo was made clear when at the time 
Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri stated in the Lok Sabha that the 
sovereignty of Malaysia should be preserved and differences between 
Indonesia and Malaysia should be sohed peacefully, adding that President 
Sukarno himself favoured a peaceful settlement. Malaysian papers splashed the 
report of India's stand and the Tunku said that he was extremely happy with 
India's support. Subsequently, India also extended support to Malaysia against 
the claims of the Philippines over Sabah. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent a 
message to the effect to Tunku through her Labour Mmister J. L. Hathi. 
On the other hand the Malaysian Prime Minister emphasized the cordial 
relations with India. There was an implied criticism of Pakistan too. Pakistan, 
he said, had joined SEATO, which was purported to have been set up against 
"communist aggression." But Pakistan was at the same time "chummy" with 
China, the Tunku pointed out. He was also warm and enthusiastic in his 
welcome to the Indian Vice-President Zakir Hussain when the latter visited 
Kuala Lumpur in October 1966. The Malaysian Prime Minister described him 
as "one of the best known Muslim leaders of the World because of the service 
he has given to India." He recalled Malaysia's support to India against the 
Chinese aggression and India's support to Malaysia "against those who 
harassed us and wanted to eliminate Malaysia from the map of the world." At 
another function the Tunku praised India for having set an example to the 
World by doing what she had "with the size of India, its population and various 
languages and religions." The Malaysian Prime Minister added; "We have 
always followed your leadership and I hope as we go on, our friendship will 
become stronger and stronger."'' 
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riic coup in Indonesia, which toppled Sukarno and the army lake over in 
1965 sharply, changed the scenario in Southeast Asia. Indonesia hostility to 
Malaysia faded away and with detente in Europe making headway and the cold 
war abating and the European nations moving towards more integrated 
economic link, the need for developing greater economic cooperation in Asia, 
particularly in Southeast Asia, was also felt. China was still busy with herself 
and with "revisionism" and Indochina was struggling bravely and desperately 
against Western and US-inflicted ward. But the non-communist countries of 
Southeast Asia were bestirring themselves and grouping for a stronger identity 
and greater economic effort. They were also in need of substantial economic, 
technological and educational assistance.' 
There was in India a sense of disappointment at the Southeast Asian, 
especially Indonesian, posture of neutrality. In the course of his Republic Day 
Address on 26 January 1963, the Indian Ambassador, Apa B. Pant, observed 
that "if a friend dose not help you when you are in danger, what is the worth of 
such a friendship." Apart from reminding the Indonesians of their obligations 
towards India, it was an attempt to arouse in their minds latent feelings of 
friendship for India by suggesting to them the worth of a friend in need. 
Whatever other implications of Indonesia's attitude, there is reason to believe 
that every step that took Indonesia nearer to China was taking it away from 
India. 
By perverse logic, although quite expectedly, the three Southeast Asian 
states aligned with the United States-Thailand, the Philippines and South 
Vietnam, interpreted Communist China's attack on nonaligned India as a 
vindication of their alignment policy and offered their "sympathy" to India's 
cause. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), whose cause India had 
been consistently espousing, came out completely on the side of China. The 
DRV had criticised India probably because the latter had voted with Canada in 
condemning the farmer's role in subversion in South Vietnam. The DRV's 
anti-Indian posture demonstrated change in its attitude of neutrality towards the 
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Sino-Soviel dispute to one of being entirely pro-China. In its issues of 24 
October and 3 November 1962, the Nhan Dan (the official dail> organ of the 
Vietnamese Workers' Party) sharply condemned the Indian '"expansionist 
group" for colluding with Western imperialists in attacking China.'' Later on, it 
softened its attitude towards India, perhaps in order not to alienate the Soviet 
Union which announced continuation of military aid to India. I'he DRV's 
approach to India, however, continued to be coloured by the exigencies of its 
own interests in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Government in 
Hanoi even put increasing curbs on the movements of the staff ol'the Indian 
Consulate-General and thereby reduced its effectiveness, demonstrating a less-
than-cordial equation of relationship with India. 
Malaya was the one country in Southeast Asia, which publicly 
condemned the Chinese aggression. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman 
stated in New Delhi on 28 October 1962, In your fight, you will have many 
friends and Malaya will be one of the strongest among them. No matter how 
grave the situation India's cause is right and India must win. 
Following the Chinese aggression in October 1962, an important issue 
on which India evinced keen interest related to the Malayan Prime Minister 
Tunku Abdul Rahman's May 1961 proposal to form a new federation of 
Malaysia. In fact India welcomed the emergence of Malaysia, because it 
marked an end to remnants of British colonialism in the region. India also 
welcomed the scheme because it offered a sound and politically viable 
alternative to instability in insular Southeast Asia. But as Indonesia changed its 
initial attitude from one of apparent acquiescence to that of hostility towards 
the scheme of Malaysia, India's attitude became restrained. China's approach 
to the developments in the region seemed to be looming large in India's 
calculations. This, to a degree, restricted India's initiatives concerning 
Southeast Asia. In view of China's bid to distort India's image in the region 
and to drive a wedge between India and Indonesia a degree of restraint on the 
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pari of India, as regards the project of Malaysia was concerned all the more 
necessary. 
It did not mean, however, India totally ignored the issue, a month after 
Foreign Minister Subandrio of Indonesia announced "a policy of 
confrontation" with Malaya in January 1963. Prime Minister Nehru explained 
why India had welcomed the Malaysian proposal in consonance with India's 
opposition to colonialism, he considered the freedom of British colonies as ''the 
first thing". In a statement in the Lok Sabha on 22 February 1963, he observed: 
"The major thing it seemed to us, was that the colonies should cease to be 
o 
colonies, the rest, it was for them to decide." 
This was fully in accordance with India's policy towards Southeast Asia 
since independence. The major components of this policy were elimination of 
colonialism, strengthening of nationalism and independence, promotion of 
peace and friendship and stability. Pursuing this policy, India welcomed the 
Indonesian, Dutch agreement on the Indonesian territory of West Irian in 
August 1962. Speaking in the Rajya Sabha on 22 August 1962, Nehru 
expressed his satisfaction over the removal of "one source of conflict in 
Southeast Asia." Besides, the agreement on West Irian, he referred to the recent 
settlement in Laos, and considered it "a matter of good augury for the peace of 
Southeast Asia." He expressed his happiness "not only because of our intimate 
contacts with the countries concerned but also because, in a sense, we are part 
of Southeast Asia, and we earnestly hope that there will be peace there".^ While 
addressing members of the Executive Board of the Organization of Asian News 
Agencies in New Delhi on 15 May 1963, the Indian Prime Minister said: "We 
want peace and progress in Southeast Asia. We are friends of Indonesia, 
Malaya and the Philippines and we hope that they will come to an agreement 
among themselves." He also expressed India's unwillingness to get "entangled" 
in this issue, because "we have enough problems of our own".'° 
Certain developments, which showed President Sukarno's inclination to 
end his country's policy of confrontation with Malaya, evoked a sense of relief 
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in India. The joint statement issued at the eonclusion of the Sukarno-1 unku 
Abdul Rahman talks in Tokyo on 30 May-1 June 1963, showed the two 
leaders' agreement to end "acrimonious attaeks and disparaging references to 
each other" and also "reaffirmed their faith in the Ircaty of Friendship between 
Indonesia and Malaya in 1959." In India it was seen as conducive to easing 
tensions between the two countries. A few days later, the Foreign Ministers of 
Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines met in Manila (7-11 June 1963) and 
agreed to take "initial steps towards the establishment of Maphilindo" as based 
on the principle of common "ties of race and culture." The Maphilindo 
proposal mooted by President Macapagal of the Philippines envisaged, "the 
grouping of the three nations of Malay origin working together in closest 
harmony but without surrendering an\ portion of their sovereignty." Both 
Indonesia and the Philippines assured Malaya that "they would welcome the 
formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo 
territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative." This was quite 
an encouraging development. The three countries seemed to be inclined to 
resolve their mutual disputes and join together in ensuring peace and stability 
in the region. 
Sukarno seemed to be inclined to go ahead with it because it provided a 
regional framework for a dominant role for Indonesia. This was despite the 
anti-Maphilindo stance of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). 
India, whose interest lay in the promotion of friendship, peace and 
stability in the region was expected to welcome the Maphilindo scheme. 
Nevertheless, the Government of India chose to maintain silence, Indonesia's 
growing relations with China, increasing PKI's pressures on the Government 
and Sukarno's unpredictability could be suggested as possible reasons thereof 
It was difficult to envisage how long Sukarno, even if agreeable to the 
establishment of Maphilindo would be able to stand up to continuing anti-
Malaysia and anti-Maphilindo stance of both the PKI and China. 
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A section of the Indian press however saw a lot of "romanticism" in the 
Maphilindo scheme. S. Nihal Singh of the Statesman interpreted the three 
countries coming together as a new mood of cooperation in Southeast Asia. 
According to him, Indonesia viewed the scheme as an instrument to checkmate 
China's aggressive expansionism. A few days later, the same correspondent 
hailed the Agreements signed by the top leaders of Indonesia, Malaya and the 
Philippines at the summit conference in Manila (30 July-5 August 1963) and 
considered them as marking a new era in the history of Asia and visualized that 
the Maphilindo scheme might thwart China's aims in the region. 
Moreover, from the Indian point of view, S. Nihal Singh believed that 
the most encouraging aspect of the agreement was, "the emphasis placed on the 
three countries to maintain their national identity." This was something India 
should be fully satisfied to note. 
The Manila agreements, which roused hopes of a peaceful solution of 
the Malaysia dispute and of peace and stability in the Malay of Southeast Asia 
in the Maphilindo framework, lost their appeal in the period of six weeks from 
the day these were signed. The pressures exerted by the PKI tilted President 
Sukarno away from a course of peaceful settlement to a policy of 
"confrontation." The UN Secretary-General U Thant's report about the 
ascertainment of the wishes of the people of the prospective constituents of the 
Federation of Malaysia was published on 14 September 1963. Indonesia chose 
to disregard the UN Secretary-General's report favourable to the formation of 
the Malaysian Federation. This was evident from the huge anti-Malaysian and 
anti-British demonstrations everywhere in Indonesia on 16 September 1963, 
the day on which Malaysia was inaugurated. The British Embassy in Jakarta 
was stormed and Malaysian and British Consulates in Medan (North Sumatra) 
were sacked. On 21 September 1963 eight months after Foreign Minister 
Subandrio had announced a policy of "confrontation" with the project of 
Malaysia on 20 January 1963, President Sukarno announced rupture of trade 
and economic relations with Malaysia.'' It clearly showed that either Sukarno 
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was nol seriously inlcresled in the Maphilindo scheme and only wanted to use 
it to delay inauguration of Malaysia or he was no longer capable of resisting the 
domestic Communist pressures. 
Unlike hidonesia, however, the Government of India accepted the report 
of the UN Secretary-General and Prime Minister Nehru wished Malaysia "a 
good start".'' He also sent to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, his "vs'arm felicitations and greetings on the happy occasion of the 
inauguration of the Federation of Malaysia." The Indian Minister of State for 
External Affairs. Lakshmi N. Menon went to Kuala Lumpur to represent India 
at the celebrations marking the inauguration ceremony. 
The press in India, likewise, hailed the emergence of the new Federation 
of Malaysia. There was a spate of editorials and articles explaining reasons as 
to why India should welcome Malaysia. The Hindu described the "birth of the 
multi-racial Federation of Malaysia" as "a landmark in the history of post-war 
Asia". In an article contributed to the Indian Express, one writer (Aruna 
Mukerji) termed "September 16" as "a red letter day in the history of Asia, 
because it will see the virtual end of colonialism on that continent." The author 
of the article considered it a "Bold Plan" and observed: "India has from the 
beginning welcomed the formation of this new nation," because it "promises to 
be a bulwark against communism". She also referred to the "treacherous" role 
of the Chinese in their tactics of "infiltration and subversive actions" in 
Southeast Asia and expressed the hope that Malaysia would play "a historic 
role in preserving the freedom which Asia has won after centuries of bondage." 
The Hindustan Times described Malaysia "as a potential bulwark against a 
common threat, namely, that posed by Communist China's expansionism."''' 
The Indian press also look serious note of the Indonesians' reactions 
following the inauguration of Malaysia. The Statesman criticised Indonesia for 
its refusal to acknowledge Malaysia and observed that the "Indonesian 
Government has done its reputation much harm and what is perhaps more 
important put a spoke in the wheel of Maphilindo".'^ The Hindustan Times 
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observed thai by "questioning the UN verdict, Indonesia has proceeded t>orn 
one blunder to another...Indonesia has gained nothing by challenging" the UN 
position. *" The Times of India described Indonesia's objections to recognizing 
Malaysia as "wholly specious." The Hindu termed the UN Secretary-General's 
Report as unequivocal enough and described Sukarno's decision "to deny 
recognition to Malaysia" and his permission to "rioters to attack the Malaysian 
and British embassies in Jakarta" as highly regrettable.'^ 
In the months following the inauguration of the Federation of Malaysia, 
whereas India continued to manifest its open pro-Malaysia attitude, Indonesia's 
anti-Malaysia stance got strengthened. India's attitude was based on its 
understanding of certain destabilizing factors operating in Indonesian politics 
in particular and in Southeast Asia in general. The Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI), which was egging President Sukarno on to a continued policy of 
confrontation with Malaysia, was making all-out efforts to bring Indonesian 
foreign policy in line with the Chinese foreign policy objectives in Southeast 
Asia. Its projection of Malaysia as a "neo-colonialist" project became a focus 
of broad national consensus, because it was fully in accord with President 
Sukarno's concept of struggle between the "NEFOS" and '"LDEFOS". 
Simultaneously, in the Sino-Soviet dispute, it was increasingly identifying 
itself with China. Interestingly, India's pro-Malaysia stance was making India 
an object of bitter criticism from both the PKI and China. 
Subsequently, viewing the Federation of Malaysia as a stabilizing factor 
in Southeast Asia, India tended to ignore the susceptibilities of the ruling elite 
group in Indonesia and continued to pursue pro-Malaysian policy. This became 
more than evident when, at the preparatory meeting of the second Afro-Asian 
Conference in Jakarta in April 1964, the Indian Minister of External Affairs, 
Swaran Singh, linked the question of Malaysia with the very prospects of the 
second Afro-Asian Conference coming off at all. This was the net result of one 
of the proposals Swaran Singh made at the preparatory meeting that Malaysia 
should be invited to attend the second Afro-Asian Conference. India ignored 
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the anti-Indian scnlimcnt growing in Indonesia as a rcsull of il. India also 
offered active moral and diplomatic support to Malaysia in getting a non-
pcrmanenl seat at the Security Council of the United Nations. 
India's pro-Malaysia attitude created very adverse reactions in 
Indonesia. Some Indonesian leaders gained the impression that India was 
throwing its weight in favour of Malaysia and interpreted '"India's attitude 
towards Indonesia, particularly in regard to Malaysia, as unfriendly and 
unwise." 
In the first half of 1965, a spate of anti-Indian write-ups in the 
Indonesian Press and President Sukarno's open tirades against India led to a 
burst of the Indonesian feelings. There were anti-Indian demonstrations and 
storming of the Indian Embassy in Jakarta on 23 June 1965. India's pro-
Malaysia attitude, its insistence on Malaysia's participation in the second Afro-
Asian Conference and its efforts to seek postponement of this Conference itself 
led to the eruption of the anti-Indian sentiment in Indonesia growing since the 
first Conference of non-aligned Countries in Belgrade in September 1961 and 
promoted by China and Pakistan, both hostile to India. The climax was reached 
when, during the Indo-Pakistan armed conflict in September 1965, Indonesia 
offered both moral and material support to Pakistan, President Sukarno did not 
mince words in calling India an "aggressor." This showed the extent to which, 
India and Indonesia had fallen apart since the treaty of "perpetual peace and 
unalterable friendship" was signed by the two in early March 1951. It also 
demonstrated the degree of success achieved by China and Pakistan externally 
and the pro-Chinese and pro-Pakistani elements in Indonesia internally in 
alienating Indonesia from India. 
This situation, however, did not continue for long. Following the 
allegedly PKI-led abortive coup in Jakarta in the early morning hours of 1 
October 1965, there was a drastic change in the pattern of domestic politics and 
foreign policy of Indonesia. The "Ganjang [Crush] Malaysia" policy of 
President Sukarno, which was the backdrop of Indonesia's aspirations for a 
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rcgionai power role, was by stages, abandoned. All the forces and factors, 
which clamoured for the continuation of this pohcy, were discredited and 
replaced. With the PKI almost physically liquidated and with China falling 
more and more into disrepute, the anti-Malaysia policy lost its raison d'etre. 
Indonesia under General Suharto abandoned the path of confrontation with 
Malaysia, rejoined the United Nations (which it had left in the first week of 
January 1965), and initiated moves for a regional grouping, which later came to 
be known as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
One aspect of Indonesian foreign policy during the Sukarno era was 
intensification of interaction between Indonesia and china and near 
synchronization of the two countries' regional as well as Afro-Asian goals. 
Sukarno's policy had led to the emergence of what the Indonesian President 
described as Peking-Pyong Yong Phnom Penh, Hanoi-Jakarta axis, aimed at 
removal of all Western influences from Southeast Asia. When hard-pressed by 
the post-coup forces to abandon this policy of "axis" with China (and some 
other East and Southeast Asian countries), President Suharto stressed the 
continuation of this policy. While explaining this policy as late as on 6 
September 1966, he stated that the strategy for defeating imperialism was for 
China to strike a blow against the American troops in Vietnam from the North 
while Indonesia struck from the South. Perhaps this was the most forthright 
explanation of Indonesia's regional ambitions evident in Sukarno's policy of 
confrontation with Malaysia, and of the basis of Indonesian-Chinese "axis" 
with a suggestion of division of Southeast Asia as an area of influence between 
themselves. Inherent in this policy of "axis" was a high degree of isolation of 
Indonesia, not only from the 'imperialist' West but also from the nonaligned 
group of nations, including India. 
Another aspect of Sukarno's foreign policy during the "Guided 
Democracy" period was a sort of Indonesian-Pakistani alignment aimed against 
India. After assiduous efforts made since the early years of the nineteen-fifties, 
Pakistan had by April 1964, succeeded in seeking Indonesia's public moral 
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support on the Indo-Pakistani dispute on the Kashmir question. The hidonesian 
leaders abandoned their early near neutral posture on the issue and from then 
onwards adopted a pro-Pakistani attitude at the expense of India. 
The new Indonesian leadership as it emerged after the 1965 coup 
showed clear indications of abandoning the pro-Peking and pro-Pakistani 
posture and as part of their general policy to remove suspicions and restore 
mutual confidence and understanding, expressed their eagerness to normalize 
their country's relations with India. India, which had seen quite helplessly a 
precipitous decline in its relations with Indonesia-the most populous and 
resource-rich country in the region with most important strategic location, the 
one in whose struggle for independence India had made quite considerable 
contribution in the late forties viewed these developments with a sense of 
relief. It was a matter of great consolation for India that a sister nation like 
Indonesia was reverting to the earlier policies of nonalignment, peaceful 
coexistence, good-neighbourliness, international cooperation and world peace. 
India, it seems, grasped the opportunity, encouraged this process of change in 
Indonesia and sought to normalize and consolidate its interaction with that 
country in all fields-political, economic and commercial. 
Relaxation of tension in the insular Southeast Asia, following drastic 
changes in Indonesian domestic and foreign policy postures was not in any 
sense matched with the developments in Indochina. After the Tonkin incident 
in 1964, there was growing escalation of the American involvement in the area. 
From 11,000 advisers in 1964, the number of American troops reached the 
massive figure of over 542,000 in February 1969. By the middle of 1967, the 
United States was spending about $ 2 billion a month on the execution of war 
in Vietnam.'^ This massive US intervention in the region led to still further 
deterioration in the situation in which the people of Vietnam were being forced 
to bleed. What was primarily and essentially a struggle for freedom, 
independence and unification got enmeshed in the vortex of the Cold War. The 
people ol Indochina were being denied freedom and peace-two things that all 
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the rhircl World countries needed most. The situation was aggravated because 
of the growing Sino-Soviet schism. 
Keeping in view all these conditions India's not-very-enthusiastic record 
of involvement in favour of the Vietnamese struggle for freedom in the late 
forties and the fifties, not much hope could be entertained about an Indian 
initiative in the matter. Yet, Indochina, as the late Indian Prime Minister Nehru 
put it, was "a proximate area" to India, and hence India was expected to 
intervene in favour of peace and freedom of the people of the region. India of 
course, did come out with a proposal. In 1966, Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi 
called for an immediate halt to the American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. 
She also announced a six-point "package" plan to restore peace in war-ravaged 
Vietnam over which the Americans had intensified bombing raids. It was a call 
to the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Union and Britain, to 
reconvene the Geneva-type Conference immediately. It was similar to Nehru's 
peace proposals on Indochina in February 1954, which had led to the 
convening of the Geneva Conference and was followed by the cessation of 
hostilities. The Indian proposal, however, failed to evoke proper response from 
all the parties to the conflict. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which had 
condemned India in the wake of the Chinese attack in October 1962 and 
criticized it again during the Indo-Pakistani armed conflict in September 1965 
was not enamoured of Indira Gandhi's proposals nor were China and the 
United States and the pro-American Republic of South Vietnam. The pro-
American governments in Thailand and the Philippines continued to assist in 
various ways the American armed intervention in Indochina. Both Laos and 
Cambodia were in a precarious position, being very close to the scene of war. 
Even Indonesia under General Suharto showed indications of following a pro-
American attitude. The whole region, in fact, seemed to be moving on a 
wavelength quite different from the Indian thinking and in the prevailing 
situation, the major Powers were simply not interested in the kind of General 
Conference, as suggested by Indira Gandhi. The voice of India, rendered feeble 
especially since the Chinese invasion on its northern borders in October 1962, 
was not receptive anywhere in the region. 
The developments in Vietnam, however, showed indications of the 
results of the Indochina war very much at variance with the thinking and 
expectations of the United States. Enormous strain on American economy, 
coupled with large number of casualties among American soldiers, both before 
and during the Tet (Vietnamese New Year) offensive as launched by the Viet 
Cong on 31 January 1968 demonstrated the high cost of American involvement 
in the Vietnam War. The United States now sought peace talks with the DRV 
and other parties involved, which began in Paris on 13 May 1968. The United 
States also endeavoured to enlist the Chinese and Soviet support in the process 
of disengagement and withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, later 
described by President Nixon as "Peace with Honour". 
India's Attitude Towards Vietnam, Cambodia & Laos after 1962 
The Sino-Indian border war of October-November 1962 is considered 
by many political scientists as a watershed in India's domestic as well as 
foreign policy. The conclusion-that through the acceptance of military aid from 
the West, principally the United States, the very basis of nonalignment was 
removed. This is particularly evidenced in India's views on some of the most 
sensitive areas in East-West relations in the mid-1960's Vietnam and Laos.^' 
It is true, however, that most Indians, including Prime Minister Nehru 
were shaken up by the magnitude and success of the Chinese offensive. Nehru 
himself confessed in an appeal to his countrymen: 
/ want you all to realize the shock we suffered during the 
last week or so. We were getting out of touch with the 
realities of the modern World. We were living in an 
artificial atmosphere of our own creation, and we have 
been shocked out of it. 
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Despite his earlier denunciations of countries receiving military aid, he 
did not hesitate to ask for and accept material rushed by the Western countries 
to bolster India's effort for defence. But during this darkest hour in recent 
Indian history, Nehru succeeded in surmounting the emotion-charged 
atmosphere and in seeing clearly through the crisis. Much earlier, in 1949, he 
had said: "Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened, or where 
aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral." The moment of 
Iruth had arrived. But, instead of appealing only to the Western countries, for 
whom help could be expected against the Chinese adversary, Nehru chose to 
write a personal letter to the heads of government of every country except 
South Africa and Portugal for help at this critical juncture in Indian history. 
Despite public opinion in the country, he did not violate the unilateral cease-
fire declared by China, nor did he formally accept it. In his broadcast to the 
nation on October 22, 1962, he appealed for every sacrifice "in this great 
crisis," but insisted on not sacrificing the principles, including the policy of 
nonalignment, adding: / believe in that policy fully and we shall continue to 
follow it. We are not going to give up our basic principles because of the 
present difficulty. 
Partly out of knowledge of the reluctance of the superpowers, indicated 
in the Berlin and Cuba crisis, to let events drift toward a major war and partly 
out of a genuine desire to avert a global conflict, Nehru localized the dispute 
between two neighbors, disclaiming any cold-war implications. He did not 
invoke ideological rivalries, but preferred to condemn Communist China's 
action in non-doctrinaire terms as violating accepted norms of international 
behavior. Thus he wrote in his letter to heads of government abroad: 
The issue involved is not of small territorial gains, one 
way or the other, but of standards of international 
behaviour between neighbouring countries and whether 
the world will allow the principle of "Might is Right" to 
prevail in international relations.... This crisis is not only 
of India but of the M'or/d and will have far-reaching 
consequences on the standards of international behaviour 
and on the peace of the world. We cannot submit to this 
law of the jungle.... 
India's diminished stature was seen in the reactions of Asian and 
African countries toward the Sino-Indian conflict. At the same time, the 
conflict raised anxiety on two scores among many of these states, particularly 
those from South and Southeast Asia. Since 1959, when India had reported 
Chinese occupation of Indian territory, the smaller states had became wary of 
China's motives and unsure about the effectiveness of a policy of 
nonalignment. Yet if India failed, would the smaller uncommitted nations be 
able to hold the line? As the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mrs. Bandaranaike told 
the six nonaligned states who met in Colombo in December, 1962, in an effort 
to resolve the dispute: 
The border dispute between Indian and China, which we are about to 
discuss, is the greatest challenge which nonalignment and Afro-Asian 
solidarity has had to face.... 
In the Sino-Indian dispute, ...I see a situation, which is a 
threat both to our way of life and to the future of mankind. 
The threat to nonalignment is not merely confined to the 
fact that there has been a negation of the agreed 
principles of Panchsheel. The Sino-Indian border conflict 
has also afforded an opportunity for the power politics of 
the 'cold war' to penetrate as it were into the affairs of the 
Afro-Asian world.... 
We have all been accustomed to regard India as the 
foremost champion of nonalignment. None of us can deny 
the great contributions, which India, led by her 
distinguished leader. Prime Minister Nehru has made in 
this respect. The concept of nonalignment and its moral 
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force today is due after all in large measure to the 
powerful advocacy of India and the personal example set 
by the Indian Prime Minister in his tireless efforts to 
promote the idea of nonalignment throughout the M'orld. 
We should therefore, make it our joint responsibility and a 
moral obligation which we owe to the cause of 
nonalignment to see that nonalignment is preserved. 
Allhough there were tremendous sympathy and concern for India among 
those assembled, non except Ghana advocated an arbitrator's role for the 
conferees or that a solution be imposed on the two belligerents. The dispute 
was not between two nonaligned states or between two aligned ones, yet the 
conferees preferred to adopt a neutral, non-committal attitude on the substance 
of the conflict on the grounds of not prejudicing a mediator's role. The 
objective of the conference was "to create an atmosphere in which the 
problems created by the border dispute would be discussed amicably in a spirit 
of friendship between China and India". Of the delegates, the Burmese and the 
Cambodians, even though they were closer geographically to China, adopted 
the most cautious attitude. Norodom Sihanouk wanted to spare for his country 
the odium of arbitration between two large nations. With characteristic 
diplomacy, he extricated his country by pointing out that the positions held by 
China and India ruled out the possibility of a compromise. Therefore, he said: 
My delegation admits with due humility its inability to 
suggest any compromise solution likely to assist in 
bridging the gulf fixed between the positions adopted 
respectively by India and China.... 
Our role seems to be limited, therefore, to an appeal to the 
noble sentiments of our two great friends exhorting them 
to consider the most grave danger threatening the future 
of their respective peoples and that of the peoples of the 
Afro-Asian group and of the whole World. 
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Later, however, Burma and Cambodia joined the other delegates in a 
resolution proposing the withdrawal ol' the armed forces of the two sides 
twenty kilometers from "the line of actual control," a cease-fire and discussions 
between the representatives of India and China. But the deliberations at 
Colombo and the reactions of the smaller countries of Southeast Asia to the 
Sino-Indian dispute left no doubt that India would fail to arouse confidence in 
her leadership after the debacle of 1962. In this context, along with the 
"brutally efficient defeat" of India must be placed China's success against the 
Soviet Union in Laos in 1961-62. As Bernard Fall observed, these two factors 
were not "ignored among the small and badly-defended nations of southeast 
Asia as portent of the things to come". ^^  After 1962 India made special efforts 
to explain her position to the governments of Southeast Asia through official 
visits by Minister of State Lakshmi Menon and Deputy Minister of External 
Affairs Dinesh Singh. After the Chinese aggression, India continued in her 
policy of nonalignment in its application to the problems and crises in 
Southeast Asia. But neither the Southeast Asian states nor the major powers 
sought, to the same extent as before, India's mediatory intervention in the 
resolution of the crises. Nonalignment faded in its effectiveness, it did not 
completely wither away, but its vitality and validity suffered tremendously in 
the land of its origin and leadership. 
India's role in the Laotian crises of 1963 and 1964 best indicates the 
diminished importance of India in world affairs. In 1960-61, when the ICC was 
not even functioning in Laos, Nehru's good offices had been eagerly sought by 
the East aad the West in trying to extinguish the flames of war in Laos. But in 
1963-64, despite ICC's existence under India's chairmanship. India figured 
little in the peacemaking efforts. Besides the fact of Indian preoccupation with 
her own problems of defense and diplomacy against China and Pakistan, 
India's ability to play a mediatory role between the two blocs had been 
severely circumscribed. For example, India no longer had any leverage with the 
North Vietnamese that could be used to bear upon the PL. 
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The neutralization of Laos in mid-1962 had been achieved largely 
because the United States and the Soviet Union had recognized the futility of 
making any headway toward gaining definitive influence in that country.^^ The 
United States had spend 265 million dollars in a country with less than two 
million inhabitants and had no chance of turning the country into a ''bastion of 
anti-Communism." The Soviet Union, on its part had realized that Laos was too 
distant and too unreliable as a satellite even if arms could be supplied to the 
neutralist and pro-Communist factions. In May 1961, Khrushchev had 
declared, "the domestic policy of Laos cannot and should not be determined by 
the USSR or the USA or other countries." His meeting with President Kennedy 
in Vienna in June produced a joint communique proposing the political and 
military neutralization of Laos, to be guaranteed by international agreements. 
Realists in the Soviet Union and the United States would have conceded, 
however, that Laos was being written off by the two powers to domination by 
China and North Vietnam-who, along with the PL, were the only ones to gain. 
The PL secured recognition at Geneva and thereafter became a part of the 
troika government in Laos. 
As for China and the DRV, the Geneva negotiations were only a 
continuation of the war through political means. At Geneva, Chinese Foreign 
Minister Chen Yi was reported to have remarked to his French counterpart 
"Laos is not yet ripe for Communism." The neutralization of Laos would 
secure the withdrawal of American influence, including an end to the Program 
Evaluation Office, an euphemism for the American military command in Laos. 
Neutralization would also ensure the decline of Soviet influence; the Chinese 
and North Vietnamese could continue to retain theirs, thanks to the factor of 
geographical contiguity. Further, through appropriate tactics the North 
Vietnamese could keep open their lines of communication with South Vietnam 
through Laos. The Chinese and North Vietnamese could thereafter be expected 
to assist the PL in the same kind of strategy as the latter had employed in 1954-
55. While outwardly keeping a semblance of cooperation with the RLG, the PL 
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would consolidate their position for a final showdown with the rightists in a 
"war of liberation." 
The Geneva Protocol on Laos was "no more than a rug thrown over the 
smouldering embers in a panic". The situation in Laos had deteriorated 
between the times when the Geneva powers decided upon neutralization of 
Laos in 1961 and when a coalition government could actually be set up and the 
protocol signed in mid-1962. The frustration of the Geneva powers with the 
protracted negotiations among the three Laotian princes was so great that 
everyone seemed to be in a hurry to assume that the protocol on neutrality was 
a foolproof remedy for the Laotian ills. In reality, the protocol left large 
loopholes for future mischief As one commentator remarked, when the 
agreements were signed, the most important clauses were the unwritten ones. 
It would probably have made more sense if the Geneva powers had 
acknowledged the partition of the country into three separate zones of 
administrative and military control with well-defined boundaries and with a 
coalition government at the center with federal powers. But the difficulty lay in 
the fact that there was no proper front line separating the areas under the 
control of the three factions. The neutralists and the PL held certain areas in 
addition to the Plain of Jars, but the rightists, aided by armed Meo tribesmen 
guerrillas, held a number of intervening pockets. There were too many 
obstacles on the Laotian chessboard for a coalition government for that matter-
to function in an effective manner. As Stuart Simmonds has observed, the 
compromises that were made in the interests of reaching an agreement, 
particularly on the text of the protocol, had introduced inherent weakness that 
might lead to breakdowns under the stresses of actual practice. The history of 
Laos in 1963-64 is largely the story of creating such breakdowns. 
The fragile edifice of a coalition government of the three factions-
rightists, neutralists, and the PL-under Souvanna Phouma's premiership had 
hardly been put together when the PL began wooing pro-left neutralists away 
from Kong Le's army. The beginning of the conflict was marked by an 
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unsuccessfui attempt on the life of the right-wing neutralist Colonel Kersana in 
November 1962, '^ as well as by the shooting down in the same month by left-
wmg neutralists (under Colonel Deuane) of American planes carrying supplies 
to Kong Le's troops at Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's request. By the end 
of March, the conflict had crystallized, with Kong Le denouncing the PL as 
foreign lackeys, alleging that the North Vietnamese were smuggling men and 
material across the hilly trails to help the left-wing dissidents from neutralist 
forces. In April, with the loss of Kong Le's headquarters on the Plain of Jars, 
the balance established by the troika government was seriously threatened. 
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma declared that if Kong Le's troops were 
eliminated there would be a bipolarization of forces in Laos, thus undermining 
the very basis of the Geneva settlement. In mid-May, the PL alleged that 
American aircraft were landing reinforcements to the rightists under General 
Phoumi and that the latter's troops were fighting alongside Kong Le's against 
the PL. In June, Souvanna Phouma openly charged that the North Vietnamese 
were assisting the PL, and the Canadian delegation on the ICC urged an 
investigation of reported infiltration by Chinese troops in northwestern Laos. In 
sum, the explosive situation, as it obtained before the Geneva Conference of 
1961, revived itself.^ ^ 
Intermittent fighting, often severe, paralleled efforts to negotiate a 
peace, until on April 17-18, 1964, an agreement in principle to transfer the 
capital from Vientiane to Luang Prabang was reached by the three factions-
rightists, the PL, and neutralists. But it could hardly be implemented. On the 
following day a right-wing military junta led by General Kouprasith Abhay, 
son of a former premier, staged a coup d'etat. Lacking support of the great 
powers, including the United States, the rightists agreed to retain Souvanna 
Phouma as premier, subject to his consent to their proposals for certain changes 
in the administration. On May 2, 1964, Souvanna Phouma announced the 
merger of the neutralists and the right-wing factions under his own leadership. 
It was then the PL's turn to object to the bipolarization of forces and to plead 
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thai the Geneva Agreements, based on the existence of the three factions, was 
being undermined by Souvanna Phouma's decision. Predictably, the PL, joined 
by dissident neutrahst, resumed fighting. On May 18, 1964, Souvanna Phouma 
revealed that Kong Le's troops had suffered defeat at the hands of the PL 
supported by North Vietnamese troops. Three days later, he authorized the 
American government to carry out reconnaissance missions over the Plain of 
Jars to obtain information to pass on to the ICC. The RLG also asked Great 
Britain, the United States, and France for military aid. By the end of the month 
it received American T-28 fighter-bombers for use against the PL. The PL 
retaliated by refusing to recognize Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister of the 
Government of National Union, condemning him as "only a prisoner held by 
the U.S. and their lackeys." Clearly the Geneva Agreements had been reduced 
to a mockery. 
Among the first casualties in the Laotian crises of 1963-64 was the ICC. 
From the very beginning, the ICC was bogged down in procedural wrangles. 
On similar occasions in former years the matters would have rested there. But 
after 1962 there was an active East-West interest in the neutralization of Laos. 
The ICC was content to leave the initiative to the co-chairmen. It is noteworthy 
that most of the peacemaking efforts in the Laotian crisis in 1963-64 were 
headed by the Soviet Union and Great Britain, either at the Foreign Office level 
or at the ambassadorial level in Vientiane. The ICC was accompanied on all 
major missions by the British and Russian ambassadors in Laos, particularly 
after June, 1963, when the ICC's helicopters came under fire.'^'^ 
The ICC's ineffectiveness was attributable to the rival interpretations put 
on Article 15 of the Geneva Agreements. The PL's point of view, supported by 
the Polish member of the ICC and the Soviet Union, was that concurrence of 
each of the three Laotian factions in government was needed before the 
deployment of an ICC's inspection team. At Geneva, the question had been 
linked with the RLG's sovereignty vis-a-vis the ICC. The Communists had 
then maintained that an independent decision by the ICC to send a team would 
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infringe upon the sovereignly of the RLG. In 1963, when the ICC decided by a 
majority vote of India and Canada to send a team to the Plain of Jars and Prime 
Minister Souvanna Phouma agreed, the Communists objected on grounds that 
the RLG had acted without the concurrence of the PL. For months controversy 
raged over whether concurrence could not be presumed to be included in the 
initial signature of the three parties at Geneva, which authorized the ICC during 
its existence to deploy as many teams as it liked, or whether such concurrence 
was needed before every such deployment. 
At first the Soviet Union cooperated with Britain in the peace efforts. 
Thus on April 18, 1963, their joint message urged Souvanna Phouma "to take 
such measures as may prove advisable to prevent actions which might 
endanger the peace of Laos and the execution of the Geneva Agreements". 
But soon the Soviet Union's attitude in supporting the Chinese and North 
Vietnamese allegations of American involvement in Laos was conditioned by 
the Sino-Soviet conflict. Only a visit by Averell Harriman, President 
Kennedy's special envoy, to Moscow produced a joint communique on April 
26, 1963, reaffirming the two governments' support for the Geneva 
Agreements. Accusations of American involvement were only one of the 
points of differences between the two co-chairmen, who for seven weeks could 
not agree until May 29, 1963, on the text of a message to be sent to both 
Souvanna Phouma and the ICC. The Soviet Union upheld the contention of the 
PL and Poland that the deployment of the ICC team on the Plain of Jars 
without the consent of the PL was a violation of the Geneva Agreements. The 
British point of view, identical with that of India and Canada, was that approval 
of Souvanna Phouma as head of the government was enough. Moreover, 
Souvanna Phouma had been given by the Laotian National Assembly, on 
October 8, 1962, full powers for a year to carry out his program of "union, 
concord and elimination of foreign intrusions''.^^ 
Efforts of the co-chairmen and the ICC did help bring the contending 
factions to the negotiating table. But mere conduct of negotiations has never 
been enough in Laos, where bonhomie and wilHngness to sit down, talk or feast 
together have not been lacking, even among rival factions. In 1963-64 neither 
the co-chairmen nor the members of the ICC nor the rival groups in Laos could 
arrive at a single agreement on any important issue. 
Despite such differences reflecting partisan attitudes, the great powers 
showed that the basic conclusion they reached in 1962-that the military and 
political neutralization of Laos was the only alternative to chronic instability 
was still valid. When the right-wing junta carried out a coup d'etant in April 
1964, it was denounced by all the major powers. The coup forced the Soviet 
Union and the United States to a "compelling recognition of Laotian neutrality 
and of Souvanna Phouma as the only feasible head of government." The British 
and the Soviet ambassadors joined the ICC on April 19, 1964 in agreeing not to 
recognize the Revolutionary Committee. On May 1, 1964 the co-chairmen 
"decisively condemned" the act as undermining the Geneva Agreements, 
"which provide for the creation of peaceful, independent and neutral Laos." 
The co-chairmen urged tripartite negotiations on the Plain of Jars. The United 
States and France condemned the coup in no uncertain terms, the former 
declaring that it might even use force to reinstate the Souvanna Phouma 
government and maintain Laotian neutrality as envisaged in the Geneva 
Agreements of 1962. India participated at various stages in the resolution of 
this crisis, but its impact was not decisive. The Indian government did not have 
any original plan to offer; she only reacted to the proposals made by others, 
exposing herself in the process to charges of inconsistency and vacillation. 
On April 22, 1962, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia had 
proposed a full meeting of a Geneva conference, a proposal supported by 
China, Russia and France, the last insisting on the neutralization of Southeast 
Asia as "the only guarantee of peace, security and independence." Poland 
proposed a limited international conference at Geneva of the co-chairmen, the 
ICC powers, and the three Laotian factions. The Polish proposal, which would 
have kept the Chinese out, was understandably opposed by China and 
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supported by the Soviet Union. The latter was, however, compelled to change 
its stand because the PL refused to participate in such a conference ^^ On May 
20, 1962, after the fighting on the Plain of Jars flared, Souvanna Phouma 
proposed consultations among the representatives of the Geneva Conference 
powers in Vientiane. Although the Soviet Union at first endorsed the Polish 
and later the Sino-French proposals. Great Britain and the United States 
accepted Souvanna Phouma's proposal for a lower-level conference in 
Vientiane. The United States was particularly opposed to a high-level 
conference outside Laos, which might be used by China and the DRV for 
propaganda purposes in condemning the American role in Vietnam. 
India had no particular preference, her interests lay in bringing an end to 
the hostilities, which could escalate into a major conflict. All the other powers 
were also keen on avoiding a flare-up and promoting a freeze of the Laotian 
situation. Even the Chinese foreign minister, in a note to the co-chairmen, 
endorsed the efforts to reconstitute the neutralist government of Laos. On 
May 22, 1962 Nehru announced that the Indian government was prepared to 
take part in consultations, as suggested by Souvanna Phouma, or in the Geneva 
Conference, as proposed by France, he added that it was for the great powers to 
decide.'"' But when a conference of some of the Western powers, represented 
by the ambassadors of Britain, the United States, Canada, South Vietnam, and 
Thailand met on June 2, 1962, in Vientiane, the Indian ambassador joined 
them on the understanding that India regarded their discussions as informal and 
not as a consultation in terms of Article 4 of the Geneva Declaration, since the 
conference was not fully representative. India also objected to a paragraph in 
the final communique that was in the nature of a finding on the military 
situation in Laos, in India's opinion, only the ICC was competent to make such 
a finding. Indian association with the communique would have amounted to 
prejudging the issue, which was at that time being investigated by the ICC" 
This was yet another instance of the limitations of India's diplomatic role 
because of her chairmanship of the ICC. On the same day Lai Bahadur Shastri 
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(not yet nominated prime minister), declared that in India's opinion the 
Vientiane meeting of ambassadors would not be able to resolve the question 
satisfactorily and that therefore a fourteen-nation conference would be 
necessar)'. 
India's abilities to mediate in the Vietnamese conflict were further 
limited by the DRV's stand in the Sino-Indian dispute. From 1959 to mid-1962 
the DRV had maintained a neutral attitude toward the Sino-Indian conflict. In 
this respect, the DRV had followed the Moscow line. But ever since India had 
voted with Canada in the ICC's special report of June 1962, condemning North 
Vietnam's role in the subversion of South Vietnam, the DRV had been chafing 
at India. When the Sino-Indian dispute took the form of full-scale fighting and 
India appealed for and accepted Western military assistance, North Vietnam 
openly sided with China in Condemning the Indian "Expansionist group" for 
"colluding" with the Western imperialists in attacking China. This was an 
indication of the DRV's support of the Peking approach towards the "wars of 
national liberation." But in the after match of the Cuban episode and the Soviet 
Union's announcement that its military aid to India would continue, the DRV 
adopted a cautious approach. It was rather with the intention of not alienating 
the Soviet Union than with that of pleasing India that Ho Chi Minh softened his 
criticism of India and urged on November 24 that the Indian and Chinese 
leaders settle the dispute through negotiations. Ho Chi Minh, however, 
maintained that China's terms were reasonable and that India should accept 
them. Despite attempts to improve the mutual relationship of the two countries, 
Indo-North Vietnamese reladons became cool in mid-1962. Even the 
effectiveness of the staff in the Indian consulate-general in Hanoi was reduced 
as increasing curbs were placed on their movements by the North Vietnamese 
government. 
The only major issue in which India was somewhat involved in 1963 
was the Buddhist crisis. In mid-1963 the entire world was shocked by reports 
of self-immolation of Buddhist monks, nuns, and laymen in protest against the 
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policy of religious discrimination and repression of Ngo Dinh Diem's 
government in South Vietnam. Feelings ran high, particularly among fellow 
Buddhists in Asia, who had begun to feel closer to one another in the era of 
decolonization and in the wake of several assemblages of Buddhists in the 
1950's, one of which was held in India in celebration of 2,500"^ anniversary of 
Buddha's birth. As the land of Buddha's birth, India had been a rallying point, 
a place of pilgrimage for Buddhists from throughout Asia. When South 
Vietnam's Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau offered his resignation from Diem's 
government in protest against the repressive measures against the Buddhists 
and was granted instead "pilgrimage leave" for three months, he went to India. 
As a leader of the Afro-Asian world, India was approached for support by some 
Buddhist countries, which used the United Nations forum for inspiring global 
pressures to restore justice and human rights to the South Vietnamese 
Buddhists. Finally, India herself had a segment of Buddhist population-mostly 
converted in 1956 from the scheduled castes by their leader B. R. Ambedkar-
who called themselves neo-Buddhists. They provided the leadership for the 
agitation in the Indian capital in favor of their South Vietnamese fellow 
Buddhists, in whose behalf they urged the Indian government to act. 
Ceylon and Cambodia took the lead in canvassing World opinion and 
action for intervention in South Vietnam. On June 14, 1963, Norodom 
Sihanouk sent telegrams to the heads of state of India, Great Britain, France, 
and the United States, and to the secretary-general of the United Nations, 
appealing to them to urge the Dinh Diem government to stop the Buddhist 
persecution, which "threatened dangerously religious peace throughout 
Southeast Asia. Two days later, Buddhist leaders in Saigon sent telegrams to 
President Kennedy, U Thant, and Buddhist associations in a number of 
countries-including India- appealing for intervention. The prime minister of 
Ceylon, Mrs. Bandaranaike, led an effort to organize a conference of Buddhist 
countries in Colombo. She received favorable responses from India, Nepal, and 
Cambodia, but not adequate support irom Burma, Japan, and Thailand. In 
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August, Ceylon turned to the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations to urge 
support for convening a special session of the General Assembly to consider 
the question. 
Despite the fact that India responded favorably to all the suggestions 
made by Ceylon and Cambodia, she was slow and halfhearted in her reactions. 
The Indian government under Nehru's direction had always been reluctant to 
meddle in any religious situation, an attitude probably traceable to the Indian 
nationalist movement and to the multi-religious environment. Then, too, there 
was the general reluctance to interfere in a matter that, strictly speaking, was in 
the domestic sphere of South Vietnam. Only when the situation reached a point 
at which-like the racial discrimination and persecution in South Africa-it 
attracted world attention, was the Nehru government moved to some action. 
In June, 1963, with reports of the understanding reached between the 
government and the Buddhist leaders in South Vietnam, Nehru wrote to 
President Diem drawing his attention to Cambodia's Ceylon's representatives 
to India and expressing the hope that necessary action would be taken in 
"generous and liberal manner to remove any misunderstandings or fears that 
the Vietnamese Buddhists may have"."^ ^ From the third week of August 1963, 
when South Vietnam proclaimed martial law and Foreign Minister Vu Van 
Mau resigned, the Indian government was active. Vu Van Mau shaved his head 
like a Buddhist monk and proceeded to India on a pilgrimage. Although his 
visit was described as personal, Indian Foreign Secretary Y. D. Gundevia saw 
him, and the Indian government gave him all facilities and privileges. India 
preferred to treat the issue as a human rights problem rather than discuss all 
aspects of it. She was reluctant, for instance, to support moves for a discussion 
in the United Nations, because it might introduce many other factors and make 
it a cold-war issue, thereby hampering its solution.''^ This fact also explains 
India's initial reluctance to join the Afro-Asian countries in urging United 
Nations intervention. Instead, the Indian government agreed to Ceylon's 
proposal for a conference of all Buddhist countries, including China, despite 
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opposition in the Indian Parliament to sitting at the same table with China. 
Replying to the opposition's charge of double standards. Nehru said: 
We may have our conflict, as we have, with China and we 
may disapprove strongly oj what it has done. But the 
present purpose of this conference would he a different 
purpose...and for us not to participate in such a 
conference of Buddhists would, I think, be rather harmful 
to that cause and not do us any good. 
India, however, joined other Afro-Asian states in proposing, on 
September 4, 1963, that the question of the "Violation of Human Rights in 
south Vietnam" be given priority on the agenda of the eighteenth session of the 
United Nations General Assembly "in view of the urgency and importance of 
the subjecf. The move had some effect. Even before the United Nations debate 
opened, the president of the General Assembly received a letter from the South 
Vietnamese government inviting the representative of member states to visit 
Vietnam and "find out for themselves the true situation." Costa Rica moved a 
formal resolution seeking to instruct the president of the General Assembly to 
send an investigating mission to South Vietnam. 
The Soviet Union opposed the Costa Rican draft resolution, probably 
because it would not enable the Communist countries to participate in it. 
Instead, she proposed investigation by the ICC headed by India, a 
counterproposal not liked by most of the Afro-Asian countries, including India. 
India was reluctant to accept the undertaking that might give China and 
Pakistan an opportunity to grind out anti-Indian propaganda. Pakistan wanted 
to exploit the occasion by alleging Indian discrimination against the Muslim 
minority in Assam. India, instead, argued with the Russians that the ICC was a 
political body and that the problem in hand was one of human rights. Although 
Russia did not accept India's definition, she did accept India's request to 
withdraw her draft resolution. The president of the General Assembly then 
appointed a mission of Afghanistan, Brazil, Ceylon, Costa Rica, Dahomey, 
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Morocco, and Nepal to visit South Vietnam. It arrived in Saigon on October 24, 
1963. Within a week of its investigation, the situation had radically changed 
with the coup d'etant that ended Diem's regime-and his life.'^  
India, Indonesia, and Vietnam: Coincidence of Interest 
The Indian perceptions of the projected increase in Chinese capabilities 
and the uncertainties surrounding Chinese intentions that both Indochina and 
Indonesia have assumed added importance in terms of New Delhi's overall 
foreign policy concerns. These Indian perceptions have also had the effect of 
augmenting the centrality of roles traditionally prescribed by New Delhi for the 
pivotal countries in the two groupings-Vietnam and Indonesia in its overall 
approach towards Southeast Asia and the empathy demonstrated by it towards 
the fundamental concerns of Indonesian and Vietnamese foreign policies.''^ 
India's positive view of Indonesia and Vietnam has been immeasurably 
strengthened by the various degrees of antipathy towards China shared by the 
three countries. This shared concern has, in fact, led to the Indian perception 
that Vietnam and Indonesia form the kingpins of any strategy aimed at 
preventing the expansion of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. This Indian 
perception is buttressed by the fact that the Vietnamese and Indonesian 
antagonisms towards China area, if anything, based on even more solid 
historical foundations than is the case with India's attitude towards Beijing. 
The Chinese invasion of Vietnam particularly stirred anti-Chinese 
emotions in India for two reasons. First, it was launched while the Indian 
Foreign Minister, A. B. Vajpayee, was on a visit to China, the first such visit in 
two decades. The timing of the attack was a source of great embarrassment for 
the Indian government and the minister had to cut short his visit as an act of 
protest. At that time, New Delhi, inflating its own importance in Chinese 
calculations, interpreted the timing as a deliberate Chinese attempt to spoil 
India's relations with Vietnam. Second, and more important, the Chinese 
invasion of Vietnam very strongly reminded policy-makers and opinion 
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moulders in New Delhi of the Chinese incursion into India across the 
Himalayas in October 1962, also ostensibly to teach India a 'lesson'. This 
Indian image was strengthened by the Chinese statements issued at the time of 
the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, which were almost identical to those issued 
by Beijing during the Sino-Indian border war. Indonesian antipathy towards 
China, despite the aberration of Sukarno's last years, when Jakarta learned up 
with Beijing to confront what Sukarno considered to be Anglo-American 
designs in Southeast Asia deleterious to Indonesian interests, runs almost as 
deep as that of Vietnam. Based primarily on the indigenous Indonesians' 
negative perceptions of the 'exploitative', affluent and often-powerful Chinese 
minority in the country, it has been overlaid by the Indonesian ruling elite's 
strong aversion towards the communist character of the Chinese regime. 
Beijing's attempt to intervene in Indonesian domestic affairs in the 1950s, 
using as a medium the issue of the status of overseas Chinese, was a strong 
reminder to Jakarta that a powerful and stable central authority in China could 
be easily tempted to utilize the Chinese minority in the country to advance its 
own objectives in the region. 
Even more important, China's perceived role as the mentor of the 
Communist party of Indonesia (PKI) and its alleged encouragement of the 
latter's strategy of a gradual takeover of the country under the guise of support 
for Sukarno's policies and by the exclusion of the military-Sukarno's other 
support base from the effective exercise of power, totally alienated the military 
leadership from China as well as from the PKI. The abortive communist coup 
of 1965 proved to be the proverbial last straw as far as the Indonesian military 
leadership was concerned, confirming as it did the military's worst 
apprehensions regarding communist Chinese 'designs'. The breach in 
Indonesia's diplomatic relations with China that took place in the aftermath of 
the failed coup, and the takeover of power by the military under Suharto, has 
yet to be repaired. In the light of this background, it is not surprising that the 
Indonesian ruling elite considers China to be the primary source of external-
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cum-internal threat to Indonesia. Therefore, despite the fact that Jakarta 
continues to subscribe to the ASEAN consensus on the Kampuchean issue, the 
conflict in Indochina, particularly the Chinese punitive attack on Vietnam, has 
confirmed the predominant Indonesian perception that China poses the major 
threat to the Southeast Asian region as a whole. 
The increasing unpopularity and the shrinking base of the Saigon regime 
in the 1960s plus direct American involvement in the war against the NLF and 
North Vietnam tilted the balance of Indian sympathies once again in favour of 
Hanoi during the second half of the 1960s and thereafter. However, this tilt did 
not come about without considerable soul-searching and internal debate among 
India's foreign policy-makers, especially in the context of the Sino-Indian 
border war of 1962 and the continuing suspicion of communist North 
Vietnam's subversive designs. As one Indian specialist on Southeast Asia has 
pointed out, even after America's direct involvement in the Vietnam war "in 
some quarters in New Delhi it was mistakenly held that America was doing the 
job in Southeast Asia for us, namely taming the Chinese power. Nothing could 
be more thoughtless and unimaginative'. 
The North Vietnamese attempt during the second half of the 1960s and 
the first half of the 1970s to maintain equidistance, as far as possible, from both 
Beijing and Moscow, India's increasingly warm relationship with the latter 
(particularly in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute), and the realization that 
Hanoi's support to Beijing was tactical rather than strategic and that the 
situation could be reversed if Hanoi had the option to do so, all contributed to 
the change in New Delhi's perception of North Vietnam and a return to its 
earlier stance of the 1954-56 period, which had been more sympathetic to 
Hanoi than to Saigon. However, it is worth noting that India recognized the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) only in January 1972 and that this act 
was directly linked to Indian ire over the American decision to deploy a naval 
task force led by the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal during 
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the Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971 as a demonstration of American 
support to Pakistan and as a warning signal, however ineffective to India. 
Similarly, Indian relations with Indonesia ran into difficulties during the 
last years of the Sukarno era. During that period the divergent Indian and the 
Indonesian perceptions of the role of the Non-Aligned Movement in an 
essentially bipolar world, their widely different views regarding the convening 
of a 'second Bandung Conference' of Afro-Asian states and of its prospective 
membership, the Indonesian leader's perception of his country's role in the 
Indian Ocean, Jakarta's alignment with Beijing as a part of its 'grand strategy' 
to combat 'imperialism', India's support for the idea of a Malaysian federation 
and its sub-sequent tilt in favour of Kuala Lumpur during the period of the 
confrontation and, in retaliation, the Indonesian political and military support to 
Pakistan in its confrontation with India over Kashmir, all added up to a 
relatively tense atmosphere in the bilateral relations between the two 
countries.^^ The divergent stances adopted by Nehru and Sukarno at the first 
Non-Aligned summit in Belgrade in September 1961 on anti-colonialism on the 
one hand and the importance of world peace in a nuclear age on the other, 
symbolized the beginning of overt deterioration in Indo-Indonesian relations-a 
process that culminated in the 1963-1965 period, which included the Indian 
moral support to Malaysia in its confrontation with Indonesia and the latter's 
moral and material support to Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 
September 1965." 
That the Indonesian assistance to Pakistan could have led to a direct 
military confrontation between Indian and Indonesia is borne out by the 
testimony of a leading expert of Indian naval power, Raju Thomas. According 
to him, "Despite the Indian navy's non-participation (in the Indo-Pakistan war 
of 1965), some reports indicate that these might have been an Indonesian naval 
threat during the war. President Sukarno, who had recently acquired a US $ 1 
billion navy from the Soviet Union, had made vague threats to intercede on the 
Pakistan side. Later, Pakistan's Air Marshal Asghar Khan revealed in his 
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memoirs Ihal Sukarno had in fact offered to divert Indian attention from 
Pakistan by seizing the Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Bay of Bengal'.^'' 
Raju Thomas further asserted that, ''Although the Pakistani naval threat was 
never substantial, naval threats have been perceived (by India) previously from 
Indonesia under Sukarno and from Iran under the Shah, whose states had 
substantial numbers of imposing combat vessels. However, since the fall of 
both leaders, Indonesian and Iranian naval forces have declined and show no 
tendency of further development that would seriously threaten the Indian navy. 
In spite of these favourable conditions, the potential for growth by the 
Pakistani, Indonesian, and Iranian navies is still perceived as considerable 
especially because all three states possess either substantial foreign exchange 
reserves or have access to such income. All three states also have the capacity 
to train efficient and capable naval manpower".^^ 
It is interesting to note that the momentum for bilateral discussions built 
up in the early days of the Suharto regime has been maintained throughout the 
last two decades with periodic discussions between the two countries held 
regularly ranging from the Foreign Minister's level to meetings between 
delegations of the Indonesian Centre for Strategic and International studies and 
the Indian Institute for Defence studies and Analyses. 
Despite these exchanges and the generally cordial atmosphere, 
Indonesian suspicions of Indian 'designs' have not totally disappeared. These 
suspicions are related partially to the divergent Indian and Indonesian 
perceptions of the two superpowers, especially to Indonesia's residual mistrust, 
a legacy of the abortive communist coup of 1965, of the Soviet Union, which 
continues to be India's major arms supplier, a role it had once performed for 
Sukarno's Indonesia. However, more importantly, they are the products of 
geographic proximity of India to Indonesian, particularly of India's island 
territories of Andaman and Nicobar in the Bay of Bengal, which are barely 90 
miles from the straits of Malacca and literally next door to the Indonesia island 
of Sumatra. Indonesian concerns about Indian intentions have been recently 
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heightened by India's attempts to augment its naval power and acquire a power 
projection capabiHty in the vicinity of the subcontinent. 
New Delhi's renewed preoccupation with China has, in turn, boosted the 
importance of Southeast Asia in the eyes of the Indian decision-making elite 
because of the region's close proximity to both India and China and the fact 
that it has been long considered a meeting ground of Chinese and Indian 
cultural and political influences. 
It is worth pointing out here, that even during the heyday of the Indian 
obsession with Pakistan, the more perceptive members of India's foreign policy 
and defence community were firmly of the opinion that, while Pakistan posed 
an immediate, short-term threat to Indian security, the long-term threat to 
India's security and its status came from China. This view was, and is, based 
on the assumption that while conflict with Pakistan is a more likely possibility 
than a war with China in the short run, Pakistan's capacity, even with the help 
of sophisticated American weapons, to hurt India's vital interests is limited by 
the sheer asymmetry in indigenous resources that can be mobilized by the two 
neighbours in time of conflict. Furthermore, American support to Pakistan can 
be matched and neutralized by Soviet support to India, thereby making the 
outcome of an Indo-Pakistan conflict primarily dependent on the inherent 
resources and capabilities possessed by the two sides. 
This, of course, gives India tremendous advantage except in the case of 
a two-front war, when New Delhi could be faced with coordinated attacks by 
both Pakistan and China. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan is not 
expected to make a great deal of difference to this situation given the load that 
India possesses over Pakistan in terms of nuclear technology." 
In the light of power asymmetry between India and Pakistan, it is 
understandable why the Indian perception of the 'Chinese threat' is almost 
exactly the opposite of such long-term complacency, but short-term 
preoccupation, with the threat from Pakistan. This analysis is based on the 
calculation that not only has China in the past demonstrated its military 
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superiority over India in the border conflict of 1962, but it is more than a match 
for India in demographic terms, and has built an impressive industrial and 
technological infrastructure which is reflected not only in its conventional 
military power but also in its capacity to produce and deliver sophisticated 
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nuclear weapons. 
It is in this context of India's self-perceived strategic inferiority vis-a-vis 
China that the latter's current modernizations programme, especially its 
upgrading of military equipment with the help of technological transfers from 
the west and Japan, its role as the balancer in the triangular balance of power in 
the Asia-Pacific region among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, 
and recent moves towards rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing, have 
combined to heighten India's sense of insecurity in relation to its larger Asian 
neighbour/^ 
The last factor, the brighter prospects for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, 
has particularly added to Indian concerns about the future direction of Chinese 
foreign policy especially as it might pertain to China's immediate regional 
environment, which includes both Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent. 
The major Indian worry in this regard is related not so much to the effects of a 
thaw in Sino-Soviet relations on the Soviet-Indian relationship, as to its effects 
on Chinese policy in China's immediate neighbourhood once Beijing is 
relieved of the uncertainty, both political and military, which has in the past 
accompanied Soviet pressures on China's northern borders. 
These Indian concerns have led to an increase in India's interest in 
Southeast Asia, with the objective of finding complementarily of interests with 
countries of the region in an attempt, among other things, to contain the likely 
growth of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. In New Delhi's perception, an 
increase in Chinese influence in Southeast Asia could possibly embolden 
Bejing also to challenge India on the latter's doorsteps in South Asia, 
particularly in the sub-Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan, or 
alternatively, to gang up with Pakistan to leach India yet another 'lesson'. 
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China's policy of alternately blowing hot and cold in the last few years at the 
on-again off-again border negotiations between the two countries, and the 
escalation of China's hostile rhetoric regarding territories in northeastern India 
considered 'disputed' by Beijing, have been viewed by New Delhi as part of a 
Chinese strategy that does not rule out renewed confrontation with India.''" 
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CONCLUSION 
India has over two thousand years of mutually beneficial and cultural 
relations with the countries and people of Southeast Asia. But the first step in 
the direction of spreading knowledge about Southeast Asia was taken with the 
establishment of Greater Indian Society in Calcutta in 1926. This was the first 
scholarly attempt by Indians themselves towards rehabilitating their ancient 
history of cultural expansions in Java and other islands across the Bay of 
Bengal. With India's freedom was linked the freedom of Burma, Malaya, 
Indonesia, and Indochina. At the Brussels Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
Secretary-General of the Indian National Congress had an opportunity to meet, 
among others, the Indonesian and Indochinese delegates. He evinced keen 
interest especially in the Indonesian representatives, in understanding the 
Indonesian people, their names, their religion and culture. 
These early contacts, at later stages, rendered the freedom struggles in 
India and Southeast Asia mutually complementary. With Nehru having been 
greatly influenced by the deliberations at the Brussels Congress, the attitude 
of the Indian National Congress towards foreign policy issues, particularly 
those relating to the freedom struggles in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in 
Asia, had grown quite assertive. 
The enormous fund of goodwill as bequeathed by a long history of 
commercial interaction provided a sound basis for evolving a new Southeast 
Asia policy. As compared to China, another major Asian power, having 
centuries old relationship with the countries of the region, India had a decisive 
advantage. It could start with a clean state, since with only one exception in the 
eleventh century, India had no record of imperialistic ventures in the area. 
India's relations with Southeast Asia had all along been based on peace and 
harmony. If the basis of this relationship in the past was provided by cultural 
exchange, the core content of it for the present was bound to be trade and 
commerce. It also required a deeper understanding of the forces at work in the 
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region and the rest of Asia, such as those of nationahsm asserting to break the 
chains of colonial slavery and emerging as independent political entities on the 
world scene. 
Different terminologies were used by different people of different 
countries. For example the early Indian navigators and merchants identified the 
region by names as Suvemadvipa (Island of Gold). Suvernabhumi or 
Kanakapuri (land or city of gold) variably referred to Burma, Malaya and 
Sumatra. 
Geographically, the present Southeast Asia is divided into two parts, 
continental Southeast Asia comprising Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, 
Vietnam, and Malaysia. And insular Southeast Asia comprising the island 
republics of Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia. In the IQ"' century 
continental Southeast Asia became the arena of confrontation between the 
British and French colonialism. Since the 18'^  century insular Southeast Asia 
was the scene of British and Dutch colonialism they were the three "super-
powers" playing their game of power politics of the 19^ ^ century in Southeast 
Asia later enjoined by the Americans. 
The term Southeast Asia is of recent origin. It gained currency as 
political entity only during World War II when the territories, the South of 
tropics were placed under Lord Mountbatten's Southeast Asia command to 
repulse the Japanese forces from the region. Thus the region owes initially its 
first perception to the strategic requirements of external powers. The region 
became more significant after the end of World War II because of its strategic 
location. The region consists of a vast stretch of land in the East of India, South 
of China and in the North of Australia. It lies between pacific and Indian Ocean 
and China Sea and serves as a bridge connecting the Southeast Asian countries 
on one side and Australia and New Zealand on the others. 
Historically and culturally, India was very close to the countries of 
Southeast Asia. Historically Southeast Asian region was not perceived as an 
area having any geographical unity but was essenliaUy an expression of 
convenience over a zone of extreme human diversit)'. 
Since the region Hes in the close proximity o( India and China, both the 
countries have influenced Southeast Asian political and cultural life to a great 
extent. The principal agencies of cultural change in Southeast Asia, since the 
mid 19' century, came from the highly industrialized states of West. The 
Western countries took over the direction of colonialism from Chartered 
companies and from traditional cultural influence emanating from India and 
China. The European control brought many far-reaching changes in the 
political, economic and cultural life of Southeast Asian nations. They put to an 
end the persisting dynastic rivalries in interstate relations by bringing the 
region under their rule through negotiations, intrigues or force or through a 
combination of all the three. In order to serve their colonial objectives, these 
Western powers introduced many changes in the existing political, 
administrative, social and cultural systems in the region. 
On the eve of India's freedom from British colonialism, all factors, such 
as history, geo-politics, strategic security environment vast economic potential 
of the area, pointed to the necessity of a new thinking and a new approach to 
the region. 
In the post colonial era, because of the new alignments among the ex-
colonial powers, the region emerged as an area of substantial importance from 
strategic, economic and political perspectives. 
The Indian foreign policy had been evolving through a pretty long 
period of her struggle against colonial rule in which Nehru's contributions is 
quite signiificant and decisive. The basic idea that dominated Nehru's mind in 
the field of foreign policy was that the United States of America and the Soviet 
Union, both have emerged as the prime move of contemporary history. Nehru 
did not seem to regard China in any way different from India in terms of actual 
power to influence history. Nehru inspired hopes to develop multi-sided 
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relations with Asian and African countries in general and with China in 
particular on the basis of Panchshecl. 
The strategic importance of Southeast Asia to India was evident to 
India's perspective policy-makers and strategic thinkers even before the 
transfer of power from British to Indian hands. The events of the Second World 
War, especially the dramatic Japanese sweep through Southeast Asia have 
driven home the lesson to India's nationalist elite that India's approaches to the 
subcontinent were as important for India's defence as the land boundaries of 
the northern-west and the north which have been traditional concerns of 
strategists during the days of British Raj. The later attitude was understandable 
in the context of the British Indian Empire because Britain was the 
unchallenged master of the sea around the subcontinent until the Japanese drive 
into Southeast Asia, however, it had to change under the dual-impact of Second 
World War and the withdrawal of British power from India. 
The events of the war also increased Indian awareness and concern with 
maritime strategy and the great importance of the Indian Ocean to the defence 
of the India. The strategic importance of Southeast Asia to India was enhanced 
in Indian perceptions, especially since it commanded the main points from 
which hostile naval forces could enter the Indian Ocean, particularly the Bay of 
Bengal. 
The region became politically significant only after World War II. The 
strategic location of the region and the emergence of China as Communist 
nation in the close proximity of the region made the region prone to Cold War 
conflagrations. The weak political and economic system of the newly 
independent states, their sense of insecurity and numerous internal and external 
pressures provided incentives to external powers to involve themselves in the 
region. It is because of strategic, economic and political significance of the 
region that it was made a theater of Cold War and the integrity, independence 
and security of the region was threatened. 
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The economic relations with Southeast Asia formed an important, 
aUhough secondary, component of hidia's overall pattern of economic 
transactions with the outside World. A pattern of interdependence based on 
mutual needs of different primary commodities with which India and the 
various countries of Southeast Asia were endowed, coupled with easy access to 
each other markets formed the bedrock on which this superstructure of 
economic relations was constructed. 
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru, India realized the 
intricacies of the complex World situation as well as the potential possibilities 
of interaction between India and Southeast Asia. This is obvious from the 
frequent exchange of visits between the Indian and Southeast Asian leaders, so 
also from bilateral treaties and agreements signed in various fields between 
India and some countries of the region. 
A substantial input into India's relations with Southeast Asia came from 
the establishment and operation of the Indian National Army towards the end 
of the Second World War. Inspired by the speeches of Subhash Chandra Bose, 
many Indians in Southeast Asia (especially in Thailand, Malaya, Singapore 
and Burma) joined the INA (Indian National Army) and also offered 
considerable financial support to it. For the first time, Indian communities in 
the region came to have a closer feeling of belonging to one mother country. 
India supported Indonesia against the Dutch Police Actions during the 
freedom struggle and went to the U.N. Security Council and reiterated its stand 
that Indonesian nationalism could not be suppressed by weapons and wars 
because it "epitomizes the spirit that is stirring the whole of Asia". The Indian 
representative urged the Security Council to meet this emergency by ordering 
immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of Dutch troops to the line demarcated by 
Renville Agreement and release of all Indonesian leaders. As usual Security 
Council passed a resolution on Indonesian question but there was no positive 
outcome. 
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While the Indonesian question was being considered at the U.N., Nehru 
also convened a Conference of 18 Asian nations at New Delhi to discuss it on 
20 ' January 1949. Whereas the Dutch government was stunned when it heard 
the news of Nehru convening a Conference to discuss the "internal affairs of 
another country". The Conference passed three resolutions recommending the 
following to the Security Council - the release of all political prisoners, 
freedom 1o the republican government to function independently, formation of 
an Interim Government comprising of the representatives of Republic of 
Indonesia and non-republic territories by 15"^  March 1949, which should enjoy 
full powers. Nehru sent these recommendations to the Security Council with 
assurance of full cooperation to end colonial rule in Indonesia. The Security 
Council accepted the demands of the New Delhi Conference and passed a 
resolution on 28' January 1949 embodying most of them. Having noticed that 
the Dutch did not pay heed to Security Council resolution, India took another 
initiative and with the support of Australian delegation requested the U. N. 
General Assembly to take up the matter on 11 "^  May 1949. 
On the other hand, the Dutch Government was in a very difficult 
position in Indonesia. It was not able to control the situation either militarily or 
politically. Hence, there was a change in their attitude. Just 48 hours before the 
General Assembly debate on this question, it entered into an agreement with 
the Indonesian leaders paving the way for a Round Table Conference held at 
The Hague from 23''^ August to 2"" November 1949. As a result of it the 
prolonged struggle against colonial rule came to an end on 27^ ^ December 1949 
with complete transfer of powers to the Republic of Indonesia. 
It is also interesting to note that India's attitude towards the anti-British 
insurgency following the Second World War and the re-imposition of British 
control in Malaya was remarkably different from the one, it adopted in regard 
to the anti-colonial insurgencies in Indonesia and Indochina. This difference 
can be directly traced to the nature of the Malayan insurgency, which was 
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Communist, largely confined to the ethnic Chinese in the country and with 
close links to the Chinese Communist Party. 
The emergence of the Federation of Malaya, which is now known as 
Malaysia as a sovereign state on 31^' August 1957 was widely acclaimed in 
India. The Government of India always showed keen interest in the 
constitutional advancement of Malaysia and Singapore. Naturally this 
development caused great jubilation everywhere. New Delhi sent a ministerial 
level delegation headed by S. K. Patil, Minister of Irrigations and Power to 
participate in the independence celebrations held at Kuala Lumpur. On the 
occasion when Malaya joined United Nations, India expressed happiness at her 
becoming a member of the United Nations. Indian leader Krishna Menon said 
that it was a happy augury for the Assembly that it had admitted a new state so 
early in its session. India approved Malaysia's membership of the 
Commonwealth and its acceptance of a military alliance with Britain. There 
was all round cooperation between the two nations. Soon after attaining 
independence, Malaysia faced an acute shortage of trained personnel. India 
assisted Malaysia in this respect. The Indian Government sought to secure 
equal rights for all Malaysian citizens irrespective of their origin. 
Before the issue of Malaysia came to have a bearing on Indonesian 
relations, the two countries had witnessed a certain coolness developing 
between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President Sukarno, on both 
ideological and personal levels. The two leaders had openly manifested the 
differences in their approaches to the issues of colonialism and World peace at 
the Conference of non-aligned states at Belgrade in September 1961. 
Both Malaysia and Singapore had unreservedly and unmistakably 
supported India against China during the border war of 1962. Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, then Prime Minister had, in fact, setup a fund (The Fund was named 
Save Democracy Fund) to assist India, of which he was himself the Chairman. 
Both Malaysia and Singapore regarded China as a subverting power and were 
most suspicious of it. There was a time when Singapore's Lee Kuan-Yew 
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would have welcomed an Indian naval presence in this region and after China's 
nuclear bang suggested that Indian should also explode a nuclear bomb, at least 
for the sake of Southeast Asia, even if she wanted to throw it into the sea later. 
They needed some power and quite obviously it would be far preferable to 
have an Asian power, to counter balance the strength and hostility of China. 
India sponsored the membership of Malaysia for the second Afro-Asian 
Conference scheduled to be held in 1964 (but subsequently called off), for 
which Sukarno was greatly displeased and China highly annoyed. By doing so 
India incurred the hostility of Indonesia and Sukarno discarded neutrality on 
the Kashmir issue and perceptibly tilted towards Pakistan. On the other hand 
the Malaysian Prime Minister emphasized the cordial relations with India. 
There was an implied criticism of Pakistan too. Pakistan, he said, had joined 
SEATO, which was purported to have been set up against Communist 
aggression. 
It is interesting to note that although Indonesia's initial reaction to the 
Malaysia no proposal was one of "no objection", it was not without caution. 
This was clear from Subandrio's words "will for freedom of the peoples 
concerned". It was just this caution, which, at the time of the Borneo revolt in 
December 1962, provided a justification for the Indonesian policy of 
confrontation with Malaysia. The Government of Indonesia perhaps wanted to 
watch the developments carefully for some time before taking a definite stand 
on the issue of Malaysia. 
Another important issue that fitted well into Prime Minister Nehru's 
Asia policy was the Vietnamese struggle for freedom from French colonialism. 
Keeping in view India's all out support to the Indonesian nationalists in their 
fight against the Dutch, it was very much expected that the Vietnamese 
freedom movement would likewise attract India's attention and active 
involvement. However, India's effort in this direction lacked the same 
enthusiasm. Nehru's enthusiasm was probably restrained by the fact that the 
Vietnamese nationalist struggle was dommated by the Communist leadership. 
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However, a significant development in the field of international politics, 
at this stage, prompted Prime Minister Nehru to shed his earlier hesitation and 
take an initiative with regards to the deteriorating situation in Indochina. 
Of all the anticolonial movements in Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese 
struggle for freedom was probably the most complex. The Geneva settlement 
on Indochina was based on the recognition of the need and practicability of 
peaceful, co-existence of states of differmg ideologies, especially China vis-a-
vis the Indochina states. 
The diplomatic moves on the part of the United States to exclude India 
from all aspects of negotiations regarding Indochina and Southeast Asia 
irritated the Indian government and public opinion. Nehru resented the fact that 
discussions on such an important issue affecting Asia were to be carried on in 
Europe, principally by non-Asian powers. 
Nehru's proposals in essence asked all foreign powers to keep their 
hands off Indochina, whose independence, peace, and neutrality were to be 
guaranteed by the major powers through the United Nations. It was due to 
Nehru's efforts that the representatives of North and South Vietnam meet in 
July 1955, to prepare for all-Vietnam elections, and the agreement were 
reached about the withdrawal of Communist troops and guerillas from Laos 
and Cambodia, where elections were to be held in 1955. 
The Geneva settlement on Indochina included three cease-fire 
agreements, eight unilateral declarations, and the final declarations of the 
Conference. In effect, the settlement recognized the independence of Laos, 
Cambodia and Vietnam and the principle of Vietnamese unity. Vietnam was 
temporarily placed under two separate administrations, the provisional 
demarcation line being the seventeenth parallel. The region North of line was 
to be under Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Southern 
area under Bao Dai's state of Vietnam. The future of the divided country was 
to be determined by a free and secret election to be held two years later. 
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Nehru characterized the Indochincsc settlement as "one of the 
outstanding achievements in international diplomacy in the post-war era". In 
India, the Geneva settlement was hailed as a signal success of Indian foreign 
policy. 
India played an active role in bringing peace in Indochina. It is true that 
India was not invited to the Geneva Conference, but behind the scene, activities 
of Krishna Menon in Geneva brought the parties closer to a settlement, but the 
stalemate in Vietnam continued. A political settlement had not been reached 
and the Commission was faced with many problems. No progress had been 
made towards consultations between the competent representatives of the two 
zones on unification on the basis of elections, besides the role of chairman of 
the International Commission for Supervision and Control. India's opinion on 
vexed problems was considered valuable by the countries of this region. 
The two Big Powers, UK and France, which took the initiative to 
negotiate the Indochina settlement should have also participated in the Manila 
Conference and agreed to set up the SEA TO was all the more odd, if not worse. 
If their real object was to ensure security for the Southeast Asian region, then, 
suggested Nehru, the People's Republic of China must be recognized and 
allowed to come into the United Nations, thereby China would have assumed 
certain responsibilities as a member of the United Nations. That would have 
been a far better way of ensuring security than the creation of the SEATO. In 
fact, the Government and people of India strongly believed that there could be 
no settlement either in East or Southeast Asia unless the existence of China was 
acknowledged by the Western Powers and given its rightful place in the 
community of nations. Perhaps, partly as a result of the belated recognition of 
this vital truth, the dominant powers of the SEATO allowed the Organization to 
languish slowly without achieving anything. It is significant to note that two 
years after the establishment of the Organization it 'neither excited its 
supporters nor frightened its opponents' and the military arrangements of the 
SEATO were not "politically disastrous.' 
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During the period of 1955-1958 Cambodia's policy was similar to India 
in International Affairs, because Cambodia's international position was 
approximated that of India, although Cambodia used the term "neutral" as 
against India's preference for being called "non-aligned". Both countries were 
anticolonial and denounced military alliances with either bloc, particularly 
SEATO. Both countries willingly accepted economic aid from East and the 
West, and opened their doors to welcome dignitaries from the Western World 
as well as from the Communist countries. On major international issues in the 
United Nations and elsewhere, where the choice lay between the Communists 
and the "free World", they voted for neither, but preferred to stand with the 
Afro-Asian bloc of countries, often led by India. But there were differences 
between the two nations on the recognition of Communist China. India had 
been among the first to recognize Communist China, while Cambodia did not 
recognize it even after an official visit by Sihanouk to Peking. Another 
difference in the motivation of the two countries in adopting the policy of 
neutrality. Cambodia had adopted neutrality after experiencing frustration in 
securing a firm commitment from the United States or SEATO to assign troops 
or to enter an alliance specially for Cambodia's protection. For India, non-
alignment was an article of faith, bom out of deep spiritual and ideological 
convictions. India's non-alignment had helped her to adopt an independent 
attitude on every issue, particularly those that tended to polarize the World. 
Inspite of some differences between India and Cambodia, India supported 
Cambodia in the dispute between Cambodia and her neighbours. 
Throughout the period from 1955-1958 Cambodia's relations with India 
continued to be most cordial, whereas her relations with China could at best be 
characterized as formal. Cambodia's uncertain ground of neutrality until almost 
the end of 1959, when her relations with China grew positively friendly and she 
learned progressively there after on her powerful Communist neighbour's 
support. In July 1958, at the height of Cambodia's dispute with South Vietnam 
and Thailand, Prince Norodom Sihanouk announced recognition of China and 
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followed the announcement by a fourteen-day state visit to China. During this 
visit Chou-En-Lai assured Sihanouk that China would not interfere in 
Cambodia's internal affairs. Moreover, China condemned South Vietnam and 
Thailand for their hostility towards peaceful Cambodia. 
Despite lack of special attention to Cambodia in Indian policy and its 
inability to assist Cambodia in the latter's disputes with its neighbours, India's 
influence was still more significant than was China's in Cambodian official 
circles until 1959. Cambodia actually followed a neutral foreign policy, which 
was closer to Indian than to Chinese policy. India's support on certain issues 
were taken for granted, and Sihanouk continued to acknowledge Nehru's 
superior stature among the non-aligned nations as well as in overall World 
affairs. 
India has maintained intimate relations with Burma (Myanmar) since 
earliest times. Burma fell under the influence of Buddhism, which still 
continues to be a dominant element in Burma's social life. The country was 
conquered by the British and made a part of the Indian Empire. The conquest 
of Burma by the British started with the conquest of Arakan and Tennasse 
coast in 1826, followed by annexation of lower Burma in 1852 and upper 
Burma in 1856. 
During the British rule over Burma the Indian merchants and 
moneylenders greatly exploited the country, which gave rise to anti-Indian 
feeling among the people. An uprising was organized against the Indian and 
Chinese settlers, which culminated in the separations of Burma from India in 
1935 and it became a separate entity within the British Empire. 
During the Second World War Burma declared itself as independent 
with the assistance of the Japanese in 1943. After the surrender of Japan, 
Burma again passed under Allied Forces. The Burmese people launched 
struggle for complete independence and firmly rejected the offer of 'Dominion 
status' made to them by the British in 1945. Ultimately the country achieved 
independence in January 1948 after the colonial rule of 122 years. 
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India's role in the Laotian crises of 1963 and 1964 best indicates the 
diminished importance of India in World affairs. In 1960-61, when the ICC 
(International Control Commission) was not even functioning in Laos, Nehru's 
good offices had been eagerly sought by the East and the West in trying to 
extinguish the flames of war in Laos. But in 1963-64, despite ICC's existence 
under India's chairmanship. India figured little in the peacemaking efforts. 
Besides the fact of Indian preoccupation with her own problems of defense and 
diplomacy against China and Pakistan, India's ability to play a mediatory role 
between the two blocs had been severely circumscribed. For example, India no 
longer had any leverage with the North Vietnamese that could be used to bear 
upon the Pathet Lao (PL). 
The neutralization of Laos in mid-1962 had been achieved largely 
because the United States and the Soviet Union had recognized the futility of 
making any headway toward gaining definitive influence in that country. The 
United States had spend 265 million dollars in a country with less than two 
million inhabitants and had no chance of turning the country into a "bastion of 
anti-Communism." The Soviet Union, on its part had realized that Laos was too 
distant and too unreliable as a satellite even if arms could be supplied to the 
neutralist and pro-Communist factions. In May 1961, Khrushchev had 
declared, "the domestic policy of Laos cannot and should not be determined by 
the USSR or the USA or other countries." His meeting with President Kennedy 
in Vienna in June produced a joint communique proposing the political and 
military neutralization of Laos, to be guaranteed by international agreements. 
Realists in the Soviet Union and the United States would have conceded, 
however, that Laos was being written off by the two powers to domination by 
China and North Vietnam-who, along with the Pathet Lao, were the only ones 
to gain. The Pathet Lao secured recognition at Geneva and thereafter became a 
part of the troika government in Laos. 
The Sino-Indian border war of October-November, 1962 is considered 
by many political scientists as a watershed in India's domestic as well as 
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foreign policy. It was generally believed in India and abroad that by accepting 
military aid from the West, principally the United States, the very basis of non-
alignment was removed but this was not so. It is true that most Indians 
including Prime Minister Nehru were shaken up by the magnitude and success 
of the Chinese offensive. Nehru himself confessed in an appeal to his 
countrymen: "I want you all to realize the shock we suffered during the last 
week or so. We were getting out of tough with the realities of the modem 
World. We were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation, and we 
have been shocked out of it". Despite his earlier denounciations of countries 
receiving military aid, he did not hesitate to ask for and accept material rushed 
by the Western countries to bolster India's effort. But during this darkest hour 
in Indian history, Nehru succeeded in surmounting the emotion-changed 
atmosphere. 
India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962 exposed her economic and 
military v/eakness, which greatly undermined her prestige. With the exception 
of the countries of region who were camp-followers of the Western countries, 
most of the other countries preferred to remain neutral. These countries did 
take initiative to arrange direct negotiations between India and China, but could 
not succeed. Thus India's strained relations with Indonesia and China 
prevented her playing a significant role in the Southeast Asia. The pro-West 
countries of Southeast Asia tried to utilize this opportunity to build a broad 
alliance against China with Indian collaborations. The non-aligned countries 
were reluctant to develop close relations with India at the cost of straining their 
relations with China, which emerged as a mighty Asian power. Soviet Union, 
however, showed greater understanding of the Indian problem. In short as a 
result of these developments a sort of stalemate was created in India's relations 
with the countries of Southeast Asia. India's relations with the countries of 
Southeast Asia entered a new phase after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. 
During the war Indonesia extended whole-hearted support to Pakistan and 
described India as an aggressor. North Vietnam and Cambodia also criticized 
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India, largely because of her failure to take a firm stand against the U.S. 
aggression. Malaysia, however, maintained neutrality. However, the victory 
scored by India over Pakistan restored her lost prestige in Southeast Asia. The 
new leadership abandoned pro-Peaking and pro-Pakistan posture and showed 
eagerness to normalize relations with India. This was naturally viewed with 
great relief by India, which tried to cultivate more intimate political, economic 
and commercial relations with Indonesia. 
The co-operation of Southeast Asian countries and India has favourable 
prospects of development. This is guaranteed by the common position shared 
by the countries of this region and India in regard to vital international issues, 
their mutual interest in strengthening and expanding their economic ties and 
friendship, which has become traditional. Southeast Asia and India's friendship 
is growing stronger from year to year, and there is no doubt that the future will 
be marked by new steps made in this direction which so far are to the greatest 
benefit for the people of these countries and for the cause of universal peace. 
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